

THE ANNALIST


A Magazine of Finance, Commerce and Economics

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Ten Cents

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NEW YORK, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1920

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Wanted—A Foreign Trade Policy for the United States

Hundreds of Millions of Dollars of American Credit Are Being Advanced to Foreign Cities and Countries With Scant Attention Paid to the Policies and Principles of the Federal Reserve Board or the Brussels Conference

By EDWARD A. BRADFORD

CONTROLLER WILLIAMS charged that the usurious call loan policy of our banks was choking our commerce just as our money market was snapping up foreign and domestic loans in a manner which surprises all observers. Since the first of last month nearly \$400,000,000 of new loans have been offered and taken, some of them within the hour of offering. There are definite reports of \$225,000,000 more to come, and it is said that, if the market holds, this amount may be doubled. On Thursday last there were offerings of \$55,000,000 in a single day, and observers of the municipal bond market think that this year's total issued will double the previous maximum.

There has been nothing like it since the offering of the Liberty loans, and there are reasons why the smaller flotations are the more remarkable. There is neither propaganda nor patriotism to support them. They are offered on money market terms alone, and need no defense along those lines. The domestic loans are so familiar that nothing need be said about them at this time. The foreign loans stand on a different basis. They are issued by several cities and countries, all of good credit, and sponsored here by bankers of highest standing for probity and patriotism. In normal times the terms would be regarded as excessively favorable for the lenders and almost as usurious as the call money allegations against our bankers.

Clearly there are funds for favored borrowers, regardless of the grip of the "call money usurers" on our commerce. The Controller was unfortunate in that phrase, for there is nothing in common between call money and commerce. The distinction is as clear as that between speculators and traders, in either securities or commodities. In neither can positions be taken and held through a trade period on money subject to recall without notice. Only speculators can change their minds and positions between two days. There is, of course, an ellipsis in the Controller's expression. He meant that the call money market reacted upon the supply of time funds, and that they were made too dear for traders to use. That is closer to the mark, but does not quite hit the centre. Eight per cent. money is too dear for traders to use, and that is why there is cause for regret that it is being supplied so plentifully for foreign borrowers, who are overbidding many of our domestic traders.

NATIONAL POLICY ABSENT

The regret is not that the loans are foreign, for foreign loans are a necessity of the times, but that they are offered and taken as though the times were normal, and that there is nothing to be thought of but the relations between the specific borrowers and lenders. Of national policy or regulation there is not a trace. Equally forgotten are the principles declared by the Federal Reserve Board and the Brussels conference. Those declarations are harmonious, and so commonplace that it seems to be thought that they may be disregarded with safety. The declaration at Brussels by our unofficial representative that Europe was not a good business risk under present conditions was little more than a paraphrase of the views of Secretary Glass when he was at the Treasury, which were repeated by his successor, Mr. Houston. Mr. Boyden's summary of the Brussels conference

may be recalled in his own words, because it serves to remind us, as well as the nations represented at Brussels, of the policy of our Treasury and Federal Reserve. Said Mr. Boyden: "The Brussels conference will accomplish great good by calling attention to the fact that two and two still make four, that expenditure still has relation to income, that prices must be high when stocks have been depleted, that production is low, that waste makes necessities dear, and that paper money is worth exactly what it will buy."

The bearing of those commonplaces appears from the findings of the conference itself. Eleven out of each twelve countries represented anticipate a deficit, and Governments are incited by popular opinion to incur fresh expenditures which only aggravate the evils needing remedy. Government expenditures of borrowed funds defeat the reduction of the cost of living. That is dependent upon increase of production, which is obstructed now by expenditure of 20 per cent. of national revenues on armaments. The first steps necessary are the balancing of budgets, the stoppage of inflation of currencies, the abandonment of unproductive expenditures, and the restriction of extraordinary expenditure to the lowest possible amount. The artificial cheapening of the necessities of life by selling below cost at Government expense, subsidies to the unemployed, and the demoralization of industry in similar ways by the expenditure of tax moneys, are all condemned. Taxation should be substituted for loans, and economies should be practiced by the people themselves.

It would be idle to say that the foreign loans so freely made here are in accordance with these fundamentals of sound finance. Still less are they conditioned upon them. Loans to cities and countries are loans to the taxing power, and are in remote relation to production, either here or there. The taxing power can outbid producers because it is without economic limitation. By borrowing abroad these cities and countries avoid the limitations of domestic credit, and ease the home situation in a manner which relieves the moment there, promotes stringency here, and prejudices the future in both cases. The principle would be the same if such advances were made to home cities and Government. It is desirable that our own cities and States and national Government should moderate their attraction of funds from production and exchange of goods, in both domestic and foreign trade. There is no hostility to foreign loans in treating them on the same lines. Loans to the taxing power are objectionable when funds are scarce, production is low, exchange is restricted, and there is a grip on commerce which is worse than any for call money.

Not all the foreign loans placed in recent weeks are open to this objection. The Midi Railroad of France was accommodated with 50,000,000 francs, "the entire proceeds to be used in the United States." That stimulates production here. On the other hand, a railway whose paper is indorsed by Canada got a loan here about the same time without the undertaking to spend the funds here, and for the purpose of refunding its maturities. No doubt that is a "good" loan, but it is a finance loan, not a commercial loan, and will not help the exchanges of goods between the two countries. It is plain that, whatever may be the benefit of foreign loans of that sort, they are an indirect withdrawal of accommodation from our own railways,

under the need of hundreds of millions, and more restricted in their borrowings than roads enjoying Government guarantee. One foreign city applying here for accommodation has exhausted its home credit by the lavishness of its borrowings, and the extent of its recurrent deficits. On the other hand, there is pending a negotiation for a loan for the electrification of the Swiss railways. It is plainly stated that the loan is not for the purpose of pacifying preceding creditors, and that "the electric plant and the rolling stock will be bought in the United States."

PRACTICE OUTGENERALS THEORY

These illustrations suffice to show that the objection is not to foreign loans because they are foreign, but because of their unsuitability to the economic situation in some cases. It has been said that such loans stimulate commerce, even though the connection cannot be clearly traced. The loans in money give the right only to command goods and services, and the goods and services may be transferred to others than the borrower without altering the fact that they were produced, delivered and paid for. Thus the loan to Norway, to pay for ships building in England, is said to be beneficial to our trade, for our goods or services were just as truly used as though rendered to Norway, although directed to the payment of Norway's debts in England.

That is better theory than practice. It is undeniable that triangular transactions stimulate exchanges between nations, and that they are beneficial under normal conditions. But these are times when direct trade between the principals to bargains are desirable, because there is free movement of neither gold nor goods. Norway can take gold from here, or the equivalent of gold in goods. But Norway cannot send here either gold or goods. That is why Norway borrows here. There is an evident limit to the extent to which we can accept orders to pay the debts of those who borrow from us when those who owe us are not obtaining orders for the payment of their debts to us nor paying themselves. It certainly is true, theoretically and normally, that goods are bought with goods and sold for goods; that the money terms used are only a symbol of the transaction, and that the route taken in the delivery of the goods is immaterial. But these are bad times for theory, and there are signs that our theorists are being outgeneralized by trade practitioners shrewder and bolder than we. England is buying here for cash and selling on credit in countries to which our trade finds access more difficult than as though we sold to those who bought where they borrowed. Some of our foreign friends who are borrowing dear here are lending cheap to enemy nations, and are thus controlling trade that might be ours, if so nominated in the bond.

No offense or even criticism is intended. The transactions are fair and honorable and not at all Kaiserlich. But there is room to say that we are not making the best use of our opportunities, through excess of caution in some respects, excess of boldness in some others and neglect of national policy oftentimes. There are those who make bold to say that we should adventure more in trade, draw the lines of finance more closely, and make sure that our funds are used for production here or elsewhere, instead of encouraging borrowers in

conduct which our highest authority has reproved in ourselves on a milder scale.

It is not an unknown occurrence for private credit to be better than public credit. Banks have maintained payments when Governments have fallen. There are private traders older than many Governments. There are some who think that commercial paper of the qualities stipulated by Napoleon for the Bank of France is as sure of payment as any monetary engagement, and who do not feel equally sure of public debts running into incredible billions and supported by taxation almost unbearable. Our Treasury has exhorted us to watch our step, lest our efforts to relieve the foreign delirium should infect us with the contagion of inflation of prices and irredeemable currency. The first precaution our Federal Reserve imposed upon us—that credit should be limited to essential and productive uses—is never mentioned in connection with foreign loans. And yet the Brussels conference declared that international credits should be conditioned "upon being used only for the most immediately remunerative purposes, including the provision of means of subsistence for the laboring population, and upon the borrowing countries doing everything in their power to co-operate in the work of restoring economic life." Also loans to distressed countries should receive priority of payment, other claims being postponed until the new credits have had time to exercise their influence upon production. There are no hints of such conditions in any of the recent loans.

Large as these loans are they are not equal to the demand for them, nor can they be so long as they are limited to the investment market. Mortgage money can be lent only as it can be saved from profits and wages. But trade money can be lent in amounts proportioned to the trade itself, increasing as trade increases. The holding of the crops with bank credit withdraws the funds from trade, and the banks should have nothing to do with it. But there is no reason why the banks should not finance the export and import of staples and manufactures in foreign trade to practically unlimited totals, provided only that the transactions are liquidated. An advance of credit until cotton reaches 40 cents or wheat \$3 is not a liquidated transaction, and might run for a longer term than some of the current bond issues. It is a counsel of perfection that foreign loans should be limited to trade purposes, and that the weight of them should be carried in the acceptance market and taken off the mortgage investment funds. We ought to finance our own trade, and we cannot

spare investment funds from domestic uses. We are denying ourselves many things, such as, for instance, the housing so sadly needed, if we let so much mortgage money "go foreign" and transact our trade with investment funds.

BETTER PRODUCERS THAN TRADERS

It is not known that there has been any refusal of credit for the purpose of exporting or importing goods. Foreign loans of that sort should be forthcoming in any amount proportioned to the volume of the trade. The September exports, and excess of exports over imports, were larger than last year. It is odd that the agriculturists who think that the way to raise the price at which they sell is to hold their crops do not remark the effect upon the price of coal of exporting a portion hardly worth mention in connection with the total of domestic consumption. If the producers would export enough cotton and grain to lessen the load on the market there might result an advance of prices as uncomfortable for our consumers as the increase in the price of coal. We never have and never can consume as much as we produce. The price of the unwanted surplus depresses the price of the whole, and the acceptance of a sacrifice price for the small surplus, comparatively speaking, would raise the price of the large remnant. Our agriculturists are better producers than traders, and they are children in the export market. The fall in their products which they lament is proof that they could have sold at those higher prices, if they had understood and used the machinery of the market, instead of imagining a conspiracy of the market against them. If the agriculturists had "hedged" by sales in the option market, when they planted the crops which made them "long," they would now be taking profits instead of losses, and would be paying loans at the banks, instead of complaining that credit is denied them for the purpose of speculating in the products about which they ought to be better informed than other speculators.

Our goods are necessary to the comfort of those who cannot supply themselves without borrowing the money with which to buy. They are necessary even to the existence of more people than our own population. And we are embarrassed in buying what we want because those from whom we buy do not take enough from us to balance the exchange. It is a curious deadlock, arising from the fact that, for the first time within experience, the bulk of both goods and credit available for satisfying the wants of the world are in the same hands.

Ordinarily some nations have surplus goods, and other nations have surplus credit. Under such conditions the credits move the goods easily. We must lend abroad to sell abroad, and we must buy abroad to sell at home. We are lending lavishly rather than expertly, and in disregard of both domestic and foreign counsel, as to the policy which should control credits under these conditions. We are buying less abroad, and are considering checking imports by law.

It is desirable to curtail national purchasing power, because all nations have too much money. But it is more desirable to increase international purchasing power, because there is everywhere deficiency of foreign credits. In other words, it is more important to balance the international exchanges than to deflate the currencies of several nations. International exchanges can be balanced only by credits until the world's production is normal once more. To keep foods and goods out of consumption and to grant credits not used for production are blunders in the fundamentals.

To borrow at 8 per cent. for twenty-five years or even longer is to assume a burden of interest double the accepted normal and double the principal funded in that manner. That is an addition to costs and a crushing handicap in competition with others more prudently financed. In proportion that such loans are attractive to lenders they are objectionable to borrowers. It ought not to be necessary to make such a trite remark. The excuse is that it is least appreciated where there is most need of it. Public borrowing being a burden on taxpayers is not felt by those who use the money. That is why our cities and States move their expenses up with the price increases, whereas private borrowers try to reduce their interest burden as their costs increase. There is no such increase of efficiency and reduction of numbers among public employees as among workers for private concerns. The high cost of governing rises faster than the cost of living, because the politicians do not pay the cost. For cities and States to double their borrowings when the borrowed money buys half less of everything is a plea of guilty to financial incompetency. And yet there are compensations even in that. It ought to be the deathblow to movements for municipal ownership and operation as a means to getting anything cheap. It passes belief that honest men can make such an argument, or that sensible men can allow it to be made to them, without indignation at the imputation upon their intelligence and good nature.

Credit Deflation a Problem of Values More Than Uses

*Not Essential or Unessential Character of Loans, but Fundamental Worth on Which They Are Based, Should be the Criterion, Says St. Louis Bank, for a Crash in the Credit Structure Would Follow a Sudden Decline in Value Even of Essential Commodities**

THERE is a growing tendency under the strained credit conditions, falling prices, and reduced industrial activity, to believe that the banks and the Federal Reserve system are largely responsible for the present difficulties. Many assert that the banks are arbitrarily refusing to make new loans and to extend old ones; that the Federal Reserve Board declines to accept for discount good commercial paper; that unfair discrimination and far-fetched comparison is made by financial institutions of essential and non-essential industries, and finally, that the situation could be met by granting additional credit which would maintain desirable price levels and business activity.

Such criticisms, or similar ones, always arise at times of low or falling prices and scarcity of credit. The disposition at such times to believe that more credit in the form of increased loans, more paper money, more bonds and more notes can take the place of greater production and more saving, is widespread among the populace. Free silver, more greenbacks, more Federal Reserve notes and similar efforts to make value by increasing mere credit instruments of value, are always urged as a substitute for saved capital and increased production. When the reform in our banking system was being discussed in the period previous to 1914 much fear was expressed lest we have a too highly centralized banking system. When we finally adopted the present Federal Reserve system, the largest possible measure of local autonomy was provided by the organization of twelve Federal Reserve Banks and by the plan of voluntary membership in the system. It was not

desirable, so the argument ran, to have a big central bank, for it would permit the money interests and Wall Street to dominate the credit and finances of the country.

What a paradox is witnessed when pressure is brought to bear upon the Federal Reserve Board from some sections and business interests of the

country which most opposed the central bank idea, to persuade the Federal Reserve Board to assume and exercise power which resides only in the original banks. It is now urged that the Federal Reserve Board compel the member banks to aid

Continued on Page 554



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Burden of Our Merchant Marine Shifted to the Taxpayer

Terms of the New Contract for the Management of Government-Owned Vessels Assures the Operators of a Profit While the Shipping Board Assumes All Risk of Loss—Features of the New System Not Generally Known to the Public

By REUBEN A. LEWIS

IF the Government-owned merchant fleet, which was created at a cost in excess of \$3,000,000,000, is operated in the foreign trade at a loss, the burden will fall directly upon the American taxpayers, as the result of a new working arrangement which has just been made with the steamship companies. The Shipping Board last week announced the terms of the new agency contract for the management and operation of its vessels. The profit-sharing idea has been cast into the discard and an analysis of the new arrangement shows very plainly that the operators of the steamers are assured of a return even in the event the voyage costs should exceed the gross income.

The contract has been characterized by the operators as a "purely commercial" agreement and a "step in the right direction." It is doubtful, however, if the arrangement is one over which the taxpayers will enthuse. The companies to which the Government Board consign the ships for operation do not risk a single cent in the management and operation of property which is worth more than \$1,000,000,000. By virtue of this contract, which has just been consummated, the income of the steamship companies for the year of 1920 will be far in excess of what it otherwise would have been.

Briefly, the Shipping Board has agreed to pay all of the expenses incurred by the ships on their voyages, and to give to the operators as remuneration 5 per cent. of the gross freight money on outward voyages and 2½ per cent. on the incoming trips. This replaces the old contract, which provided for the payment of a small fixed sum per deadweight ton and a division of profits provided there were any.

It is a matter of current report that the fleet has been operated at a loss during the past six months. However, no financial statement may be obtained from the Shipping Board, because voyage accounts are so hopelessly muddled that the Government cannot check up and determine its balance. The new system which will do away with much red tape becomes retroactive as of March 1, 1920. The exact provisions of the contract as regards compensation are contained in Section 11. The most important features are:

The corporation shall pay to the agent as full compensation for the agent's services hereunder as follows:

(a) From United States Ports.—Five (5%) per cent. on gross outward freight, dead freight, demurrage, express and mail revenue; provided that two and one-half (2½%) per cent. only shall be paid on full cargoes of coal, grain, sulphur and phosphate, regardless of the number of ports of loading or discharge and regardless of the number of bills of lading, or consignees; and provided further that two and one-half (2½%) per cent. only shall be paid on full cargoes or other commodities shipped from one shipper to one consignee, from one port of loading to one port of discharge, to be accepted by the ship and delivered without count or marks.

(b) Into United States Ports.—Two and one-half (2½%) per cent. on gross inward freight, dead freight, demurrage, express and mail revenue, the minimum inward fee at each port where cargo is discharged to be \$250.

(c) Coastwise Between United States Ports.—The provisions of (a) and (b) above shall govern except as to the New England coal trade, as to which the agent shall receive only two and one-half (2½%) per cent. on gross outward freight, dead freight and demurrage, but nothing on gross inward freight or dead freight.

(d) Between Ports Other Than United States Ports.—Two and one-half (2½%) per cent. on gross outward freight, dead freight, demurrage, express and mail revenue, and two and one-half (2½%) per cent. on inward demurrage.

(e) Ballast Voyages.—Five (\$5) dollars per day on ballast voyages, minimum fifty (\$50) dollars; days to be counted from clearance of vessel to entry at port of destination.

(f) Compensation While Under Repairs, &c.—For each period the vessel is laid up for repairs, inspection or survey the agent shall receive twenty-five (\$25) dollars per vessel per day for each day beyond the first ten days of that period.

(g) Passenger Revenue.—Ten (10%) per cent. on gross passenger and excess baggage revenue,

provided, however, that five (5%) per cent. only shall be paid on gross passenger and excess baggage revenue derived from carrying passengers on cargo vessels, as provided in Section 26 of the Merchant Marine act of 1920.

(h) Salvage.—Five (5%) per cent. of all salvage earned for account of the vessel for salvage services rendered to vessels not owned or controlled by the United States Shipping Board or the corporation, and two and one-half (2½%) per cent. on all salvage earned for account of the vessel for salvage services rendered to vessels of the United States Shipping Board or the corporation.*

The position of the Shipping Board is unique in maritime history. As a result of the intensive shipbuilding program necessitated by the war the United States finds itself in possession of a fleet of more than 2,000 ships—1,400 of which are suited for transoceanic voyages. As the ships were delivered to the Shipping Board by the shipbuilders it became necessary that they be operated. The Government requested the various steamship companies to handle the ships for its account—to book the freight, supply the crews, and operate the steamers just as if they owned the vessels. It was agreed that a certain sum, to be fixed later, would be paid. In this way the system started.

The first agreement as to the remuneration proved unsatisfactory. The Shipping Board agreed to pay 2½ per cent. on outward cargoes and 1½ per cent. on inward business. While the freight rates ruled high this seemed to be adequate, but when the charges dropped there was a cry for revision.

Negotiations were started for a new agreement. After several weeks of bickering, Commissioner Thomas Scott proposed his plan which incorporated the profit-sharing idea. The operators objected to this plan because they claimed that \$200 a deadweight ton was excessive and that, if 23½ per cent. annually were charged off, there would be no profits remaining. Furthermore, it was explained that the American ships would in many cases have to pioneer new ocean routes and develop trade. This "spade work," they asserted, would be accomplished at a loss under the most favorable conditions. Finally, early in April, 1920, it was agreed that the contract should become operative under the conditions stated, with an additional "gentleman's agreement" that the Shipping Board would reduce the capital cost of the ship to such a figure—"when conditions justified it"—that all voyages would show a profit.

A slump in shipping was felt in the early Spring, when an embargo was placed on the export of coal and the foreign exchange swung heavily against the United States. The plan did not work out well, for there were no profits to share. The whole system was a mass of red tape. Complaints were made by virtually all interests. Finally, in May, the Shipping Board agreed to revise the contract to make it mutually satisfactory. For more than five months conferences were scheduled, and the result was the contract executed last week.

Since March 1 there seems to have been no disposition on the part of either the operators or the Shipping Board to deny the fact that the American merchant fleet, as a whole, has been operating at a loss. By making the present agreement retroactive, the steamship companies are at least guaranteed 5 or 2½ per cent. of the total freight money. The difference between this sum and the share of profits on the various voyages doubtless would amount to several million dollars.

Now that the nature of the working arrangement has been revealed, the charges that the ex-German trade routes would be restored at the expense of the American taxpayer take on a definite form. There seems to be no doubt that the United American lines and the United States Mail Steamship Company, which have entered into agreements with the Hamburg-American Line and the North German Lloyd, will ask for the allocation of Shipping Board tonnage to assist in the development of the former German services. Admiral Benson has announced that it would be his disposition to consign American steamers to the companies for these purposes. W. Averell Harriman, Alfred E. Clegg and virtually every steamship man familiar with the situation have admitted that operation of most of the former trade routes for the first few years would be accomplished at a deficit rather than at

a profit. Under the new operating and management agreement, the Shipping Board meets the operating expenses, the steamship companies being paid a certain percentage of the gross freight money. Therefore the losses will be borne by the Shipping Board, not by the operating company.

Congress has declared in the Merchant Marine act of 1920 that the fleet of merchant ships shall be sold to private interests as soon as possible. But the future of American shipping is admittedly somewhat uncertain, because the operating expenses are higher than those of foreign ships. It is possible, however, for a steamship company to operate a large fleet of State-owned vessels on a commission basis without running any of these risks. A sure income is promised, and if ten or more steamers are allocated, it would seem that a rather comfortable sum may be earned. This will act as a curb on the purchase of tonnage by private interests, unless the Shipping Board, in its allocation policy, coerces the lines to buy ships in order to insure the management of other vessels.

There seems to be little doubt but the unheralded agreement—which few taxpayers know is in existence—will prove a severe drain upon the Treasury. Thus far the Shipping Board has not made any demands upon the exchequer, but it must be recalled that the millions of dollars which it derives from the sale of ships may be applied to meet any deficits incurred through operation.

The financial statement to be made by the Shipping Board for 1920 will be one of the most interesting ever made by a Government department, provided it is complete. So far, no official balance sheet has ever been presented. When Congress convenes, there is reason to believe that some inquiry will be made into the various acts of the board, and it seems that this probe will include the present agreement.

American Code Causes Trouble

THE American Chamber of Commerce in London has sent word to American manufacturers that it is practically impossible to decode cable messages sent to Great Britain in what is known as the "A. B. C. Fifth Edition Improved" code. This code has no legal existence in England and there is apparently not a copy in the country which could be consulted.

It appears, says the American Chamber, that the A. B. C. Fifth Edition Improved code as published and used in America cannot be sold in Great Britain because it would be an infringement of copyright on the A. B. C. Fifth Edition which was published in Great Britain in 1901, but which was not copyrighted in America.

During the last few months the American Chamber has received an average of two inquiries a week from British firms unable to decode cables received from the United States in the Fifth Edition Improved code.

An A. B. C. Sixth Edition has now been published which is copyrighted in the United States and practically all over the world, and it is hoped that this will simplify matters, although it does not altogether do away with the difficulty.

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Real Help, Not Exploitation, Chinese Consortium's Aim

Eastern Republic Is to Have a Share in the Work, Indeed, Will be Required to Participate as the Price for Foreign Assistance—Educational Propaganda to be Instituted as a Preliminary to Any Loan Flotation—Amazing Showing of Chinese Industries

THE International Consortium for China has at last come into being, and, by the form in which it has been set up, it marks a new departure in international financial affairs. Like all other international financial agreements, the Chinese Consortium contemplates profit for the members, but the profits are not to be sought in the fashion of an older day, when the exploitation of foreign countries was at times carried on mainly for the profits of the moment, with the future and its returns allowed to take care of itself. The Chinese Consortium is designed to last a long time, and its purpose, which will be kept jointly by the international bankers, their respective Governments, and the Chinese themselves, will be to build for the future.

The consortium in its present form is made up of representatives of four great powers, the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan. During the conferences held in this city a few weeks ago, the application of a Belgian group, comprising the leading banks and bankers in that country, was received, acted upon favorably by the bankers and referred for approval to the foreign offices of the four countries which established the consortium. Further, the representatives at the New York conference adopted a resolution recommending that a Chinese group be added, and this, it is understood, will probably be done. Aside from this, little has been said as to the progress of the consortium. No formal central governing body has been created and none is expected.

In whatever public utterances members of the consortium have indulged, great emphasis has been laid on the spirit of friendliness in which the body approaches its tasks. It has been pointed out, time after time, by representative after representative, that the whole idea is to hold China, and not merely to exploit her for the benefit of Western countries. It is to be a sort of "big brother" movement.

CHINA'S INTERESTS PARAMOUNT

With the consortium still in more or less of a formative stage, it seems to be a fixed determination that there shall be no misunderstanding of this friendliness to the great Oriental republic. Sir Charles Addis, head of the British delegation, in an address before the Bond Club of New York, emphasized this. So did Reitaro Ichinomiya, the leading Japanese delegate, and so did Thomas W. Lamont, Chairman of the Managing Committee of the American group. Later, by the insertion of a new clause in the tentative form of agreement, the whole conference made clear its position. The new clause, which recommended the formation and admission to membership of a Chinese group, was the only part of the formal agreement made public. And it was stated in no uncertain language. In this way notice was given to the whole world that the consortium desired mainly to help China, and that profits which may accrue to the several banking groups are to be of secondary importance. The consortium does not say that it will not attempt to work profitably to itself, but it does say that China's interests are paramount, and members of the conference have gone on to explain that, if this plan is adhered to, the profits will take care of themselves.

Perhaps the delegates had in mind the unhappy experiences of former consortiums, when misunderstanding, and at times jealousy, placed in jeopardy the whole business. It is not inconceivable that some notion of so thoroughly committing everybody, bankers and Governments alike, to the present arrangement as to prevent the subsequent withdrawal of any single nation or individual faction was entertained. At all events, with the organization now on such a high plane, it is difficult to see how any withdrawals for any legitimate reason will be possible.

A former consortium, known as the Four Power Group and later as the Six Power Group, came to grief because our own Government withdrew its support of the American banking members. It is quite possible that the Six Power Group, automatically reduced to a Five Power Group, might have functioned had not the great war intervened to split the group. But it is reasonably certain that it would not have functioned in the way it was originally intended to under those circumstances. The United States is an integral part of any Oriental concert which is to go ahead and perform the

things which it must perform to be a success. This now is realized, and the new consortium includes a very important and very powerful American group, with energetic and aggressive leadership.

The purposes of the present consortium have been summed up by Sir Charles Addis, the leader of the British faction, in the following words:

"The object of the consortium is to assist China to stand upon her own feet. When a man is down there is no use in helping him up unless he means to make an effort himself, and I believe I am expressing the opinion of my colleagues when I say that we are laying down as a fundamental fact that China can only be saved by her own exertions. The utmost that this consortium can do is to facilitate the effort and endeavor that, in the first place, must come from China herself. It seems unnecessary to emphasize this point: that, without the good-will and assistance of China, the consortium cannot be fruitful."

Those words make it evident that China is to be encouraged to contribute her part of the effort, and if she is invited to do this there is a reasonably plain implication that she is to have a voice in the doing. This doubtless will overcome the objections which some have raised to the consortium idea that the whole business is designed merely to exploit the country for the profit of the bankers and without allowing China any say in the matter. To make this even plainer the clause inserted into the agreement regarding the creation of a Chinese group reads as follows:

"The said national groups (those of the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan) are of the opinion that the interests of the Chinese people can in existing circumstances best be served by the co-operative action of the various banking groups representing the investment interests of their respective countries in procuring for the Chinese Government the capital necessary for a program of economic reconstruction and improved communications. With these objects in view the respective national groups are prepared to participate on equal terms in such undertakings as may be calculated to assist China in the establishment of her great public utilities, and to these ends to welcome the co-operation of Chinese capital."

A PATRIOTIC UNDERTAKING

In that clause it is pointed out that capital must be raised if China is to be developed. And it also is pointed out that Chinese capital is to have the same opportunities for taking advantage of whatever investments may arise. That would seem to do away with the charge that European and American capital is to be forced upon China. The idea has been fostered by some that this foreign capital was to be forced upon China with the intention of gaining special advantages for those who advanced the money.

Similarly the consortium representatives have gone to some length to assure the public that they have not revived the idea of international assistance to China on their own initiative. Mr. Lamont explained this when he said recently:

"The bankers of Great Britain, France, Japan and the United States did not start out of their own initiative on this quest with the idea that they wanted a lot of money, to be made in China. Not at all. Quite the other way around. Rather our Governments came to us and asked us whether we would not lend our good offices in the formation of influential and powerful banking groups to help out the situation in China, to help stabilize China, and so help stabilize the whole Far East. They came to us and asked us to do that as a patriotic measure. We said 'yes.'"

That comes close to committing all of the Governments involved. Probably unless all the Governments were committed the bankers would not have gone ahead with the plans, for the whole success of the transaction rests on the ability of all groups and all interests within each group to maintain active efforts until the thing is completed. It can be no case where the component parts are free to go or come as they may see fit. If the consortium is to serve its purposes, the bankers who already are in it say, it must stick in its present form, or with additions of other national groups, until the whole task is finished, and when that time will be nobody can say now.

As for the activities of the consortium in the immediate future, it is stated most definitely that

no loans to China are under consideration at the present time. There will be loans, of course, in the future. But they are not being considered, and may not be for some little time. The situation is not ripe for a loan at the moment, although the condition of our own investment market would seem to indicate that such an operation could be successfully undertaken.

This does not presuppose that there will be no temporary loans, no stop-gaps, floated. Something of this sort may be done, but no great, comprehensive program for the thorough financing of Chinese public enterprises is being worked out just yet. There is plenty of time for that and, until the consortium is more thoroughly organized, it can wait. Mr. Lamont said the other day that when the time came for a real loan flotation the public would be advised.

One of the things the consortium is likely to attempt, if, in fact, it has not already undertaken it, is an intelligent educative propaganda of Chinese information. It is realized that when the time arrives for the offering of Chinese securities there must be understanding among investors of the inherent worth of these securities. Little is known of China and her industries, and it will be no small task to inform the potential buyers of the consortium's emissions regarding them.

In the first place, it will be necessary to educate the men who will be called upon to distribute the securities. If they know what they are selling they will be able to do a better job than if they are only half informed. And it will be very largely up to them to pass along the information to the security buying public.

CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL SHOWING

The spreading of this information should have its own benefits quite without regard to the success of any one particular Chinese bond or stock offering. A good many Americans will be amazed at the showing of some Chinese industries. For example, the Chinese railroads have been operating at a working ratio of about 44 per cent. The American railroads have been operating at a working ratio of something like 96 per cent. In other words, the Chinese railroads require 44 per cent. of gross for operating expenses, returning the balance to net which, in their case, largely goes to the Government after making allowance for return on investment. Our roads, as a whole, have been using up approximately 96 per cent. of gross for the cost of operations.

Perhaps the comparison between Chinese and American roads is not a fair one. In China, with a sixth more area than the United States has, there are only 6,000 miles of railroad. The capital cost of these 6,000 miles was about \$431,000,000 silver, or half of that, substantially, in American funds. That gave an average cost per mile of \$70,000 silver, or \$35,000 "American." In the last year reported on the net operating earnings of the Chinese roads was \$43,000,000 silver, or just about 10 per cent. of the cost of construction.

These figures were given by Sir Charles Addis, who submitted that they bore out his contention that Chinese railway bonds, secured upon roads which are operating at such a handsome profit and are further secured by unconditional pledge of the Chinese Government, are among the prime investment offerings of the world.

News Notes

FRANZ MEYER, an assistant cashier of the National Bank of Commerce in New York and manager of its foreign department, has been appointed a Second Vice President of that institution. The bank has also announced the appointment of three new assistant cashiers. These are Ira W. Aldom, William S. Graves and Eugene M. Prentice. These appointments, all of which are effective Nov. 1, 1920, will increase the number of the bank's officers to thirty-six.

IRVIN J. GREENE has been appointed an Assistant Secretary at the Brussels office of the Guaranty Trust Company of New York. He was sent to the Paris office in September, 1916, and in August of 1919 was transferred to the Brussels office. For several months past he has been employed at the main office in New York.

The McFadden Gold Bill Condemned and Defended

American Bankers Association Committee Holds That Proposed Tax Would Violate a Fundamental Element of the Gold Standard and Calls Measure Uneconomic and Unnecessary—The Author Sees in His Bill Protection for the Monetary Reserve and a Bulwark of the Gold Standard

Below is given in full the report of the American Bankers Association Committee on the McFadden Gold bill now before Congress. With it is given in large part the reply of Louis T. McFadden, Chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee of the House of Representatives. The report to the Bankers Association was prepared

By GEORGE M. REYNOLDS, Chairman,
LAWRENCE E. SANDS and
A. BARTON HEPBURN

THE McFadden bill, so called, provides for a tax of 50 cents per pennyweight of fine gold for all gold manufactured, used or sold for other than coinage or monetary purposes, including jewelry and other purposes of ornamentation and dentistry (with some exceptions for children and charity cases). From such funds thus collected and "any other funds in the Treasury of the United States not used for specified purposes" there shall be paid a bonus to the producers of new gold in the United States of \$10 per fine ounce down to May 1, 1925, and that thereafter both the tax and the premium shall be readjusted annually by certain Government officers in accordance with the commodity price index number, as determined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The tax and the premium are both to rise or fall after May 1, 1925, according as the index number rises or falls. In behalf of the bill it is argued that the general increase in prices and wages in the United States has raised the cost of gold production, while the price of gold is fixed at \$1 for every 23.22 grains of fine gold; that as a consequence of the fixed price and rising costs the profits of gold production are cut, and the mines where low-grade ore is worked are in some cases being forced to close, with the result that gold production in the United States, which stood at about \$89,000,000 in 1913, was cut to \$58,488,000 in 1919—a reduction of around \$30,000,000—whereas the industrial consumption of gold which stood at about \$45,000,000 in 1913, increased to over \$80,000,000 in 1919. The result is that whereas we had a large surplus for monetary purposes in 1913, we were obliged to draw on our monetary stock of gold for industrial purposes in 1919 to the extent of about \$22,000,000. It is urged that this consumption of gold money for industrial purposes, cutting into our gold reserve, constitutes a national emergency, and that a measure both to reduce the industrial consumption of gold (by taxation) and to increase the production of gold (by a bonus) is called for. It is further argued that if relief is not given to gold miners by some such measure some gold mines will be abandoned permanently, particularly the deep mines which will fill with water and other mines where timbering will deteriorate to such an extent that the mines will become unsafe for operation.

CREDIT DEFLATION THE CURE

It can hardly be contended that the loss of \$22,000,000 of gold per year from our monetary stock of around \$3,000,000,000 constitutes a national emergency. When the gold embargo was removed the United States had the largest gold supply of any country in the world's history, a supply so abnormally great that every banker and economist knew that it could not be permanently held, and practically all students were agreed that it was desirable that a substantial part of it should leave the country. Its presence made possible an over-expansion of credit in the United States and the outflow which has since taken place of three or four hundred millions has actually made our situation far safer than it was, by imposing a check upon credit expansion. The best banking opinion of the country looks forward to a progressive and far-reaching contraction of our credit fabric and regards it as the only alternative to such a disastrous disruption of the credit system as Japan has recently seen. The proper course to take is not by artificial methods to seek to expand the gold basis of our credit system, but rather to contract the superstructure of credit to a point where it can be safely maintained under conditions of a normal distribution of the world's gold supply. The problem of gold production is an international and not a national problem. Our national stock of gold is dependent, not upon the difference between gold production and gold consumption in the

United States, amounting to a few tens of millions, but rather upon the worldwide consumption and production of gold, and upon the course of international trade. If at any time the banking situation calls for more gold in the United States, we can purchase it in the international gold markets far more cheaply than we can obtain it by the doubtful method of an expensive bonus on new gold produced in the United States, which could at best make a difference of only two or three tens of millions per annum. Gold imports and exports of the United States in the first four months of 1920, running between two and three hundred million dollars, were far more significant than any difference that could be made by the gold bonus plan in our stock of gold would amount to in several years.

The increased industrial consumption of gold, following the armistice, was partly temporary, a phenomenon growing out of the relaxation of wartime economies. Our people who had repressed their desire for luxuries during the war, turned suddenly extravagant and bought jewelry of all kinds lavishly. This tendency may be undesirable, and probably is. Extravagance of all kinds should be suppressed. The policy of a general tax on luxuries may be commended, and a tax on jewelry, as part of such a general tax, may well be advisable, but a differential tax on gold as a raw material of production is a different matter, and one which no national emergency calls for.

The essential elements of the gold standard are: (1) the instant convertibility of all forms of representative money in gold on demand; (2) the free coinage of gold bullion; (3) the unrestricted melting down of gold coin into bullion; (4) the uninterrupted flow of gold from money into the arts, and the uninterrupted flow of gold from the arts into money; (5) the free export and import of gold. A tax of this kind, interfering with the free flow of gold into the arts, thus violates one of the basic elements of the gold standard.

From the outbreak of the great war in Europe our industrial system has been under an increasing strain. Our markets have been drained increasingly of goods and supplies for Europe. The one-sided flow of commodities to Europe has been financed from the beginning, in considerable part, by expanding bank credit in the United States; the resultant shortages of goods, together with expanding bank credit, have raised prices high, and as a consequence costs of production of all kinds have risen. These conditions were intensified by our own entry into the war. Our Government spent many billions of dollars, raised by taxes, bond issues and borrowing from banks, resulting in increased shortages of goods and increased prices, which increased the strain on our industrial system. During the war 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 able-bodied men were withdrawn from the ranks of industry and entered the military and naval service of the United States, while many more millions were diverted from the production of ordinary goods to the production of wartime materials and supplies. A labor shortage necessarily resulted, with a material increase in wages.

While some industries, owing to the rise in wartime prices, have made very large profits, many others have suffered. Among these were the gold mines producing low-grade ore. A number of these, because of the increased cost of production and labor shortage, were obliged to suspend. This was true, however, of copper and iron as well as gold. The well-known Treadwell mine, possessing a large volume of low-grade ore, was obliged to suspend. Others very likely suspended production from the same cause. Some continued, hoping for a change in conditions. But gold miners are not the only ones who have suffered. Traction companies, for example, having a stipulated fare, usually a nickel, have suffered severely. The different States have refused to make it possible for the traction companies to earn expenses by allowing them increased compensation for their service, somewhat in proportion to the general advance in costs. The steam railways have a just claim upon the public for increased compensation in order to enable them to maintain efficiency and to render the public good service. Universities and charitable institutions, with income derived largely from bonds, have found themselves in many cases in desperate plight as a consequence of the rise in prices, with no increase in income. Widows and orphans, trust funds, public

officers and in general all recipients of fixed incomes have suffered.

A large body of other industries whose costs have risen faster than their prices have similarly suffered.

Recognizing that no national emergency exists calling for special treatment of the gold mining industry, it is difficult to make a case for singling out the gold mining industry for special relief from the Government. That it has suffered is unfortunate, but it is one of the costs of the war. It is one among a large class of those which the war has injured.

Gold mining, however, though suffering under present conditions, enjoys a peculiar advantage which few other industries enjoy. As a consequence of the fact that gold is the standard of value, the price of gold in terms of gold money is necessarily fixed. The demand for gold, however, is always unlimited. The gold miner can always sell at a fixed price as much gold as he can possibly produce. He finds his costs rising in periods of boom and prosperity, and he suffers as a consequence. On the other hand, periods of adversity, depression and falling prices bring to the gold miner, as to no one else, increased profits. He has an unlimited market in the worst depression, and the more severe the depression the lower his costs of production tend to be. He is at present suffering in an intensified form from the upswing of prices and costs. He has in the past, however, enjoyed periods of prosperity when the rest of the community was suffering, and in the natural course of things he may look forward to the recurrence of similar situations.

In reality, the propaganda in favor of doing something for gold is exactly on a par with the propaganda in favor of doing something for silver, about which we heard so much a generation ago. It has no more stable foundation than did the silver propaganda. There is nothing to justify Government interference in behalf of this industry, or to justify a Government bounty upon the production of virgin gold. Per contra, there is very much to be said against such action on the part of the Government.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST BONUS

We may pass briefly over the difficulties of administration of such an act; the danger that frauds would be practiced upon the Government; the difficulty of distinguishing virgin from old gold melted down. Gold which differs from other gold merely in having a special history, and which, by virtue of that special history rather than its intrinsic qualities, commands a high premium, presents an anomaly inconsistent with the normal functioning of a free gold market and the normal functioning of the gold standard. The temptation to manufacture history instead of mining gold would be very great.

Again, the provisions in the McFadden bill introducing the index number of commodity prices as a basis for fixing the rate of taxes on gold manufacture and of premium on gold mining constitutes an opening wedge for the general introduction of the index number as a standard of value in the United States, in accordance with Professor Irving Fisher's plan for "Stabilizing the Dollar." It is beyond the province of this paper to deal with that plan in extenso. Your committee believes in the gold standard and does not believe in tampering with it or interfering with it in the present critical condition of the world's monetary affairs. There is, moreover, another committee of the American Bankers' Association, which is to make a detailed report upon the project. We shall content ourselves, for the present, with pointing out that if this index number standard is to be adopted it should be considered on its own merits and not introduced "by the back door" as a feature of the McFadden bill.

The greatest objection of all, however, lies in the danger which this measure would involve in the gold standard itself. Nearly all of the European States are on a paper basis. Only a few of the smaller countries of Europe are even approximately maintaining the gold standard. The United States, par excellence, and Japan as well, stand out conspicuously as nations maintaining the gold standard. All the world believes that our dollars are as good as gold. All the other nations of the

world are struggling and hoping to get back to the gold standard. We enjoy a proud pre-eminence in this respect, and it should be zealously guarded and maintained. The belief which obtains in the world today that our dollars are as good as gold must be maintained. The whole world must be convinced that money can be deposited in this country at any time and withdrawn at any time in any form which the depositor may elect.

Offering to pay a premium for the production of gold in this country, instead of strengthening our position would weaken it. Instead of assuring the world that the gold standard would be maintained by the United States, it would raise a doubt. Public sentiment throughout the world would at once assume that our position is weak, that we are in danger of going on a paper basis and that it is in order to guard against this we regard it as expedient to pay a premium on the production of gold. Great Britain, with far greater difficulties than we are facing, has resolutely refused to do anything of the sort in reply to the petition of her South African gold miners. Unable to maintain the gold standard in its integrity, she has frankly permitted an open gold market in which the depreciation of her paper money could be measured. The so-called "premium" on gold in London represents not a real premium on gold bullion in standard gold coin, but rather merely a "discount" on British paper money. Action of the kind proposed by the United States would be a red flag to the commercial world. The passage of the McFadden bill, instead of strengthening confidence in the position of the United States, would weaken it. It would be considered as a confession of weakness. The McFadden bill should be opposed by every well-wisher of this country's credit and commercial and financial prosperity.

The present situation of high costs of production is abnormal and temporary. When our wholly abnormal balance of trade is reduced, leaving \$300,000,000 or \$400,000,000 worth of goods per month for our domestic markets to absorb, which they have not been absorbing; when labor gets over its illusion that prosperity can be maintained by the shortening of hours and by reduced efficiency, accompanied by higher wages, and when the strain in our money market is relaxed through reduced extravagance and increased savings on the part of our people, and their Government, most of the present derangements in our industrial system will disappear.

Increase of gold mining will return with normal conditions. It must not be forgotten, however, that part of the automatic working of the gold standard depends upon an increase in gold production when prices are low and upon a decrease in gold production when prices are high. Increased gold production in a period of low prices and low costs makes it easier for prices to rise again, while diminished gold production in periods of high prices and high costs tends to reduce prices and costs again.

Moreover, the industrial consumption of gold tends to increase in a period of high prices, since the price of gold does not rise as other prices rise, while in a period of low prices the prices of gold manufactures are relatively high, and purchasers of gold manufactures consequently tend to diminish. Variations in the consumption of gold thus also work toward diminishing the supply of free gold when prices are too high, and toward increasing the supply when prices are too low, thus tending to correct both the rise and the fall of prices. In this feature of gold production and consumption we have one of the stabilizing factors in the gold standard. The McFadden bill proposes to strike at this automatic regulator and corrective. It would aggravate the very conditions which it seeks to remedy.

By LOUIS T. McFADDEN

GOLD is our standard of value and the money of bank reserves. The entire body of outstanding indebtedness, public and private, including the Liberty bonds recently issued, is payable in gold coin of the present weight and fineness. The nearly \$10,000,000,000 of loans which the United States Government has made in the last two and one-half years to foreign Governments are payable in this gold coin. The \$3,500,000,000 adverse European trade balance created since Jan. 1, 1919, has still to be funded. The outstanding indebtedness of nearly the entire world is contracted in gold. Outside of Asia gold is still recognized as the unit of value and the basis of monetary systems, although in many countries the stress of war conditions and unbalanced trade have compelled a suspension of gold payments. All of these countries regard such suspension as temporary and desire to get back on the gold basis and establish their currencies in fixed relations to gold at the earliest possible date.

For the United States to adopt remedial measures to maintain its normal gold production would be construed abroad not as an element of weakness, but rather as one of strength. A stimulus to domestic gold production would be regarded not only as evidence of our desire to retain the present gold standard throughout the world, but as an aid to European countries to more rapidly recover their pre-war gold reserve positions. To allow the industrial consumers of gold in this country to withdraw gold from the monetary reserves of foreign countries would have a depressing effect upon the exchanges, and would delay the time when foreign exchanges would be restored to par. The diversion of gold from the monetary reserves of the nations of the world into the manufacture of articles of luxury particularly at a time when the world's gold production has so greatly declined will still further delay the financial recovery of all nations from the pressure of war finance.

WORLD RESTORATION OF GOLD STANDARD

The report of the Gold Committee states: "If at any time the bank situation calls for more gold in the United States, we can purchase it in the international gold markets far more cheaply than we can obtain it by the doubtful method of an expensive bonus on gold produced in the United States." Is it not evident that if the United States was forced to withdraw gold from the already depleted reserves of foreign countries their purchasing power in our markets would be lessened? A still further decline in the exchanges of such countries from which the gold had been withdrawn would result. The loss of European purchasing power in the markets of the United States upon which our domestic industries depend for prosperity would occasion a loss far greater than the premium provided for in the bill, which is borne not by the public at large, but directly by the consumers of gold articles, luxuries. Since the consumers of gold in the industrial arts and trades are receiving their metal at the pre-war price, no reason can be assigned why they should not pay an increased cost alike with all other industries which have been forced to pay the increased cost for their raw materials. * * *

As compared to 1914, the purchasing power of the dollar in terms of all commodities in 1919 was 47 cents. The gold producers' ounce in 1914 had a purchasing power of \$20.67, whereas during 1919 the same ounce could purchase in terms of all commodities but \$9.70. Since the price of gold has been arbitrarily fixed by statute at \$20.67 an ounce, the gold producer is in the same position as a person who received the same income in 1919 as in 1914 and finds that a \$2,000 income has shrunk in purchasing power to \$970. This is the principal reason for the decline in the gold production from \$101,000,000 in 1915 to less than \$50,000,000 this year. Were it not for the fact that the Government has arbitrarily fixed the price of gold, in which event the law of supply and demand does not operate, it would not be necessary to consider compensating the gold producer for a part of the decline in the purchasing power of the dollar which has taken place in the last four years. The premium to be paid to the gold producer, based upon the new ounce of production, cannot be construed as a bonus or subsidy for the above reason. Most of the wage increases that have been allowed by various industries and the increases in transportation rates, car fares, and for municipal gas and electric services throughout the country have been based upon the increase in commodity prices or the decline in the purchasing power of the dollar. The products of all other industries except that of the gold mining industry have been automatically increased in price during the period, so that the cost of production is fully covered, together with a profit, by which alone future production of such commodities may be assured. If we are to maintain the normal gold production of the United States it will be necessary to take this into consideration. Gold is the only product, because it is fixed in price, that has not been able to respond to the law of supply and demand, and special provision must be made if we are to keep the gold production of the country from vanishing altogether.

FREE GOLD MARKET MAINTAINED

The Gold Committee refers to the excise tax proposed as interfering with the free flow of gold into the arts, thus violating one of the basic elements of the gold standard. In another place the committee refers to the excise as a differential tax on a raw material. In this most important provision of the bill the committee has overlooked the fact that the excise is to be paid only upon the sale of the manufactured article, and not upon the bullion, which the manufacturers will receive from the

Mint as they always have at the fixed price of \$20.67 per ounce. In this way a free gold market is maintained, and there is no interference with the free flow of gold either into the arts or from the arts into the Mint. The fact that the rate of the excise is fixed at 50 cents a pennyweight for the fine gold contained cannot be construed as a differential tax on the raw material, as it is simply a means by which the tax may be equitably measured and levied upon the consumers of articles containing gold, in the same manner in which the French Government has imposed its sumptuary tax.

PAPER CURRENCY INFLATION AND NOT GOLD CAUSE FOR HIGH PRICES

The committee makes a statement with reference to the effect of gold production as follows: "Increased gold production in a period of low prices and low costs makes it easier for prices to rise again, while diminished gold in periods of high prices and high costs tends to reduce prices and costs again." This is not borne out by the facts. The gold production of the world has declined from \$469,000,000 in 1915 to \$350,000,000 in 1919, a reduction of 25 per cent in the last four years, and yet prices throughout the world have risen enormously. Commodity prices in this country continued to increase between May 1, 1919, and May 1, 1920, notwithstanding the loss by excess exportation from the United States of \$445,000,000 in gold, or 14½ per cent. of the highest gold stock ever possessed by this country. Furthermore, during the period when the gold reserves of foreign nations were being greatly reduced by what they sent to this country their prices advanced even more rapidly than those in this country. This indicates that the reverse of the committee's observation is true, that the depletion of gold reserve at a time when currency is rapidly expanding is mainly accountable for accentuating the increase in prices. The degree of inflation is measured by the ratio of the gold reserve to the volume of the circulating media, and it must be apparent that an increase in the gold reserve without an increase in the circulating media would reduce the degree of inflation. It must also be evident that the effect on prices of the supply of gold in active circulation is relatively small compared with that of the credit currency based on gold which is not "free," but locked up by the Treasury and Reserve banks and used indirectly as the basis for a larger volume of currency. If this gold were really free and circulating, it could not be so used. The true remedy for inflation is to return the gold to circulation, from which it has been so greatly withdrawn as the basis for inflation. Of the total gold stock of the United States, which amounted on Oct. 1, 1920, to \$2,704,672,504, \$2,003,072,000 was held as the gold reserve of the Federal Reserve system, and thereby was tied up by the Federal Reserve act, 35 per cent. against net deposit liabilities and 40 per cent. against the note liabilities of the Federal Reserve banks. After satisfying the reserve requirements of the net deposits there was on Oct. 15, 1920, a gold cover of 46.6 cents for every Federal Reserve dollar note in circulation, of which there were \$3,353,271,000. The gold cover on Oct. 15, 1920, of the Federal Reserve note was but 6.6 cents per dollar above the amount required by law, which is closer than conservative financiers would like to see it. * * *

The committee has stated that a loss of \$22,000,000 occasioned by the increased industrial consumption of gold over the production of new gold is a very small item to the monetary gold stock of the nation. In the opinion of the committee, no doubt, the \$80,000,000 in gold that was withdrawn from the United States Mint and Coinage and used for industrial purposes during 1919, was also an excessively small amount, notwithstanding that the metal was entirely diverted from monetary use. The gold dollar in the vaults of the Federal Reserve banks may serve as the basis of deposit liabilities of \$2.50, and these deposits to the credit of a member bank may in turn serve to enable credit extension by that bank of anywhere from seven and a half to fourteen times that amount, or say \$19 to \$36. With reserves close to the legal minimum, therefore, every million dollars of gold lost to the monetary gold reserve means forced credit contraction of at least \$20,000,000. The \$80,000,000 withdrawn for industrial consumption during 1919 would, therefore, be equivalent at the least estimate of a contraction in the credit structure of the country of \$1,600,000,000. It is interesting to note the comments in the reviews of several of our banks recently with reference to the marked improvement in the money market resulting from the small amounts of gold which have come in from Europe. The National City Bank statement of October makes the following reference: "One explanation of the easier tone in the money market is to

Continued on Page 574

OverProduction Makes Copper Outlook Depressing

Present Surplus Estimated to be Heavier Even Than in 1919, a Record Year for Production—Market Conditions Were Apparently Misjudged After the War and a Policy of Taking Its Loss Seems to Have Been Instituted by the Industry—May Cut Production in Half

OVERPRODUCTION is the crux of the entire copper situation as evidenced in the price decline which is now under way and which has driven the metal down to a quotation representing sales made at an actual loss when costs of operation, depletion and the like are considered. Part of the difficulty was inevitable, part is directly attributable to a misconception as to the course of the market. That which was inevitable was the piling up of a large copper surplus in the latter part of 1918 and early in 1919. This came about because the copper industry was working at full speed in 1918 in an endeavor to supply the war demands for the metal, and with an industry operating at such high efficiency it was naturally impossible to bring about an abrupt slowing down. Therefore, high production kept adding to already heavy stocks of metal, and the so-called copper surplus moved up to what was estimated at more than 1,000,000,000 pounds. The error as to judgment was in underes-

timating the period of time that it would take to bring liquidation of stocks and a failure to foresee that demand for copper would not become assertive in sustained and large proportions so as to permit of even such curtailed operations as were put into effect without adding to the copper surplus.

It is estimated that the copper surplus now is even heavier than it was early in 1919, and the price for the metal fell last week as low as 14¢ cents a pound, a figure at which there can be no profit on transactions, except possibly in the case of the lowest cost producers. During the early part of this year the price of copper held well, and until well along toward Fall there was little variance between high and low. This was largely because of the fact that the big companies were upholding the price and the little companies were doing business by cutting slightly under the figure quoted by the large operators. There was evidently a hope that copper would move forward ultimately on the

strength of increased demand here and an appearance of foreign buying. To the end of obtaining the increased price which was expected the big companies were willing to carry stocks along without making pronounced sacrifices.

THE MARKET MISJUDGED

Now the situation has changed. Perhaps this change has been brought about, in part at least, by the sign of falling commodity prices everywhere. There is, no doubt, a sentimental effect in a display of this sort but, whatever may be the cause, the copper companies have adopted new tactics. They are apparently willing to accept the inevitable with what good grace they can command. Early in the year some big amounts of copper were moving, and the stand which was taken then was in part justified. Buying by Japan absorbed a large amount of copper and ultimately, it may be said, acted as a boomerang here. The copper men were,

\$30,000,000

Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company

Seven Per Cent Gold Bonds

Due May 1, 1931

Interest payable May 1 and November 1. Coupon bonds in denominations of \$1,000 and \$500 with privilege of registration as to principal and exchangeable for bonds registered as to both principal and interest. Fully registered bonds re-exchangeable for coupon bonds. Principal and interest payable without deduction for any tax or taxes (other than Income Taxes exceeding in the aggregate 2% per annum) which the Company or the Trustee may be required to pay or to retain therefrom under any present or future law of the United States of America, or of any State, County, Municipality or other taxing authority therein.

The Bonds will be redeemable as a whole, but not in part, at the option of the Company, on notice as provided in the Indenture, on May 1, 1926, or on any semi-annual interest date thereafter at their principal amount and accrued interest, together with a premium equal to one-half per cent. of their principal amount for every six months intervening between the date so fixed for redemption and the date of maturity.

Guy E. Tripp, Esq., Chairman of the Board of Directors of Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, in a letter to the undersigned, dated October 27, 1920, writes in part as follows:

"The purpose of this issue is to secure working capital for a fixed period, and the proceeds of the sale of the Bonds is to be applied to the payment of Notes Payable.

The Bonds are to be issued under an Indenture to be made by the Company to Central Union Trust Company of New York, as Trustee, which will provide that the Company (including its Proprietary Companies as defined in the Indenture) shall at all times, while the Bonds are outstanding have unpledged current assets equal to at least one and one-half times the total indebtedness of the Company and of its Proprietary Companies (excluding the outstanding \$6,275,000, principal amount, Westinghouse Machine Company First and Refunding Mortgage Bonds, which are secured by mortgage), all as defined in the Indenture. The Indenture will further provide that the Company will not while any of the Bonds are outstanding make or permit to be made any mortgage on any of its real property or plants or on any of the real property or plants of any of its Proprietary Companies (other than purchase money mortgages) unless such mortgage shall secure the Bonds *pari passu* with the other indebtedness secured thereby.

The large current volume of the business of the Company is reflected in the Sales Billed which, for the six months ended September 30, 1920, amounted to \$78,771,675, and which it is believed will for the fiscal year to end March 31, 1921, exceed the Sales Billed for the previous fiscal year. The aggregate income of the Company and of its Proprietary Companies, for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1920, (after deductions for depreciations, Federal and other taxes, etc.) applicable to interest charges, amounted to \$16,801,164, or more than ten and one-half times such charges, which, for that fiscal year, amounted to \$1,594,823. Such income for the six months ended September 30, 1920, after like deductions, amounted to \$8,164,875, while such charges for that period amounted to \$751,852.

As of September 30, 1920, the current assets of the Company amounted to \$128,630,880, while the current indebtedness, consisting mainly of Accounts Payable, not due, advance payments on contracts and accruals for interest, Federal and other taxes, after applying as of said date the proceeds of the sale of the Bonds, amounted to \$31,112,486. The only other indebtedness will be this issue of \$30,000,000 Bonds and \$6,342,500, consisting almost entirely of Westinghouse Machine Company First and Refunding Mortgage Bonds, due 1940. The Capital Stock of the Company, now paying 8% dividends per annum, amounts to \$74,812,650 par value, having a market value at present quotation in excess of \$70,000,000.

The issue of the Bonds and their sale to you is subject to favorable action by the stockholders of the Company upon a proposed increase in the indebtedness of the Company at their special meeting heretofore called to be held on November 18 next.

The form of the Bonds and the provisions of the Indenture under which they are to be issued shall be subject to your approval, and all legal proceedings for the creation thereof shall be subject to the approval of your counsel.

Pending the preparation of Definitive Bonds, Temporary Bonds will be issued.

Application will be made in due course to list the Bonds on the New York Stock Exchange."

The undersigned will receive subscriptions for the above Bonds, subject to allotment, at 94¾% and accrued interest to date of delivery, at which price the Bonds will yield about 7¾% on the investment if held to maturity.

Payment for Bonds allotted is to be made at the office of the undersigned against delivery of temporary Bonds, deliverable if, when and as issued and received by them. The right is reserved to reject any application in whole or in part.

New York, October 29, 1920.

KUHN, LOEB & CO.

All the above Bonds having been sold this advertisement appears as a matter of record only.

however, optimistic. They could see no reason why the industry should not pick up as other industries were doing, entirely overlooking, it seemed, the fact that copper was far in excess of demand, while other lines were well below demand. The lack of an analogous condition in copper as compared with other industries was largely ignored, and predictions were even made that, before the end of this year, the copper industry would have re-established itself to the point that dividends, which were cut in many instances in the first quarter, could be resumed on the level obtaining at the start of the year.

This hope has been dispelled. Demand, instead of increasing, has fallen off, and there is no immediate prospect that the situation will change. The copper companies are beginning to realize that their policy has been out of line with the situation, and there is an endeavor now to revamp the industry. There must be a new beginning. The copper surplus, as long as it exists, will be an ever-present menace to any establishment of a sane copper market, and, for this reason, there is an endeavor to unload stocks of copper. The big producers have been moved by this incentive as well as the small. Heavy bank loans are outstanding against copper and, whether or not they are called, it is the part of discretion to ease the carrying burden by liquidating stocks, and this endeavor is now in progress, even though its undertaking is so belated as to threaten the success of the proposal. Copper is being sold at a loss in the hope that ultimately conditions will be corrected and a foundation established from which a new start may be made.

But the plan is not as easy of consummation as it is of mention. At the outset of this year and well along toward the Summer, it is probable that some large amounts of copper could have been placed had price concessions been the rule, for industry then had not felt the stagnation brought on by buyers withdrawing from the market. There is a new problem to be solved now, namely, that of creating a demand for copper when industry is at, or approaching, a standstill. Only price recessions of the most drastic sort can impel consumers to stock up with copper at the present time. The bargain in the purchase has got to be beyond all manner of doubt since there is no telling just how long the copper will have to be carried before there is a demand for copper products which will call for heavy use of the metal.

Therefore, there is indication that the bottom

has been reached in copper. Consumers are reluctant to enter the market, though they may know in their hearts that copper is selling at a price far under production costs. They bank against this the endeavor of the producers to unload stocks, and thus the process of liquidation by the copper industry is hampered, and much copper will have to be carried for a long time to come no matter how drastic may be the price reduction. The outlook is not bright. It is in fact sombre. Apparently the consumers have the whip hand in copper rather more than in almost any other commodity and, so long as they are content to make hand-to-mouth purchases, the copper companies will have to carry the metal, a course which is the direct opposite of that which prevailed before the war.

It may be that the present situation will bring about a long-continued revolution of the normal condition in copper when the burden of carrying costs was carried by the consumers. Certain it is that the consumers will be loath to change since the fact that copper companies carrying the surplus is not altogether unacceptable as long as the copper surplus hangs over the market.

ALMOST A RECORD LOW PRICE

The chief endeavor of the producing companies, therefore, will be to reduce the surplus rather than to add to it, and in furtherance of this there is bound to be a further curtailment of operations in the industry. At the present time the producers are operating on a basis, roughly speaking, of 50 per cent. of capacity. This is too great, for the surplus is being increased. Therefore, the only answer is a further decrease in operations. How great this must be no one can tell, but it may be that some mines will close and that production in general will be cut in half as compared with the rate now obtaining. This, to be sure, will mean the disrupting of organizations which the copper companies have been loath to do, for it means that copper production will be interfered with for a long time after demand becomes assertive and higher operations are justified and called for by future conditions. The method is radical. It will mean the throwing out of employment of a large number of men, but it is the only course that can be pursued with any degree of justice to the companies themselves. Maintaining a wage scale based on a minimum price for copper of 18 cents a pound and at the same time selling the metal at 14 cents a pound is not by any means a profitable or equitable transaction.

Much has been heard as to copper costs. They are a bit intangible to be sure, since in many instances the cost of production is figured without making allowances for certain items of big portent, such, for instance, as the recovery of other metals, gold and silver. It is generally agreed, however, that there are almost no companies in the country which can consistently produce the metal for a sale price of 15 cents a pound and yet show a profit on the transaction when depletion and like considerations are figured. In 1918 there were only fourteen companies that reported a cost per pound of less than 15 cents, and these comprised 44 per cent of the copper output of the country. Since then costs have risen rapidly. In 1919 there was only one company which reported costs of less than 15 cents a pound, and the cost in the case of one company was placed at 22.40 cents a pound. The price of the metal now is lower than has prevailed since March of last year and, taking yearly averages as a basis of comparison, one has to run back as far as 1914 before the average falls below 14 cents. This proves conclusively that the present price is low. In 1919 the average price was 18.691, in 1918 24.682, in 1917 24.180, in 1916 27.202 and in 1915 17.275.

It is estimated that the copper production this year will be 1,350,000,000 pounds against a high record of 1,943,000,000 pounds in 1916. It will be seen from this that the falling off in production this year was not anywhere near as much as would have been expected in view of the unfavorable situation which exists. This year's production will be higher than that of any pre-war year.

The copper market has always been more or less influenced by the foreign situation. Prior to the war the Germans dominated the world market. This has been changed, but it is agreed that demand from abroad must come in big proportions before there can be relief from the surplus here. And that demand is far off. For one thing there is not the activity abroad to cause the buying of huge amounts of copper. Neither is there the money in many countries to make the purchases were demand assertive. Also the fact cannot be overlooked that exchange is a serious obstacle to the export of copper, and there is a disposition to use such scrap metal as exists rather than to come into the American market.

In all, the period of depression in copper, it appears, will continue to exist for a long time to come, and there will be a further sharp curtailment of mining operations.

Credit Deflation a Problem of Values More Than Uses

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this or that interest which believes it should have additional credit. We provided for decentralization, and now that we have it, particular interests which could be served by centralization of authority, want this power exercised in their behalf.

WHAT CREDIT IS

However, the situation is one which neither a centralized nor a decentralized banking system could immediately correct. The present inflation has come about from various causes. There is no magic way by which a normal condition can be restored by further increasing inflation, whether it be of gold, currency, or credit. Least of all have the banks—either now or in normal times—any such control over credit as is commonly supposed.

Notwithstanding the intimate contact which the business man often has with credit, its true nature and the relation of the bank to it, seem not to be understood. True credit is simply the transfer of purchasing power from one person to another, based upon a pledge by the second person that he has, or will have, actual or prospective control over goods which, in turn, will liquidate the debt. The basis of all credit must, in final analysis, be goods of actual value. Confidence is an essential element only in so far as it is superimposed upon this basic principle of actual or potential control over things of value—commodities or services—which can be bought and sold in the market. The bank is simply a dealer in commercial credit in that it exchanges its credit, which takes the form of general purchasing power, for that of an individual, which is distinctly limited. The bank must largely accept the conditions of business and credit as it finds them. Credit is essentially in the nature of a commodity, having its supply and demand, and being governed by the fundamental laws determining the value and price of other commodities.

The bank has only the depositor's funds with which to do business. It can no more make credit than it can make money. If the demand for credit and capital is large with respect to the supply,

then the elementary law of supply and demand operates, and consequently the price of the commodity increases. High money rates, or tight money, which is a short and inaccurate expression in common use to describe the condition wherein the supply of capital is small in proportion to the demand, is a result of conditions almost wholly without the control of the banker. Money or credit has its price, like any other commodity—that is, an increased demand for capital in the face of a relative decrease of the supply, causes high interest rates.

During the last six years there has been an enormous use of the capital funds of the world to carry on the war. It should be realized that in the use of this capital there was, in most cases, an actual destruction of it—that is to say, the form which this capital took earned for itself no replacement fund as it ordinarily would have done in times of peace. When a unit of capital becomes embodied in a machine, it normally earns not only a replacement fund, but also a repair fund, and the interest on the unit of capital employed. But a thousand units of capital, expressing themselves in a shell, earn no replacement fund. Shells, munitions of war, and even the clothing, horses and other war supplies, are in the nature of temporary and fixed capital goods which can be used for only a single purpose, and which by a single use are destroyed. Nor should it be forgotten that the cost of the war has been met. All the munitions and supplies have been paid for—capital has thus been utilized.

However warranted the purpose and use, it has been employed largely in an uneconomic manner, so far as returning an increase to the stock of permanent producers and consumers' goods. In all nations, the attempt, as of old, was made to make bricks without straw. We used up our capital in various war activities, and yet we needed the funds to carry on the industrial enterprises. We proceeded to increase our credit instruments; we issued bank notes and currency, and extended loans

until we had a highly inflated credit structure resting upon a narrowing basis of real value. The credit super-structure must always be based upon a sound capital foundation, which capital arises out of the industrial activity and savings of the people. It cannot be counterfeited by shadowy forms of value, variously called paper money, bank notes, &c.

GOVERNMENTS SHOWED THE WAY

The Governments of the leading nations led the way in erecting this flimsy credit structure by the vast system of deficit financing in the form of bonds, certificates of indebtedness and various obligations. Public debts of all leading nations doubled, trebled and quadrupled. Private credit followed the same course as public credit. The inflation of currencies of the leading nations, with concomitant causes, resulted in a violent increase in the price levels. Goods in process of production had their prices multiplied over night. Inventories enormously increased during short periods, with a result that the business man, facing the necessity of having to pay increased prices for raw materials and for labor, went to the banker, who, in turn, proceeded to loan him on the basis of these highly inflated values. Then began the endless chain of events—wages and prices rose, loans and credit instruments increased to meet the high costs of production, which again expresses itself in high prices. And yet there are those who would urge that more credit extension be made and higher prices and higher wages be provided that this endless comedy of robbing Peter to pay Paul be continued on its endless path.

The complaint of those who state that they are inadequately financed means, when followed to its logical conclusion, that the inflation should be continued; that loans should be based not upon the actual value of their goods as determined by conditions of supply and demand in the market, but upon some imagined value of price which they think they should receive for their produce.

The amount of credit financing that has taken place since 1914 is so enormous that it would stagger belief were it not for the fact that it is an accomplished performance. While a review of the increase in bank deposits, loans and discounts, and the increase in monetary circulation in the last few years, gives a good superficial index of the extent to which we have resorted to credit financing, it nowhere nearly tells all of the story. Bank deposits, including both national and State banks, increased from \$18,584,000,000 in 1914 to \$33,631,900,000 by Jan. 1, 1920. Loans and discounts rose from \$15,288,000,000 to \$25,301,000,000 in the same period. This tremendous increase was in large part due to the method used in financing the war, and was not a result of the legitimate growth of industry and trade.

The credit financing of the Government from April 6, 1917, to June 30, 1920, necessitated an increase in the public debt of more than \$23,000,000,000. In addition to this public financing, the output of new securities for the year of 1917 amounted to \$1,529,970,000; that of 1918 to \$1,344,810,000, and that of 1919 to \$3,021,171,000, and for the first six months of 1920 to \$1,800,177,000, thus entailing a total of more than \$30,000,000,000 of new financing in a period of three and one-half years, when normally in pre-war years the total of public and private financing was probably less than \$3,500,000,000.

The extent to which industrial financing enters into this total is not necessarily a cause for criticism or alarm. So far as these funds were used for essential purposes, they will take care of themselves. The extent to which this tremendous volume of credit financing fell upon the banks and used up their available supply of credit is not generally realized by the rank and file of the business community. During the war period, abstract questions of banking practice were of secondary consideration to that of winning the war. It mattered little whether the dominant purpose of that time was achieved by following a sound or an unsound method. The important thing was to obtain results and obtain them quickly.

OUR CREDIT SHOWING

After victory was achieved, sound banking methods again became a prime requisite if the results of the war were to be retained. Business men, however, in their desire to take advantage of the business opportunities that existed immediately following the close of hostilities, took little account of the changed condition in our banking situation resulting from governmental borrowings. In spite of the straitened financial condition, they called upon the banks to supply a volume of credit of unprecedented magnitude. The banks of the country responded to this demand to an extent almost unbelievable. It is not the banks that have curtailed credit, but the business men have used up all the available supply of credit. The degree to which the banks and the Federal Reserve system responded to the credit needs of the business community is well illustrated by the following table reviewing the volume of bills discounted for member banks by the Federal Reserve system each year from 1915 to June 30, 1920:

Date.	Bills Discounted for Member Banks.	Yearly Inc. of Bills Discounted.
1915.....	\$161,353,000
1916.....	207,870,000	\$46,517,500
1917.....	8,968,990,000	8,761,120,818
1918.....	39,752,933,847	30,783,943,029
1919.....	79,173,969,730	38,421,035,883
Six mos. of '20	38,431,408,230

The above table establishes a complete refutation of the charge quite frequently made recently that the banks have been restricting or withholding credit accommodations. With the volume of discounts running at the rate of \$39,000,000,000 for 1918 and \$79,000,000,000 for 1919, and the volume for the first six months of 1920 running at about the same ratio as that of 1919, it would seem that the truth of the matter indicates prodigality in the extension of credit rather than a refusal to loan. The latest figures available show that loans and discounts of national banks alone increased \$2,100,000,000 in the period from Sept. 12, 1919, to June 30, 1920. The increase for this period of less than nine months is more than 50 per cent. of the total volume of loans and discounts in all national banks in September, 1908, when they totaled \$4,781,000,000. Under these circumstances there seems to be little grounds for the charge that the banks have been denying credit accommodations arbitrarily.

That financial authorities should finally come to view with alarm the tremendous growth in our credit superstructure was but natural. Students of finance were in agreement more than a year ago that the banks had about reached the limit of prudence in the creation of credit. It was gen-

erally felt that it would be unsafe to go on increasing loans in order that manufacturers and others might produce goods which could be sold profitably only at prevailing or higher prices. The price level had become so unnaturally high that a curtailment in the demand for goods was strongly indicated. This, in itself, was the best reason for caution in extending credit at this time.

Under these conditions the obvious course to be followed was one which would permit the market to find its level. Because the public had for a short time shown an apparent willingness to pay any price in order to satisfy its wants was no justification for continuing to produce goods which could profitably be sold only at a price which as time went on was giving signs of rising considerably above that which the public was willing to pay.

That the banking community should take cognizance of these factors is cause for commendation, not condemnation. Disintegration develops in the credit structure not primarily because of its size, but because of some weakness in the foundation supporting it. It is not the size of the present credit structure that is causing worry, but the basis upon which it rests. To the extent that bank loans are based on the abnormally high prices to which some commodities rose, there is necessity for a curtailment in loans. We have already had a number of concrete illustrations in the banking world of the inevitable consequences resulting from extending any large volume of loans on the basis of commodities whose values have risen abnormally in relation to the average increase in commodity prices. Take the case of loans based on the \$14.05 a pound value for silks which obtained in January of this year, and which by July had dropped to \$6.08 a pound, a decline in value of 52 per cent. Furs need only to be mentioned to bring to mind what happened in the case of loans granted on their inflated values of nine months to one year ago.

The normal price of sugar before the war was about 4½ cents. The average increase in commodity prices from 1913 to June, 1920, according to the index number used by the Bureau of Labor, on the basis of 100 for 1913, was 269. On this same basis sugar rose to its high point in May, 1920, when its index number reached 523.3, or more than 150 points above the normal commodity increase. While sugar stands out prominently among the commodities that rose abnormally in price, it should be borne in mind that wheat, corn, oats, rye, potatoes, barley, cotton, cotton yarns, woolens, leather and pig iron also rose to a level considerably above the average commodity price increase. In the case of all such commodities while the higher prices may have been justified for a time, due to a real shortage in their supply, their physical volume of production at the present time should be carefully watched, for there is a strong probability that as soon as the cause for the abnormal rise in prices is removed they will drop back into line with the general price level. The mere fact that these are all staple commodities, and classed as necessities; will not prevent a decline in their value or save those from loss who have extended loans on the basis of their inflated value.

CREDIT INFLATION OUTSTANDING

Inflation is an evil, regardless of the commodity involved. Recently, we have heard so much concerning inflation that its real import often escapes us. In any discussion of this subject it is always well to bear in mind that, whether it is gold, currency, or credit inflation, the idea involved in each case is fundamentally that of an excessive supply. The evil, in this situation, results from the fact that the excess in supply of any one of the three destroys the normal relation existing between the volume of goods and the volume of purchasing power as measured by the monetary standard. Any sudden downward revision in the relative value of the purchasing power of the monetary unit, in terms of goods, is dangerous. It makes no difference whether the purchasing power of the monetary unit is depreciated as a result of an excessive supply of the metallic base supporting the monetary unit, or, from an abnormal increase in the paper equivalents representing the metallic unit, or, from an increase in the circulating medium of the country in terms of bank deposits. A sudden increase in any one of the three results in industrial and financial difficulties.

At present the inflationary tendency is manifesting itself primarily as credit inflation. The credit superstructure has been expanding at an ever accelerating rate until today it is obviously topheavy and has reached a point where a halt must be called. The Federal Reserve system has been making every effort to stabilize the situation in one way or another. Plea after plea has been sent out to the business communities requesting them to limit their credit needs to purely essential operations.

Much of the discussion about credit control has been thoughtless and dogmatic. There is no such thing as an absolute fixed "normal credit condition" which can be established by abstract rule. Business and prices are continually changing, increasing and decreasing in activity and levels in certain or in all lines and, therefore, credit extensions and contractions should respond to the changed condition. There is no more reason to stabilize credit at a certain point than to stabilize the dollar, or the production of corn or of cotton. Our problem is not necessarily to reduce the credit structure as a whole 10, 20 or 30 per cent., but to reduce that part of it which rests on an unsound foundation. To attempt merely to strengthen our reserve position, as some have recently advocated, or to stabilize the present situation by preventing further expansion, would be a mere palliative—not a cure—for our present ills. The essential task confronting us is to bring about a discriminating deflation by reducing the volume of credit that rests upon an unsound or insecure foundation. This does not necessarily involve a general policy of contraction all the way along the line, but requires a reduction in that part of the credit superstructure that is weak because of its inadequate foundation. To achieve this purpose it will be necessary to apply a principle considerably different from that recently advocated, which had for its purpose a discrimination between essential and non-essential loans. The fallacy involved in attempting to discriminate on this basis lies in the implied assumption that no matter how much the selling price of an essential commodity may have advanced in the last few years, its present value is fundamentally secure, and vice versa—that no matter how little the value of a non-essential may have advanced in the last few years, loans based on such a commodity should be denied.

Such a policy is not only unsound, but unjust. It misses the real evil in our present credit structure—loans made on the basis of overvalued commodities—and merely attempts to reduce the demand for credit by limiting it to a particular class of commodities. A crash in the credit structure can occur only as a result of some sudden decline in the value of one or more commodities which have been overvalued and upon which large sums of money have been loaned on the basis of their inflated value.

Responsibility for the existing situation rests no more with the banking community than it does with the business community or the general public. It is the result of a development inherent in the conditions that existed during the last few years. If the banks failed to be as prudent as they should have been in granting loans, the business community was likewise imprudent in the demand it made for funds, and the public—in last analysis—bears a large degree of responsibility in so far as it demanded an unprecedented volume of goods and commodities, showing a willingness over a considerable period of time to pay almost any price in order to satisfy its desires.

To the extent that the banks loaned money on commodities having a highly inflated value they did so only because the public was buying freely at the higher levels. It is unjust to attempt to fix responsibility for a situation that has resulted from the interplay of so many forces. It was no more the duty of the banks to curtail loans when the price level was high than it was the duty of the public to curtail purchases, or of the manufacturer to reduce production. An increase in the supply of goods and commodities was essential. It is a debatable question, the extent to which the Federal Reserve system should have limited its facilities at such a time when there existed an obvious shortage in the supply of many necessities. The business community was urged to speed up production even though prices were high, not only by the effective demand of the public, but also upon the advice of careful students of financial and industrial conditions.

GETS BACK TO THE WAR

In the last analysis responsibility rests largely with the psychological condition produced by the post-war boom. After the immediate effects of the reaction resulting from the ending of hostilities had subsided, business men everywhere naturally turned their attention to supplying domestic needs that had been neglected for several years. Industrial concerns as a whole were in a most advantageous and prosperous condition as a result of the war boom. Profits resulting from the manufacture of munitions had been large. Many additions had been made to plant and equipment. Old deficits had been wiped out and large surpluses had been accumulated. While prices were high, wages were also high, and the purchasing power of the public was large, not only as a result of higher wages, divi-

Forces Swaying Stocks and Bonds

Stocks

STOCK market activity was at low ebb last week, the election rally which had been predicted failing to materialize and prices drifting lower in the leading issues. There seems to be some pressure against the market now from sales to establish losses for income tax purposes. The appearance of this factor in the market thus early is quite the opposite of what has taken place in previous years. Most of the selling heretofore has been crowded into the month of December, but there is an evident desire now to make whatever losses may have been incurred a clear cut fact without waiting until the eleventh hour. The rather sharp declines in some stocks were traceable to this market influence rather than to a continuation of bear raids.

The stock market continued to be in the hands of the professionals, but their endeavors even on the long or the short side were rather apathetic. The public continued to refrain from making purchases except in so far as some stocks were picked up by bargain hunters, and in such cases the shares are usually taken out of the Street. Call money was again tight, this preventing to a certain extent any display on the long side. Then, too, there were depressing factors, such as the British strike situation and word of unsettlement in some of the South American countries. The closeness of the market to the election also acted as a curb, traders preferring to wait until after the ballots have been cast before assuming a positive position. How dull was the market is best told by the fact that reports that the State Department was preparing to recognize the de facto Government of Mexico failed to arouse more than a momentary interest.

American Car and Foundry Loses 1/2—The company is rushing work on its new plant at Buffalo. Plans are being undertaken for handling the big equipment business which is expected to start some time next Spring.

American Linseed Down 2 1/2—Trading was in small volume, some speculative holdings being released. The supposed deal whereby British interests will take over the company continues to hang fire.

American Locomotive Off 1 1/2—While the equipment business is not by any means good for the moment, the company is understood to be earning well in excess of dividend requirements.

American Smelting Gains 1 1/2—Good buying came to this issue despite the fact that copper during the week touched the low of 14 1/2 cents per pound.

American Sumatra Tobacco Off 2—There has been considerable speculation in this issue. At present prices the dividend yield is highly attractive, but there continues to be a doubt in the minds of some as to whether the company will continue the 10 per cent. rate.

American Tobacco Down 6 1/4—Heavy short selling served to depress the price. The company is believed to be doing a business far in excess of that of last year.

American Woolen Off 1/4—While the woolen business is not particularly good, there is every evidence that productions from capacity operations could be absorbed, since actually there is a shortage of woolen goods. The price cutting campaign, however, has held back demand.

Anaconda Gains 1/4—Many believe that this issue has discounted all the unfavorable aspects of the copper situation. The shares are selling close to the low of the year, which was made last August.

Atlantic, Gulf and West Indies Down 3 1/2—Recognition of Mexico by this Government will perhaps mean that some of the denunciations made by Atlantic Gulf on Mexican oil property will go into the discard. The United States has voiced unqualified disapproval of the Carranza decrees under which the denunciations were made.

Baldwin Locomotive Down 1 1/2—Speculation was heavy, short selling being a factor of importance in depressing the shares.

Barnet Leather Off 15—There was only a thin market for this specialty. Offerings, in view of the demoralized condition of the leather market, were made at a sacrifice.

Bethlehem Steel Down 1 1/2—The shares failed to respond to an excellent statement of the company's position by President Eugene G. Grace. The company is earning at the rate of \$25 a share on the common stock.

California Packing Gains 1 1/2—The company's business is steadily expanding and net earnings are moving up proportionately.

Canadian Pacific Down 1/4—There were reports that the company might reduce its dividend rate, but these were not taken seriously.

Central Leather Preferred Declines 4 1/2—The report for the third quarter of the year showed a heavy deficit. It is believed that inventories were heavily written down.

Chandler Motors Off 2 1/2—There has been a slowing up throughout the entire automobile industry.

Coca-Cola Down 4 1/2—The Directors again postponed the dividend which was due at this time.

Corn Products Up 1/4—While the company is not operating at capacity, it is understood that earnings are well in excess of dividend requirements.

Crucible Steel Down 5—The bears succeeded in

bringing some liquidation in this issue. A lowering of steel prices provided ammunition for the raid.

Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Off 1 1/2—There was a further moderate liquidation of speculative holdings.

General Chemical Gains 1/2—Earnings for the third quarter of the year were highly favorable, being well in excess of earnings of the same period in 1919.

General Motors Off 1/4—The shares dipped close to its low for the year on further liquidation of long stock.

Great Northern Preferred Loses 1 1/2—The September earnings statements which have thus far come forth from the railroads have proved something of a disappointment.

Inspiration Copper Down 1/4—Offerings of the stock were well absorbed, there apparently being some persistent buying of the copper shares.

Kelly Springfield Off 2—The stock reacted on reports that there was to be a general reduction in tire prices, following the lead set by the United States Rubber Company.

Maxwell Motors Down 1/4—Shares continued to be heavy. It is reported that a large portion of the stockholders have turned in their stock in support of the reorganization plan of Chalmers and Maxwell.

Mexican Petroleum Off 1 1/4—The stock failed to reflect the announcement that the de facto Government of Mexico might be recognized within a short time.

New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Gains 2 1/2—An initial dividend of 1 1/2 per cent. was declared on the stock.

New York Central Down 1 1/2—The earnings statement for September proved to be a disappointment.

Northern Pacific Off 2 1/4—There was some liquidation of stock due to the fact that railroad earnings for September were not living up to expectations.

Otis Elevator Declines 9—There was only a thin market for the shares, and in view of the unsteady position of the industrial group, small offerings served to depress this issue sharply.

Owens Bottling Machine Company Off 4 1/2—The nine months' earnings statement showed a good gain over last year. The stock, however, was weak on small offerings.

Pan American Petroleum Down 1—There was a heavy turnover of the stock. Pan American is steadily expanding its business in conjunction with the Mexican Petroleum Company.

Pierce-Arrow Off 1 1/2—There was a sharp drop in earnings for the quarter ended Sept. 30.

Prairie Oil and Gas Up 20—There was excellent buying of this Standard Oil issue in the belief that other companies will follow the lead as to stock dividends which has been set by Standard of Indiana.

Railway Steel Spring Down 2 1/2—The company is doing a big repair business, and the present dividend rate, it is said, is being more than earned.

Savage Arms Loses 3 1/4—The company passed the quarterly dividend due at this time.

Standard of Indiana Gains 22—The company declared a stock dividend of 150 per cent.

Seneca Copper Up 1 1/4—There was further speculative buying of the issue in anticipation of the property being taken over by another large copper company.

Standard of New York Advances 11—It is believed that the stock dividend plan put out some time ago and then withdrawn will ultimately be revived.

Sinclair Consolidated Gains 1/2—The Mexican properties of the company are being developed on a large scale. Several new wells have been brought in recently.

Bonds


TRANSACTIONS in listed bonds last week were in good-size volume, with prices mostly irregular, and the demand for new high-yielding offerings, which has been abnormal during the last few weeks, continued unabated. This was particularly true of those offerings brought out last week, aggregating approximately \$60,000,000, chief among which were \$30,000,000 Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company 7 per cent. gold bonds, which were heavily oversubscribed, maturing May 1, 1931, and offered to investors at 94 1/2 and interest, yielding about 7 1/2 per cent., and \$13,000,000 first and refunding mortgage 7 1/2 per cent. twenty-year sinking fund gold bonds of the Pennsylvania-Ohio Power and Light Company, offered at 96 1/2 and interest, to net about 7.95 per cent. Other important offerings were \$5,000,000 ten-year 7 per cent. convertible sinking fund debentures of the Pfister & Vogel Leather Company at 95 and interest, to yield about 7.70 per cent.; \$2,625,000 (Series "D") fifteen-year 8 per cent. convertible collateral trust bonds of the San Joaquin Light and Power Corporation at 100 and interest, and \$5,500,000 Lukens Steel Company first mortgage twenty-year 8 per cent. gold bonds at 99 1/2, to yield over 8 per cent.

Liberty Bonds Irregular—Most of the bonds of this group moved along irregularly the better part of the week, with the 3 1/2s finally selling up to around 93.12 from a low of 92.70. With the second 4 1/2s, the fluctuations were between 88.04 and 89.06, the third 4 1/2s between 89.90 and 90.90; the fourth 4 1/2s between 88 and 89.06, and the Victory 4 1/2s and 3 1/2s between 95.94 and 96.42 and 95.94 and 96.44, respectively.

Railroad Bonds Continued Irregular—Irregularity was again very pronounced in this section. For instance, Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé general 4s, which the first of the week sold up to around 77 1/2, later fell off a point to around 76 1/2, with a recovery to around 77 1/2, and Baltimore & Ohio 6s, which on Monday reached 92 1/2 from a low of 90 1/2, sold down to around 91, and then moved up to around 92. The convertible 4 1/2s of this latter company moved along in about the same fashion, selling up early to 74 1/2 and then taking a big drop of about four points to 70 1/2, finally advancing to around 73 1/2. Other similar cases were the Central Pacific first 4s, which fluctuated between 73 1/2 and 75; Chesapeake & Ohio convertible 5s between 85 1/2 and 86 1/2; and the convertible 4 1/2s between 75 1/2 and 76 1/2; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy joint 4s between 96 and 96 1/2; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul convertible 4 1/2s of 1932 between 73 1/2 and 75 1/2; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific refunding 4s between 68 and 69 1/2; Erie convertible 4s (Series "D") between 49 1/2 and 52 1/2; Kansas City Southern 5s between 74 and 76; Kansas City Terminal 4s between 73 1/2 and 75; Missouri Pacific general 4s between 57 1/2 and 58 1/2; Missouri, Kansas & Texas first 4s between 62 1/2 and 62 3/4; New York Central debenture 7s of 1930 between 102 and 102 1/2, and the debenture 6s between 91 1/2 and 93 1/2; Pennsylvania 7s of 1930 between 104 1/2 and 105, and the general 4 1/2s between 83 and 84 1/2; Rock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana 4 1/2s between 68 and 69 1/2; St. Louis & San Francisco prior lien 4s (Series "A") between 61 1/2 and 62 1/2, the adjustment 6s between 67 and 68, and the income 6s between 53 1/2 and 55; Seaboard Air Line adjustment 5s between 39 and 42; Oregon & California first 5s between 88 1/2 and 89 1/2; Southern Pacific convertible 5s between 99 1/2 and 102 1/2, and the

Continued on Following Page

Continued on Following Page



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Money

CALL money was tight throughout the week. On Monday the opening and renewing rate was 8 per cent., but by afternoon new loans were being arranged at 10 per cent., and on every day thereafter the renewal rate was at 9 per cent. and the afternoon rate for new loans 10 per cent. The supply, so far as could be judged from the exterior, was at all times sufficient to meet the Stock Exchange requirements, but there was not the usual "unlending surplus" returned to the banks each afternoon. Evidences were plentiful that the bankers were more carefully "rationing" the stock market than they had been in the habit of doing for some little time. This rationing was informal and according to no set plan, so far as could be learned, but it was, nevertheless, carried on, and no dumping of money into the stock market occurred.

Time funds were nominal, both as to supply and quotation. There was very little business moving, and such as there was was at unchanged rates. Commercial paper was quiet and no outstanding feature developed. The demand was mainly from out of town, local banks apparently holding off from this market, presumably because of the demands made upon them by the great mass of new financing which just now is coming into the investment market.

Regarding the commercial paper market, the local Federal Reserve Bank has made a canvass of leading dealers, and in the current number of the institution's monthly review gives the result of this canvass in the following words:

"With the consent of eleven large distributors of commercial paper, we are able to show from reports made by them from month to month to this bank the aggregate amount of commercial paper outstanding for their respective houses, exclusive of short-time notes and similar instruments. The amount shows practically a steady increase from \$662,000,000 on Oct. 31, 1918, to a peak of \$1,019,000,000 on Jan. 31, 1920. Within the last eight months, however, the total outstanding has declined \$216,000,000 to \$803,000,000, reported at the close of September."

Last week's stringency in the call money market was easily explainable and came from perfectly natural causes. In the first place there was the deficit of \$23,977,180 reported in the actual Clearing House statement of a week ago. This was sufficient reason to inspire a reasonable amount of tightening in new loans. And, added to that, the Government withdrew upward of \$45,000,000, in two installments, from the local district, which is to say mainly from New York City banks. In the actual Clearing House statement of the last week the amount of depletion in Government deposits was shown to have been \$38,279,000, which is about the right proportion of local to district withdrawals.

This decline brought the amount of Government deposits in local banks down to \$26,640,000, as against \$175,000,000 at the end of September, with a Treasury certificate subscription figuring in in the meantime. Such a loss to the banks, when added to a loss of nearly \$120,000,000 in demand deposits in the last three weeks, even in the face of a contraction of slightly more than \$150,000,000 in loans in the same period, leaves the banks about \$115,000,000 lower in available cash than they were, and is sufficient explanation for the 10 per cent. call rate without any irrelevant reference to "profiteering."

Further, the banks have been called upon to render the usual assistance in the new financing which has been going ahead very rapidly these last two months or so. Both foreign and domestic borrowers are fairly flooding the local market with applications for loans, and with the present state of the bond market, where apparently there is no end to the demand for high-grade and attractive emissions, it is probable that the flow of new issues will be uninterrupted for some time to come.

The weekly statements of the Reserve Bank and the Clearing House Association again reflected the drains which the interior is making. In the Federal Reserve Bank's display there was an improvement in the ratio of cash reserves to note and net deposit liabilities of one-half of 1 per cent. to 39.1 per cent. This was accomplished largely through the transfer of \$23,000,000 of the bank's commercial paper discounts to other Federal Reserve Banks, for total cash reserves were up only \$21,793,000, while net deposits were up \$35,219,000 and outstanding Federal Reserve notes were increased on the week by \$1,679,000. The increase in net deposits was occasioned largely by the increase of \$28,522,000 in member banks' reserve deposits and by the gain of \$4,104,000 made in the Government's deposit account.

Member banks' borrowings were increased \$30,-

927,000 on balance, through an increase of \$36,910,000 in commercial paper borrowings and a decrease of \$5,983,000 in Government paper rediscounts. The bank, as stated, borrowed \$23,000,000 additional from other Reserve Banks, making the full amount now stand at \$48,000,000. The Treasury paid off \$5,995,000 of its loans at the Reserve Bank, but the institution added \$14,983,000 to its holdings of acceptances purchased in the open market. Thus, on all accounts, total earning assets were increased by \$16,915,000 on the week.

In the Clearing House exhibits loans in both the actual and average increased considerably, the former by \$61,749,000 and the latter by \$74,282,000. In demand deposits, however, the comparison was marked. In actual demand deposits there was a decline of only \$3,889,000, while in average demand deposits the decline was \$65,574,000, indicating an increase in deposits at the end of the week. Government deposits were down \$38,279,000 in the actual, and bills payable, acceptances, rediscounts, &c., were up \$27,113,000 to a new high record for all time of \$1,306,823,000. By increasing their reserve deposits by \$87,049,000, according to the Clearing House computation, the associated banks were able to overcome the deficit of \$23,977,180 which they had sustained the preceding week and replace it with an excess reserve of \$13,995,090.

Stocks—Transactions—Bonds

STOCKS, SHARES

October 30

	1920	1919	1918
Monday	481,365	1,258,540	952,769
Tuesday	430,521	1,553,060	546,248
Wednesday ..	460,281	1,444,641	943,006
Thursday	839,433	1,520,473	817,524
Friday	505,364	1,865,950	797,286
Saturday	216,859	807,400	387,950

Total week.	2,933,823	8,459,064	4,444,793
Year to date.	177,945,079½	259,446,707	117,864,937

BONDS, PAR VALUE

Monday	\$13,428,000	\$12,931,000	\$7,819,500
Tuesday	12,308,500	12,036,500	7,266,500
Wednesday ..	10,737,500	11,783,000	7,040,000
Thursday	15,236,700	15,134,500	8,199,000
Friday	10,182,400	12,649,000	9,307,500
Saturday	6,349,850	7,126,500	5,833,000

Total week.	\$68,243,550	\$71,660,500	\$45,465,500
Year to date.	3,073,182,800	2,730,297,000	1,465,547,500

In detail the bond dealings compare as follows with the corresponding week last year:

	Oct. 30, '20	Nov. 1, '19	Changes
Corporations ..	\$21,230,000	\$12,454,500	+ \$8,775,500
Liberty	41,149,050	55,069,000	- 13,949,950
Foreign Govts.	5,653,500	3,857,000	+ 1,796,500
State	61,000	+ 61,000
City	150,000	250,000	- 100,000
Total all	\$68,243,550	\$71,660,500	- \$3,426,950

Stocks—Averages—Bonds

TWENTY-FIVE RAILROADS

	High.	Low.	Last.	Net Same Day	Ch'ge. Last Yr.
Oct. 25....	61.46	60.82	60.95	-.29	60.79
Oct. 26....	61.28	60.87	61.13	+.18	60.48
Oct. 27....	61.12	60.54	60.69	-.44	60.48
Oct. 28....	60.79	59.32	60.19	-.50	60.07
Oct. 29....	60.87	59.83	60.53	+.34	60.26
Oct. 30....	60.81	60.40	60.58	+.05	60.17

TWENTY-FIVE INDUSTRIALS

Oct. 25....	105.20	103.77	104.21	+.11	131.47
Oct. 26....	104.06	103.35	103.70	-.51	133.76
Oct. 27....	103.57	102.26	102.62	-1.08	133.42
Oct. 28....	102.47	100.02	101.59	-1.03	133.32
Oct. 29....	102.83	101.04	102.43	+.84	134.84
Oct. 30....	102.83	101.97	102.26	-.17	134.45

COMBINED AVERAGE—FIFTY STOCKS

Oct. 25....	83.33	82.29	82.58	-.09	96.13
Oct. 26....	82.67	82.11	82.41	-.17	97.12
Oct. 27....	82.34	81.40	81.65	-.76	96.95
Oct. 28....	81.63	79.67	80.89	-.76	96.69
Oct. 29....	81.85	80.43	81.48	+.59	97.55
Oct. 30....	81.82	81.18	81.42	-.06	97.31

Bonds—Forty Issues

	Close.	Net Change.	Same Day
Oct. 25.....	72.99	-.07	75.06
Oct. 26.....	72.81	-.09	74.90
Oct. 27.....	72.69	-.12	74.85
Oct. 28.....	72.43	-.26	74.79
Oct. 29.....	72.50	+.07	74.48
Oct. 30.....	72.68	+.18	74.33

STOCKS—YEARLY HIGHS AND LOWS—BONDS

— 50 STOCKS. —				— 40 BONDS. —			
	High.	Low.		High.	Low.		
*1920..	94.07 Apr.	75.04 Aug.	73.14 Oct.	65.57 May			
1919..	99.59 Nov.	69.73 Jan.	79.05 June	71.05 Dec.			
1918..	80.16 Nov.	64.12 Jan.	82.36 Nov.	75.65 Sep.			
1917..	90.46 Jan.	57.43 Dec.	89.48 Jan.	74.24 Dec.			
1916..	101.51 Nov.	*0.91 Apr.	89.48 Nov.	86.19 Apr.			
1915..	94.13 Oct.	58.99 Feb.	87.62 Nov.	81.51 Jan.			
1914..	73.30 Jan.	57.41 July	89.42 Feb.	81.42 Dec.			
1913..	79.10 Jan.	63.09 June	92.31 Jan.	85.45 Dec.			
1912..	85.83 Sep.	75.24 Feb.			
1911..	84.41 June	69.57 Sep.			
*To date							

*To date.

Bonds

Continued from Preceding Page

convertible 4s between 77% and 79, and Union Pacific convertible 4s between 82½ and 84, and the 6s between 99 and 100½.

Tractions Active and Irregular—The local traction obligations absorbed a good part of the interest manifest in last week's bond market, but prices were mostly headed downward until the latter part of the week, when substantial gains were recorded. Interborough Rapid Transit first and refunding 5s on Monday opened at 54½, dropped over three points to 51½, and finally finished the week around 53½. The Interborough-Metropolitan 4½s early reached 22½, and then like the 5s developed a sinking spell, going down to around 18½, but later got up to around 21. Hudson & Manhattan first and refunding 5s, too, were very erratic, first selling up to 62¼, declining to 61½, advancing again to 62¼, dropping to 61½, gaining fractionally to 62¼, finally closing the week around 61½, while the adjustment income 5s, which were rather quiet most of the week, fluctuated between 23¼ and 24½. Third Avenue adjustment 5s continued their activity, but like the rest of the group, were inclined to seek lower levels. The bonds sold down from a high of 34 established on Monday to 30¼, and then improved to around 32¼.

Industrials Only Moderately Active—The bonds of this section were only moderately active, and the price tendency, like the bonds of the other group, was more or less on the decline. Probably the most noticeable in this respect was on Thursday, when the Bush Terminal Building 5s sold up a point to 75, and before the day was over dropped a full three points to 72, later moved up to around 74½, then finished the week almost three points lower to 72. Atlantic Fruit 7s, too, after advancing a point to 85½, fell off fractionally to around 85, and American Smelting and Refining 5s (Series "A"), which early declined from 77½ to 76½, later moved up to 77, and then dropped to around 76½, while the United States Realty and Improvement 5s got up to 82, finally falling off fractionally to around 81½. United States Steel sinking fund 5s were active, and fluctuated between 90½ and 94. International Mercantile Marine sinking fund 6s moved between 79½ and 81½; United States Rubber 7½s between 98 and 98½, the 7s between 98 and 99, and the first and refunding 5s between 77% and 78. Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania 7s were traded in at prices ranging between 100 and 101½.

Foreign Bonds in Fairly Good Demand—Foreign obligations as a whole on the Exchange were quite active, but not so much so as during other recent sessions. The new Government issues were leaders in activity with the French 8s. advancing at one time to 102½, but selling off later to around 101½, and the Belgian 7½s going to around 99½ from a high for the week of 100½. Government of Switzerland 8s, on the other hand, after selling off on Monday from 104 to around 103½, advanced to 104½, later dropped to 103, and then advanced again to 103½. Argentine 5s early gained a half a point to 71½ and then started to decline, going down again to 71. City of Paris 6s were fairly active and fluctuated between 95 and 95½. Japanese 4s were traded in between 57% and 58, the first 4½s between 74¼ and 75¼ and the second 4½s between 74¼ and 75; the United Kingdom 5½s, the 1922 issue, between 94% and 95½, the 1929 maturity between 88% and 89½, and those maturing in 1937 between 87% and 87½. The United States of Mexico 5s were unusually active on Friday and gained almost two points to 43, closing the week around 42½.

Stocks

Continued from Preceding Page

Southern Pacific Up 3¼—The shares moved close to their high for the year on a wave of speculative buying.

Standard Oil of New Jersey Gains 49—It is rumored that this company may follow the lead of Standard of Indiana and declare a stock dividend.

Studebaker Loses 1½—There was further liquidation of speculative holdings.

Union Pacific Off 2—Heaviness throughout the entire railroad group brought selling pressure into this issue.

United Fruit Down 4½—It is reported that the question of stock dividend may come before the Directors at their next meeting.

United States Rubber Off 5½—There was heavy bear pressure against the issue in the latter days of last week. The company announced reductions in tire prices.

United States Steel Declines ¼—The shares held firm but failed to reflect, as might have been expected, the excellent earnings statement for the third quarter of the year. The balance was equivalent to nearly \$5 a share on the common stock.

Utah Copper Up ¼—There was good buying of the stock despite the fact that the copper market showed no improvement.

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The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

THE September foreign trade figures, announced during the last week, were a revelation quite unexpected by many of those who pose as accurate forecasters of the business trend. It had been confidently asserted that the September figures would show a decline in exports as compared with August, this conclusion being arrived at because of the known factors making for a curtailment in our foreign business. And that there was refutation of the predictions as regards September probably serves only as an instance of the exception proving the rule. The foreign exchange situation is the underlying reason why there should be a contraction in our foreign business and that during September it did not play its part to the extent that might have been expected is probably accounted for by the imperative demand which Europe was feeling for goods obtainable with the greatest expediency in our market. Exports for the nine months of this year are the heaviest on record, but in any comparison of figures due allowance must necessarily be made for the higher values represented by the commodities exported. Furthermore, the exports have been showing a marked change in character, foodstuffs playing a lesser rôle than they did in 1919. The September exports amounted to \$606,000,000, or some \$11,000,000 more than in the corresponding month of last year. The outward flow of goods in September was, however, far below the record of \$819,000,000 established in March.

Imports during September were \$363,000,000 as compared with \$435,000,000 for September last year. Comparing the September exports with imports there was a favorable trade balance of \$243,000,000, which is the largest since May. The balance for August on the other hand fell to \$65,000,000, which was well below what would be considered a normal figure for even the pre-war years.

The situation with relation to business in this country shows no developments other than an accentuation of the decline in prices, which has been the topic of discussion for many weeks. There is beginning to be once more speculation as to the extent of price recession, and more and more evidence is coming to hand for authoritative quarters that the decline has been too rapid and that there must be a recovery in the primary markets at least. There is no way of estimating when such a rally will make its appearance. Several factors would seem to indicate that it was still far off. In the first place, the Fall trade has been literally shot to pieces, and there can hardly be any hope of the business revival until Spring. That is the time most frequently mentioned in business circles. But before that comes there will have to be some stabilization of prices, and it may not be amiss to expect that it will be on a somewhat higher price plane in many lines than that which now obtains. Wool, hides and leather and cotton have gone through a severe readjustment, and while the effect of the primary market declines has not yet worked its way through the retail channels it will ultimately do so, even though there may be an upturn in basic prices. Those lines which have not thus far suffered heavily, it appears, must in the long run give way, the only difference being that the reconstruction of industry in such avenues will be postponed a bit longer than elsewhere.

Shipping

THERE will be no change in the system under which Shipping Board steamers are operated during the next few months. In spite of the indorsement by the shipowners of the bare boat charter plan, Chairman Benson has advised that the Government will not consider this system until the present allocated operation plan, under the new agreement, is given a thorough trial. However, it is regarded as inevitable that the Shipping Board will be forced to change from the present form because it does not place a direct responsibility on the operator.

Announcement has been made that Commissioner John A. Donald, who has had practical experience as a ship operator, has agreed to accept a renomination on the new Shipping Board. Although Gavin McNab of San Francisco and Theodore Marburg of Baltimore have declined the appointment, Joseph N. Teal of Portland, Ore., has accepted, and Frederick I. Thompson of Mobile is expected to acknowledge his willingness to sit upon the Shipping Board. When the personnel is complete more stabilized shipping conditions are expected.

The ocean freight market remains quiet. The Pacific Coast steamship companies are following the lead of Eastern operating companies in return-

ing steamers to the Shipping Board because of the lack of freight offering. The Matson Navigation Company and the Pacific Mail Steamship Company have taken this step.

The strike of the British miners did not have any material effect upon shipping. The demand for export coal was surprisingly weak, and the charters of vessels did not drop appreciably. The most marked change in rates came when the Shipping Board narrowed the ocean freight rate on flour to only 5 cents more per 100 pounds than on wheat.


Developments by American companies continue in spite of the depression. The Polish-American Navigation Corporation has announced the purchase of the Sierra from the Green Star Steamship Line. The vessel is being reconditioned and will be employed as an immigrant carrier, operating from New York to Danzig, sailing Nov. 10. The line submitted the highest bid to the Shipping Board for the Black Arrow, formerly the German ship Rhaetia, and expects to add her to the fleet. The International Maritime Line has announced a new service to Cuban ports, while the Five Continent Line will start a bi-monthly service to Mexico in

November with the sailing of the Elida Clausen, a 4,000-ton ship.

The Federal courts held last week that steamship conferences on rates were not in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust act, and ruled that the thirty-four steamship companies and a large number of freight brokers were not guilty of a conspiracy to restrain trade, because the steamship lines would not pay brokerage to firms not members of the Steamship Freight Brokers' Association. The decisions indicated that the courts would not interfere with legitimate operations of the conferences and the associations and cheered the shipping interests considerably.

The American Line has announced that steps have been taken to transfer from British to American registry the 17,000-ton vessel Minnekahda. She will be reconstructed and converted into a passenger liner, operating with the Mongolia and Manchuria from Hamburg to New York. The White Star Line has purchased the former German steamer Berlin from the British Government for its Mediterranean service from New York and Boston to Italian ports, and has announced that it will bring its fleet up to pre-war strength

Business Index Line



August Index Number 36.8.

Number required for September to continue potential forecast already begun not less than 40.

Actual September Index Number 40.02.

SINCE it requires four index numbers to constitute a forecast of impending favorable business conditions, no more can be said at this time than that the preliminary requirements of such a forecast have been fulfilled, the index number for September substantiating the indication given by the August number. Should the October number reach 44 or more, an upturn of prices on the New York Stock Exchange, the beginning of a long rising market, should be looked for about the end of the year and a revival of business activity should be expected in the late Spring or early Summer.

In general the prices of investment stocks on the New York Stock Exchange and of the condition of business throughout the country will follow the trend of the Business Index Line, stock prices responding first to the influences which direct the index line and business feeling the effect of these influences some four to ten months later.

However, a change in direction of the line is not, alone, an indication that a falling stock market will rally or that a rising market has reached its peak. Such changes in direction of the index line may mark only momentary fluctuations which will presently cease to exert an influence and the line will resume its former trend.

In the case of a low level in the stock market and of unsettled business conditions, such as exist at present, an upward turn of the line can be considered as indicative of an impending change in conditions only when the index number of the second month following the turn shall be greater than 110 per cent. of the index number marking the turn and also greater than 108 per cent. of the index number of the first month after the turn and when the index number of the third month after the turn shall be greater than 110 per cent. of the index number of the third month. As exemplified in the present instance a forecast can be considered to have been given only if the October index number shall be greater than 110 per cent. of the September index number, or approximately 44.

In the case of a high level of the stock market, accompanied by great activity and prosperity in the business field, a downward turn of the line can be considered as indicative of an impending change for the worse only when the drop in per cent. from the index number of the preceding month is equal to an amount at least as many times .71 as the second index number is numerically greater than 83. For example, a drop in the index number from 92 to 88 would constitute a forecast, for 88 is 95.6 per cent. of 92 and so has fallen 4.4 per cent. But 88, being numerically greater than 83 by five, is required to fall only five times .71, or 3.55 per cent. A drop to 88 from 91 would not constitute a forecast, for 88 is only 3.3 per cent. less than 91 and the fall to 88 must be at least 3.55 per cent.

through the acquisition of other ships which were gained from Germany.

The Shipping Board has refused the bid submitted to it for all of the surplus property on the Pacific Coast, because it was held to be "inadequate." The shipyard at Mobile, operated by Frederick Ley & Co., has been disposed of to H. A. Stone of Philadelphia. It is anticipated that Hog Island will be sold to one of the companies submitting a bid for the world's largest shipyard. The steamer Madequet, a 5,175 deadweight ton freighter, has been sold at \$180 per deadweight ton to the Mount Washington Steamship Company. The board has refused to allocate more ships to the Kerr Steamship Company because the two principal officials of that line are not yet American citizens.

Shipbuilding is in a stagnant condition, in so far as new orders are concerned. The Mallory Line has announced that it will spend \$1,600,000 in giving a new life to the San Jacinto, which will be employed in the coastwise passenger trade. Plans have been drawn for a number of passenger steamers to be produced for private interests, but no contracts are being placed, because it is thought that shipbuilding steel and materials—which constitutes approximately 50 per cent. of the ship's total cost—will drop within a short while. No new contracts are being awarded for freighters, and it is not believed that many more tank steamers will be ordered.

There is talk of the Leviathan being reconditioned to serve as an immigrant carrier, but no official announcement has been made by the Shipping Board to indicate that it will follow out this recommendation. Transatlantic travel seems to be picking up, but a slump is expected to set in just after the holidays.

Iron and Steel

THERE was a further weakening in the prices in the steel market, and now and then reports come forth of instances wherein the independent quotations are on a par or at least close to those named by the United States Steel Corporation. Demand continues to be unassertive, which accounts for the price declines which are taking place, but in the main the steel men do not appear to be in the least worried, since they are working well along toward capacity on accumulative orders which bear only few marks of cancellation. Furthermore, there is a hope, not unjustified by indications of the moment, that the railroads will be heavy buyers of steel during 1921. Already some large rail orders have been placed, but the question of prices hangs in abeyance in certain instances. The Bethlehem Steel Corporation is one of this sort. The company has agreed to deliver a large tonnage of rails, with the price to be agreed upon before the end of this year, after a conference between the buyer and the seller. Also there is an expectation in some quarters that the steel corporation will advance the price of rails before the end of the year. The open hearth quotation at the present time is \$47 a ton, or the old stabilization figure. Several of the independents are asking \$57 a ton, and some contend that rails cannot be manufactured even at that price with a fair degree of profit.

The trend as to steel prices is best evidenced in the case of billets, which have declined rather sharply. During the middle of last week they were quoted at \$50 a ton, as compared with \$65 a ton several weeks earlier. The price of coke has dropped sharply, and the break in this essential fuel was what brought about a sharper recession in steel prices last week than has taken place at any time this year.

For the most part the steel companies are operating at somewhere in the neighborhood of 80 per cent. of capacity, and it does not seem that this level of production will be impaired during the balance of this year, unless perchance labor troubles and transportation difficulties occur. In contradistinction in the fall of prices last week the word came from Youngstown that puddlers' wages had been increased. This does not presage, however, any general increase in wages in the steel industry at this time.

Foreign Exchange

THE foreign exchange market was again dull and with out especially sensational feature. Sterling ruled reasonably firm and moved within narrow limits, but the Continental rates were heavy throughout the week and most of them closed far below where they had left off the previous week. Italian lire were probably the feature in the Continental department, with a break all through the week and a final price considerably below the previous extreme low quotation. The European

neutrals were as heavy as the countries which recently could be characterized as belligerents.

The overhanging factor in sterling was the coal strike and the threat of a sympathetic strike by railway and transport workers. Over the end of the previous week foreign advices had indicated an early breakup of the labor troubles and on Monday sterling was up about 2 cents in the pound to \$3.47½. On Tuesday and Wednesday, notwithstanding many conflicting reports and rumors regarding the labor situation, it ruled strong, going as high as \$3.48½ on the latter day. But on Thursday it became reactionary and fell away to \$3.45 and after a dull Friday broke again on Saturday to the week's lowest point of \$3.43¼, closing about a cent above the maximum decline. The news at the end of the week was considerably better, if for no other reason than that it was more definite than it had been earlier, but the rate continued to fall in the face of the improved news.

Just why the market should have acted in this way is difficult to say, unless it is that the same inconsistent movement which appeared in the market about a month ago is to be resumed. The market, of course, is extremely narrow and the offering of or the bidding for a relatively small quantity of bills will suffice to send it shooting one way or the other, without any regard whatever for the underlying factors which should govern its movements. The trading position of a few speculators, under present conditions, seems more powerful than economic developments. But this situation, obviously, cannot obtain for long. Only now when the market is too excessively thin is it possible for this to be so.

The action of the Continentals was more conventional and more easily explainable. All of these countries are suffering, in great or lesser degree, from the same evils. Paper inflation, insufficient taxes and deficits in budgets, combined with labor and social disturbances and a preponderance of imports over exports, notwithstanding some progress toward correcting the latter situation, all have contributed to upset the Continental exchanges, and while these influences were at work two or three or even five years ago, they still are factors in the situation at present.

Italy, one of the countries on the Continent which appeared to be facing its problems most courageously, now is suffering from a throw-back of labor difficulties. In addition, the Italians are not exporting goods in anything like the quantities in which they are importing, and the flood of lire bills, while never so excessive as judged by the standards of, say, France, is very heavy. On Saturday the quotation fell below 27.06, which is the lowest it ever has gone.

France, contrary to general expectations, does not seem to be working into the more favored position predicted for her as soon as the Anglo-French loan was out of the way. On Monday French francs sold slightly higher than on the preceding Saturday, but after that time the market fell and stayed down thereafter. Some improvement is noted in the volume of French paper money, the output of the Bank of France, but whether this is a definite improvement or only a temporary recovery remains to be seen.

Belgian exchange, as usual, moved in sympathy with French, and after a brief rally early in the week pointed downward persistently.

German marks, next to Italian lire, were the feature of the week. The opening quotation was 1.44, an advance of ½ over the close of the previous week, but on Tuesday they were down to 1.43 and continued to fall until Thursday, when they were quoted at 1.31½. They rallied to 1.35 on Friday but plunged downward again on Saturday, going as low as 1.28 and closing at 1.30½.

So far as may be seen, Germany is in most unhappy position. Inflation of paper money in tremendous volume continues to be the only method of German finance, and so long as this continues there can be no real or lasting improvement. The present decline marks the fourth movement in German exchange this year. When the year started marks were above 2 cents. By Feb. 9 they were down to about 1 cent each. Then they shot up again and by the latter part of May they were above 3 cents. Through the Summer and early Fall they fluctuated a good deal, going under 2 cents in August and above that price again and did not fall under 2 cents until the second week of September. Recently they have been falling steadily and at the present time seem destined to fall as low as they were in February unless something entirely unforeseen occurs to stabilize them. For Germany herself, this instability is quite as bad as the extremely heavy discount, for if the rate were stabilized, at whatever level, it would be possible for Germans and German customers and those who deal with Germany, to know how to price their goods and their bids for

German goods, but without stability the whole business is made a huge gamble.

As for the European neutrals, here was a steadily downward tendency in all of their exchanges last week, with the single exception of Spain. Most of these countries are now suffering the aftermath of the war. Most of them dealt with Germany, to some extent, and so far as they were paid in marks are finding it difficult to realize at any price. Also, a number of them lost ships because of U-boat activities and now are trying to make replacements. This costs a good deal of money, and it counts doubly against them when it is considered that out of ship earnings many of them were used to meeting other deficiencies. This is especially the case with the Scandinavian countries, whose exchanges are in very poor shape.

These countries are now trying to overcome their exchange difficulties by extensive borrowings in New York and London. So far we have had flotations of Danish and Norwegian Government loans, with Sweden obtaining a loan in June, 1919. Some of the Scandinavian cities have borrowed here and more are likely to follow suit. Further, it would be entirely in keeping with expectations if Sweden were to apply for another loan. Switzerland, that is the Government, will not apply here again this year, but two Swiss cities, Zurich and Berne, have obtained \$12,000,000 between them and Geneva is said to be negotiating. Holland yet is to be heard from. Spain, according to Madrid dispatches last week, has declined an American loan.

Textiles

POLITICS frankly replaced business in the textile markets last week. With Election Day imminent sellers showed scarcely more anxiety to sell than buyers did to buy, which was none at all. The result was that all of the cloth trades experienced the dullest week of the year to date.

No new developments in bleached, colored or gray cottons were apparent, nor will much be done in any of them before Wednesday of this week, at the earliest. Until then, it was intimated, no new prices would be given out on heavy colored cottons, such as denims. The big printing concerns will not announce their new quotations on percales until after election. Trading in unfinished cottons, of which there is always some, just dragged along, with prices more or less steady in a nominal way.

The only word which will adequately describe the woollens and worsteds trade at the moment is "dead." The colder weather, which will, if sustained, start a consumer-buying movement for the heavier clothing, came too late in the week to have any stimulating effects felt in the cloth market.

Interest in the silk industry again centred in the raw material, this time due to conditions which resulted in the closing of the Silk Bourse at Yokohama. The silk syndicate, backed by the Japanese Government, is scheduled to begin its work today, but its aid apparently will come too late for some reelers. Financial necessities apparently have forced them to dispose of "distress" lots of silk at the best price they could get for them, which was less than the "pegging" figure so frequently mentioned. A turn for the better is looked for, however, with the syndicate operating and production curtailed by the closing movement which will begin in the Sinshu district on Nov. 30 and in the other silk-raising sections on Dec. 10. The period of the closing is indefinite. Despite the fact that it may mean higher prices, manufacturers still continue to buy raw silks in this market in the most marked hand-to-mouth way. Sales of made-up silks were limited during the week, but sellers were quite optimistic of the immediate future.

Apropos recent contradictory reports concerning lower prices for linen has come one from Paris telling of an agreement now in contemplation between manufacturers in France, Belgium, Holland and Ireland to sustain prices by curtailing output. This will be done, if the reported plan is agreed to, by operating all plants only four hours a day.

Business in the burlaps trade was featureless this week. Important demand was lacking, and prices, while fairly steady at the close of the week, were lower on both light and heavy goods than they were at the beginning of it.


Acceptances

PREVALENCE of a 10 per cent. call money rate, which unquestionably reflected a marked stringency in the available volume of bank accommo-

Continued on Page 572

GROUP INSURANCE
THE GREAT MODERN WELFARE MEASURE FOR EMPLOYERS
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES

Curve of the Food Cost of Living



An index number is a means of showing fluctuations in the average price of a group of commodities. The Annalist Index Number shows the fluctuations in the average wholesale price of twenty-five food commodities selected and arranged to represent a theoretical family's food budget.

Financial Transactions

	Last Week.	Same Week Last Year.	Year to Date.	Same Period Last Year.
Sales of stocks, shares.....	2,933,823	8,459,064	177,945,079	259,446,707
Sales of bonds, par value.....	\$68,243,550	\$71,690,500	\$3,073,182,800	\$2,730,297,000
Average price of 50 stocks.....	High 83.33	High 98.47	High 94.07	High 98.47
	Low 79.67	Low 94.91	Low 75.04	Low 69.73
Average price of 40 bonds.....	High 72.99	High 75.06	High 73.14	High 70.05
	Low 72.43	Low 74.33	Low 65.57	Low 74.33
Average net yield of ten high-priced bonds.....	5.230%	5.050%	5.400%	4.945%
New security issues.....	\$67,782,000	\$4,520,600	\$1,382,991,600	\$883,655,000
Refunding.....			139,825,210	192,003,000

POTENTIALS OF PRODUCTIVITY

The Metal Barometer

	—End of September—	—End of August—
	1920.	1919.
United States Steel orders, tons.....	10,374,804	6,284,638
Daily pig iron capacity, tons.....	164,210	82,932
Pig iron production, tons.....	3,129,323	2,487,965
Month of September.....	1920.	1919.
Month of August.....	1920.	1919.

Alien Migration

	June.	May.	April.	March.	Feb.	Jan.
	1920.	1920.	1920.	1920.	1920.	1920.
Inbound.....	62,692	53,772	48,219	39,971	30,606	31,858
Outbound.....	24,543	17,121	19,107	22,639	11,607	27,066
Balance.....	+38,149	+36,651	+29,112	+17,332	+18,999	+4,772

Building Permits (Bradstreet's)

	August.	July.	June.
	1920.	1919.	1920.
152 Cities.....	\$109,235,941	\$150,177,348	\$118,066,967
157 Cities.....	\$135,454,719	\$119,493,718	\$119,771,980

MEASURES OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY

Bank Clearings

Entire country estimated from complete returns from cities representing 92.3 per cent. of the total. Percentages show changes from preceding year.

	The Last Week, P.C.	The Week Before, P.C.	Year to Date, P.C.
1920.....	\$8,530,000,000 - 0.9	\$8,050,000,000 - 4.3	\$375,927,000,000 + 9.6
1919.....	9,170,000,000 + 28.1	9,300,000,000 + 22.2	342,300,000,000 + 25.0

Gross Railroad Earnings

	Third Week in October.	Second Week in October.	First Week in October.	Month of July.	From Jan. 1 to July 31.
	18 Roads.	15 Roads.	13 Roads.	187 Roads.	187 Roads.
1920.....	\$19,594,766	\$18,221,855	\$17,548,585	\$528,132,988	\$3,264,543,575
1919.....	14,822,387	13,670,978	13,233,628	455,280,142	2,810,541,762
Gain or loss.....	+\$4,772,379	+\$4,550,870	+\$4,314,957	+\$72,852,846	+\$454,001,813
	+32.65%	+33.28%	+30.62%	+16.0%	+16.1%

WEEK'S PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES

	Current Minimum Price.	Range High.	Mean Price 1920.	Mean Price 1919.	Mean Price of Other Years.
Copper: Lake, spot, per lb.....	\$0.1475	\$0.19%	\$0.1475	\$0.17125	\$0.2475
Cotton: Spot, middling upland, lb.....	2200	4375	2050	32125	32625
Cement: Portland, bbl.....	5.10				
Fine: Nor. Car. Roofers 6 in., per 1,000 feet.....	40.00	62.00	40.00	51.00	44.00
Hides: Packer, No. 1, native, lb.....	.25	.41	.23	.3450	.40
Petroleum: Pennsylvania crude at well, bbl.....	6.10	5.00	5.55	4.50	5.875
Pig iron: Bessemer, at Pittsburgh, per ton.....	46.96	50.46	37.40	43.93	33.85
Rubber: Up river, fine, per lb.....	24.50	40	24.50	.3675	.54
Silk: Japan, Simshu No. 1, per lb.....	6.50	17.85%	5.00	11.4275	

Comparison of Week's Commercial Failures (Dun's)

	Week Ended Oct. 26, 1920.	Week Ended Oct. 29, 1919.	Week Ended Oct. 30, 1918.	Week Ended Oct. 31, 1917.	Week Ended Nov. 2, 1916.
	To-Over	To-Over	To-Over	To-Over	To-Over
East.....	57	42	19	54	29
South.....	58	25	30	11	31
West.....	63	42	19	6	28
Pacific.....	23	13	18	11	25
United States.....	236	137	100	41	148
Canada.....	29	11	18	3	11

Failures by Months

	September 1920.	September 1919.	September 1918.	September 1917.	September 1916.
Number.....	677	473	5,383	4,856	8,090
Liabilities.....	\$29,554,288	\$8,701,319	\$106,577,471	\$88,941,908	\$122,975,024

OUR FOREIGN TRADE

	September 1920.	September 1919.	September 1918.	September 1917.	September 1916.
Exports.....	\$313,550,000	\$313,550,000	\$6,989,254,121	\$5,785,713,601	\$4,363,627,445
Imports.....	363,000,000	307,203,000	2,568,843,440		
Excess of exports.....	\$243,000,000	\$206,257,000	\$1,725,626,676	\$3,216,570,251	

BAROMETRICS

The State of Credit

Foreign and Domestic Exchange Rates

New York funds in Montreal were quoted at \$165.62% premium. The discount in Montreal funds in New York was from \$90.96 to \$90.95. The week's range of exchange on the principal foreign centres last week compared as follows:

	—Last Week—	—Prev. Week—	—Yr. to Date—	—Same Wk., 1919.
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
4.8665—London.....	3.48%	3.45	3.45%	3.40%
5.1813—Paris.....	15.46	15.87	15.36	15.62
5.1813—Belgium.....	14.62	14.99	14.62	14.67
5.1813—Switzerland.....	6.29	6.39	6.33	6.35
5.1813—Italy.....	26.48	27.00	25.94	26.63
40.20—Holland.....	30.65	30.36	30.875	30.65
19.30—Spain.....	9.70	9.58	9.35	9.80
19.30—Greece.....	14.08	13.65	14.24	14.10
26.80—Copenhagen.....	13.83	13.48	13.95	13.90
26.80—Stockholm.....	19.42	19.30	19.80	19.55
26.80—Christiania.....	13.75	13.43	13.80	13.70
51.44—Russia.....	1.25	1.03	1.30	1.12%
48.06—Bombay.....	30.00	28.75	30.50	30.00
18.66—Calcutta.....	30.00	28.75	30.50	30.00
78.00—Hongkong.....	100.00	98.50	100.00	98.50
108.32—Shanghai.....	94.00	94.00	94.00	94.00
49.83—Yokohama.....	51.00	50.875	51.125	51.00
50.00—Manila.....	46.50	46.50	46.50	46.50
42.44—Buenos Aires.....	35.125	35.00	35.50	34.75
33.55—Rio.....	18.375	17.375	17.00	16.75
23.83—Germany.....	1.44	1.31%	1.46	1.42%
20.16—Austria.....	.34	.33%	.37	.34%
20.26—Jugoslavia.....	.81	.81	.83	.83
20.26—Czechoslovakia.....	1.23	1.23	1.24	1.24
19.30—Belgrade.....	3.25	3.25	3.32	3.32
19.30—Finland.....	2.35	2.35	2.65	2.65
19.30—Rumania.....	1.71	1.71	1.75	1.75

Cables.

	—Last Week—	—Prev. Week—	—Yr. to Date—	—Same Wk., 1919.
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
4.8665—London.....	3.40%	3.45%	3.40%	3.41%
5.1813—Paris.....	15.44	15.85	15.32	15.58
5.1813—Belgium.....	14.59	14.96	14.61	14.66
5.1813—Switzerland.....	6.30	6.37	6.31	6.33
5.1813—Italy.....	30.75	30.46	30.95	30.75
40.20—Holland.....	30.75	30.46	30.95	30.75
19.30—Spain.....	9.75	9.60	9.00	9.85
19.30—Greece.....	14.10	13.67	14.26	14.12
26.80—Copenhagen.....	13.87	13.63	14.00	13.85
26.80—Stockholm.....	19.52	19.35	19.85	19.60
26.80—Christiania.....	13.80	13.48	13.85	13.75
51.44—Russia.....	1.10	.05	1.15	1.02%
48.06—Bombay.....	30.25	29.00	30.75	30.25
18.66—Calcutta.....	30.25	29.00	30.75	30.25
78.00—Hongkong.....	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
108.32—Shanghai.....	94.25	94.10	96.50	94.50
49.83—Yokohama.....	51.25	51.125	51.375	51.25
50.00—Manila.....	46.75	46.75	46.75	46.75
42.44—Buenos Aires.....	35.25	35.125	35.625	34.75
33.55—Rio.....	17.50	17.125	16.75	16.50
23.83—Germany.....	1.44%	1.32	1.47	1.43
20.16—Austria.....	.36	.34%	.39	.35
20.26—Jugoslavia.....	.83	.83	.84	.84
20.26—Czechoslovakia.....	1.24	1.24	1.27	1.27
19.30—Belgrade.....	3.30	3.30	3.34	3.34
19.30—Finland.....	2.40	2.40	2.70	2.70
19.30—Rumania.....	1.72	1.72	1.75	1.75

Cost of Money

	Last Week.	Previous Week.	Year to Date.	—Same Week—
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
New York.....	10 @ 8	10 @ 6	25	6
Call loans.....	10 @ 8	10 @ 6	25	6
Time loans, 60-90 days.....	8 @ 7%	7 @ 6	10	7
Six months.....	8 @ 7%	7 @ 6	10	7
Commercial disc's, 4-6 mos.....	8	8	8	8

Foreign Government Securities

	Last Week.	Previous Week.	Year to Date.	—Same Week—
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
Brit. Cons. 2 1/2%.....	45 1/4 @ 45	45 1/4 @ 45	51 1/4 @ 45	66 1/4 @ 65
British 5%.....	84 1/4 @ 84 1/2	84 1/4 @ 84 1/2	84 1/4 @ 84 1/2	95 1/4 @ 92 1/2
British 4 1/2%.....	78 1/4 @ 78 1/2	78 1/4 @ 78 1/2	83 1/4 @ 76 1/2	87 1/4 @ 86 1/2
French rentes (in Paris).....	55.75 @ 52.00	54.75 @ 54.12	59.20 @ 52.00	60.90 @ 60.27
French War Loan (in Paris).....	86.45	86.45 @ 86.37		90.57 @ 90.27


Bar Gold and Silver

	Last Week.	Prev. Week.	Year to Date.	—Same Week—
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
Bar gold in London.....	118s 2d @ 117s 9d	120s 3d @ 118s 10d	127s 4d @ 102s 7d	96s @ 77s 9d
Bar silver in London.....	52 1/2 @ 52 1/2	53 1/2 @ 50 1/2	59 1/2 @ 44	65 1/2 @ 65d
Bar silver in N. Y.....	80 1/2 @ 79 1/2	80 1/2 @ 76 1/2	\$1.37 @ 76 1/2	\$1.23 @ 71.30%

Average of Wholesale Prices

	Last Week.	Previous Week.	1919.	1918.
Steers, good to choice, live weight.....	15.70	15.80	18.05	17.30
Hogs, light and heavy.....	12.8625	14.50	14.30	17.85
Flour, S. P., per barrel 196 pounds.....	11.925	12.55	13.05	11.60
Flour, W. S., per barrel 196 pounds.....	11.425	10.825	11.05	11.10
Potatoes, white, per 100 pounds.....	.95	.9750	1.35	1.00
Pot., native disks, per pound.....	.2050	.20	.21	.2175
Mutton dressed, per pound.....	11.50	.11	.13	.15

Federal Reserve Gold Holdings and Total Stock of Gold



The space between the base line and the broken line represents the cash reserves required, that between the broken line and the light line the excess reserves, or free gold, and the whole space between the base line and the heavy line represents the total stock of gold. The supply is computed monthly so that the record can never be brought to the date of publication. The chart records the last figures published.

Bank Clearings					By Telegraph to The Annalist				
Week Ended Saturday, Oct. 30					Last Week				
Year to Date					Year to Date				
1920.	1919.	1920.	1919.		1920.	1919.	1920.	1919.	
Central Reserve cities									
New York	\$4,577,523,029	\$5,442,684,073	\$205,722,212,605	\$191,907,782,930	Baltimore	\$102,152,564	\$89,847,329	\$4,136,941,574	\$3,007,229,170
Chicago	609,777,165	605,583,270	27,801,918,022	24,560,368,925	Buffalo	43,695,814	39,005,238	1,928,847,394	1,320,654,777
St. Louis	144,402,265	164,024,111	7,108,329,135	5,731,346,244	Cincinnati	67,761,909	62,872,436	3,053,078,779	2,593,929,499
Total, 3 C. R. cities	\$5,331,702,459	\$6,212,301,454	\$240,632,459,762	\$222,199,468,108	Columbus, Ohio	13,816,800	13,329,900	620,414,400	917,628,762
Increase	*14.1%		8.2%		Denver	27,234,855	29,065,590	907,101,123	958,067,152
Other Federal Reserve cities									
Boston	\$344,657,622	\$373,110,882	\$16,212,659,440	\$14,526,556,814	Los Angeles	83,309,000	51,722,000	3,283,835,000	1,930,212,000
Cleveland	120,128,488	117,359,689	5,554,537,554	4,467,627,325	Louisville	25,568,930	14,706,200	1,068,064,583	784,871,347
Kansas City, Mo.	211,790,137	242,170,973	10,233,364,318	5,601,557,318	Milwaukee	30,585,476	27,882,644	1,472,560,453	1,313,575,903
Philadelphia	485,471,972	440,337,745	21,037,161,944	18,180,454,806	New Orleans	62,425,854	76,269,657	2,848,884,039	2,551,063,909
San Francisco	156,200,000	162,816,448	6,775,182,000	5,770,736,848	Pittsburgh	202,162,700	143,675,946	7,315,728,832	5,985,994,432
Total, 5 cities	\$1,327,248,219	\$1,335,795,737	\$59,812,905,256	\$48,546,933,114	Providence	11,717,100	12,912,800	603,994,018	372,602,000
Increase	*0.5%		23.2%		St. Paul	43,277,865	19,962,277	1,247,257,628	780,582,293
Total, 8 cities									
	\$6,658,950,678	\$7,548,097,191	\$300,445,365,018	\$270,746,431,222	Seattle	37,065,780	42,584,402	1,784,229,634	1,778,100,601
Increase	*13.1%		10.9%		Washington	16,623,901	15,652,402	739,152,176	658,526,171
Total, 22 cities									
	\$7,427,285,324	\$8,188,846,271	\$331,465,463,652	\$296,312,387,807	Total, 14 cities	\$768,334,046	\$640,749,060	\$31,020,096,634	\$25,565,938,585
					Increase	20%	21.3%		
					Total, 22 cities	\$7,427,285,324	\$8,188,846,271	\$331,465,463,652	\$296,312,387,807
					Increase	*9.2%	11.9%		
									*Decrease.

Actual Condition

Statements of the Federal Reserve Banks

Oct. 29

	Dist. 1. Boston	Dist. 2. New York	Dist. 3. Philadelphia	Dist. 4. Cleveland	Dist. 5. Richmond	Dist. 6. Atlanta	Dist. 7. Chicago	Dist. 8. St. Louis	Dist. 9. Minneapolis	Dist. 10. Kansas City	Dist. 11. Dallas	Dist. 12. San Francisco
Gold reserve	\$194,571,000	\$476,694,000	\$190,427,000	\$232,340,000	\$88,250,000	\$88,103,000	\$308,067,000	\$73,053,000	\$49,350,000	\$72,317,000	\$46,557,000	\$163,545,000
Total gold reserve	223,102,000	1,023,769,000	194,941,000	261,139,000	118,198,000	142,926,000	508,058,000	122,142,000	96,068,000	118,090,000	78,708,000	220,531,000
Bills on hand	507,054,000	1,856,957,000	484,412,000	616,878,000	281,661,000	279,106,000	968,222,000	263,235,000	167,828,000	276,380,000	195,454,000	444,400,000
Resources	122,470,000	703,701,000	106,806,000	150,584,000	59,341,000	49,283,000	258,978,000	60,921,000	44,534,000	77,214,000	52,694,000	119,135,000
Due to members	296,168,000	876,606,000	273,286,000	352,123,000	146,116,000	177,734,000	554,186,000	137,898,000	82,714,000	111,575,000	91,071,000	251,746,000

Federal Reserve Bank Statement

Consolidated statement of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks compares as follows:

	Last Week	Previous Week	Year Ago
RESOURCES—			
Gold coin and certificates	\$164,849,000	\$161,438,000	\$254,027,000
Gold settlement fund, F. R. Board	416,163,000	389,069,000	444,126,000
Gold with foreign agencies	74,686,000	80,441,000	129,923,000
Total gold held by banks	\$455,698,000	\$630,948,000	\$828,076,000
Gold with Federal Reserve agents	1,175,118,000	1,203,240,000	1,205,576,000
Gold redemption fund	172,504,000	160,423,000	104,348,000
Total gold reserves	\$2,003,320,000	\$1,994,611,000	\$2,138,000,000
Legal tender notes, silver, &c.	164,718,000	162,650,000	67,502,000
Total reserves	\$2,168,038,000	\$2,157,270,000	\$2,205,592,000
LIABILITIES—			
Bills discounted: Secured by Government war obligations	1,203,905,000	1,199,139,000	1,681,082,000
All other	1,597,392,000	1,550,143,000	447,465,000
Bills bought in open market	298,375,000	300,666,000	394,355,000
Total bills on hand	\$3,099,672,000	\$3,049,948,000	\$2,522,902,000
United States Government bonds	26,868,000	26,856,000	26,845,000
United States Victory notes	60,000	60,000	84,000
United States certificates of indebtedness	269,434,000	280,807,000	274,325,000
Total earning assets	\$3,396,043,000	\$3,357,680,000	\$2,824,156,000
Bank premises	15,993,000	15,864,000	13,357,000
Uncollected items and other deductions from gross deposits	742,976,000	825,588,000	855,795,000
Five p. c. redemption fund against Federal Reserve Bank notes	12,854,000	12,953,000	13,333,000
All other resources	5,703,000	5,232,000	7,869,000
Total resources	\$6,341,007,000	\$6,374,587,000	\$5,939,344,000
LIABILITIES—			
Capital paid in	\$97,753,000	\$97,692,000	\$83,013,000
Surplus	164,745,000	164,745,000	81,087,000
Government deposits	18,754,000	15,015,000	100,465,000
Due to members—reserve account	1,805,661,000	1,779,024,000	1,833,481,000
Deferred availability items	571,807,000	634,007,000	693,766,000
Other deposits included for Govt. credits	21,307,000	21,929,000	97,543,000
Total gross deposits	\$2,417,329,000	\$2,450,065,000	\$2,725,555,000
Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation	3,351,303,000	3,356,190,000	2,752,876,000
Fed. Res. Bank notes in circulation, net liab.	214,961,000	213,838,000	254,933,000
All other liabilities	91,316,000	92,048,000	38,880,000
Total liabilities	\$6,341,007,000	\$6,374,587,000	\$5,939,344,000
Ratio of total reserves to net deposit and F. R. note liabilities combined	43.1%	43.3%	47.9%
Ratio of gold reserves to F. R. notes in circulation after setting aside 35 per cent. against net deposit liabilities	47.2%	47.3%	56.6%

Statement of Member Banks

Data for Federal Reserve Cities and in Federal Reserve Branch Cities.

	New York		Chicago	
	Oct. 22.	Oct. 15.	Oct. 22.	Oct. 15.
New York				
Number of reporting banks....	72	71	51	51
U. S. bonds to secure circulation	\$36,966,000	\$37,101,000	\$1,439,000	\$1,439,000
U. S. bonds, incl. Liberty bonds	221,006,000	220,593,000	16,484,000	17,377,000
U. S. Victory notes.....	74,034,000	73,693,000	11,064,000	11,212,000
U. S. cts. of indebtedness.....	137,753,000	151,238,000	18,377,000	19,230,000
Total U. S. securities.....	469,759,000	482,627,000	47,384,000	49,258,000
Loans sec. by U. S. bonds, &c.	422,965,000	427,402,000	59,426,000	62,299,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	1,162,136,000	1,221,228,000	337,961,000	334,777,000
All other loans and investments	3,682,640,000	3,698,733,000	1,075,952,000	1,103,433,000
Total loans and investments.....	5,737,710,000	5,829,991,000	1,520,723,000	1,549,877,000
Reserve with Fed. Res. Banks.....	567,804,000	640,552,000	134,785,000	138,640,000
Cash in vault.....	106,200,000	107,949,000	38,818,000	41,100,000
Net demand deposits.....	4,513,490,000	4,647,688,000	948,855,000	980,594,000
Time deposits.....	335,907,000	334,984,000	292,807,000	291,731,000
Government deposits.....	70,293,000	86,854,000	6,538,000	6,897,000
Bills payable with F. R. Bank.....	321,429,000	303,773,000	25,286,000	24,973,000
Bills rediscl'd with F. R. Bank.....	534,674,000	544,516,000	206,963,000	219,207,000
—All Reserve Cities—				
	Oct. 22.	Oct. 15.	Oct. 22.	Oct. 15.
Number of reporting banks....	285	284	208	208
U. S. bonds to secure circulation	\$95,840,000	\$96,275,000	\$72,272,000	\$72,250,000
U. S. bonds, incl. Liberty bonds	341,246,000	341,003,000	148,502,000	146,492,000
U. S. Victory notes.....	104,945,000	104,044,000	51,915,000	50,272,000
U. S. cts. of indebtedness.....	204,497,000	235,071,000	66,135,000	78,688,000
Total U. S. securities.....	746,528,000	776,393,000	338,824,000	347,700,000
Loans sec. by U. S. bonds, &c.	681,192,000	691,294,000	137,472,000	137,376,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	2,195,683,000	2,261,362,000	498,137,000	489,119,000
All other loans and investments	7,498,821,000	7,547,438,000	2,306,135,000	2,304,964,000
Total loans and investments.....	11,122,224,000	11,276,487,000	3,289,568,000	3,279,179,000
Reserve with Fed. Res. Banks.....	974,801,000	1,052,034,000	203,194,000	211,116,000
Cash in vault.....	214,664,000	218,843,000	74,395,000	75,965,000
Net demand deposits.....	7,862,936,000	8,031,637,000	1,767,489,000	1,803,669,000
Time deposits.....	1,302,706,000	1,299,437,000	908,418,000	906,418,000
Government deposits.....	116,318,000	145,491,000	24,742,000	28,716,000
Bills payable with F. R. Bank.....	461,875,000	441,077,000	132,696,000	143,747,000
Bills rediscl'd with F. R. Bank.....	1,128,244,000	1,177,312,000	219,337,000	218,792,000
—All Other Reporting Banks—				
	Oct. 22.	Oct. 15.	Oct. 22.	Oct. 15.
Number of reporting banks.....	330	330	330	330
United States bonds to secure circulation	\$100,556,000	\$100,455,000	\$100,455,000	\$100,455,000
United States bonds, including Liberty bonds.....	119,801,000	120,396,000	120,396,000	120,396,000
United States Victory notes.....	36,489,000	36,957,000	36,957,000	36,957,000
United States certificates of indebtedness.....	43,240,000	47,996,000	47,996,000	47,996,000
Total United States securities.....	299,886,000	305,804,000	305,804,000	305,804,000
Loans secured by United States bonds, &c.	93,943,000	95,052,000	95,052,000	95,052,000
Loans secured by stocks and bonds.....	412,083,000	411,776,000	411,776,000	411,776,000
All other loans and investments.....	1,892,356,000	1,915,698,000	1,915,698,000	1,915,698,000
Total loans and investments.....	2,398,288,000	2,422,526,000	2,422,526,000	2,422,526,000
Reserve with Federal Reserve Banks.....	155,420,000	156,932,000	156,932,000	156,932,000
Cash in vault.....	88,432,000	85,276,000	85,276,000	85,276,000
Net demand deposits.....	1,610,163,000	1,637,618,000	1,637,618,000	1,637,618,000
Time deposits.....	683,435,000	692,448,000	692,448,000	692,448,000
Government deposits.....	10,789,000	14,194,000	14,194,000	14,194,000
Bills payable with Federal Reserve Bank.....	82,786,000	88,138,000	88,138,000	88,138,000
Bills rediscounted with Federal Reserve Bank.....	176,958,000	179,903,000	179,903,000	179,903,000

New York Stock Exchange Transactions

Highest and lowest prices of the year are based on sales of 100 shares. Where prices are used for less than that amount they are marked with an asterisk (*)

Week Ended October 30

Total Sales 2,933,823 Shares

1919.			1918.			1917.			1916.			1915.			1914.			1913.			1912.			1911.			1910.			1909.			1908.			1907.			1906.			1905.			1904.			1903.			1902.			1901.			1900.			1899.			1898.			1897.			1896.			1895.			1894.			1893.			1892.			1891.			1890.			1889.			1888.			1887.			1886.			1885.			1884.			1883.			1882.			1881.			1880.			1879.			1878.			1877.			1876.			1875.			1874.			1873.			1872.			1871.			1870.			1869.			1868.			1867.			1866.			1865.			1864.			1863.			1862.			1861.			1860.			1859.			1858.			1857.			1856.			1855.			1854.			1853.			1852.			1851.			1850.			1849.			1848.			1847.			1846.			1845.			1844.			1843.			1842.			1841.			1840.			1839.			1838.			1837.			1836.			1835.			1834.			1833.			1832.			1831.			1830.			1829.			1828.			1827.			1826.			1825.			1824.			1823.			1822.			1821.			1820.			1819.			1818.			1817.			1816.			1815.			1814.			1813.			1812.			1811.			1810.			1809.			1808.			1807.			1806.			1805.			1804.			1803.			1802.			1801.			1800.			1799.			1798.			1797.			1796.			1795.			1794.			1793.			1792.			1791.			1790.			1789.			1788.			1787.			1786.			1785.			1784.			1783.			1782.			1781.			1780.			1779.			1778.			1777.			1776.			1775.			1774.			1773.			1772.			1771.			1770.			1769.			1768.			1767.			1766.			1765.			1764.			1763.			1762.			1761.			1760.			1759.			1758.			1757.			1756.			1755.			1754.			1753.			1752.			1751.			1750.			1749.			1748.			1747.			1746.			1745.			1744.			1743.			1742.			1741.			1740.			1739.			1738.			1737.			1736.			1735.			1734.			1733.			1732.			1731.			1730.			1729.			1728.			1727.			1726.			1725.			1724.			1723.			1722.			1721.			1720.			1719.			1718.			1717.			1716.			1715.			1714.			1713.			1712.			1711.			1710.			1709.			1708.			1707.			1706.			1705.			1704.			1703.			1702.			1701.			1700.			1699.			1698.			1697.			1696.			1695.			1694.			1693.			1692.			1691.			1690.			1689.			1688.			1687.			1686.			1685.			1684.			1683.			1682.			1681.			1680.			1679.			1678.			1677.			1676.			1675.			1674.			1673.			1672.			1671.			1670.			1669.			1668.			1667.			1666.			1665.			1664.			1663.			1662.			1661.			1660.			1659.			1658.			1657.			1656.			1655.			1654.			1653.			1652.			1651.			1650.			1649.			1648.			1647.			1646.			1645.			1644.			1643.			1642.			1641.			1640.			1639.			1638.			1637.			1636.			1635.			1634.			1633.			1632.			1631.			1630.			1629.			1628.			1627.			1626.			1625.			1624.			1623.			1622.			1621.			1620.			1619.			1618.			1617.			1616.			1615.			1614.			1613.			1612.			1611.			1610.			1609.			1608.			1607.			1606.			1605.			1604.			1603.			1602.			1601.			1600.			1599.			1598.			1597.			1596.			1595.			1594.			1593.			1592.			1591.			1590.			1589.			1588.			1587.			1586.			1585.			1584.			1583.			1582.			1581.			1580.			1579.			1578.			1577.			1576.	
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New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued

1919. Price Ranges.										Amount		Last Dividend		Last Week's Transactions						
High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Capital	Stock	Date	Per	Per	First.	High.	Low.	Last.	Change.	Sales.
1919.	1919.	1919.	1919.	1919.	1919.	1919.	1919.	1919.	1919.	Capital	Stock	Date	Per	Per	First.	High.	Low.	Last.	Change.	Sales.
*101	*101	130	101 1/2	205	Apr. 21	97 1/2	Sept. 2	Col. Fuel & Iron pf.	2,000,000			Aug. 20, '20	2	Q						
27 1/2	18	31 1/2	19	30 1/2	Apr. 21	120	Sept. 11	Colorado & Southern	31,000,000			Aug. 31, '12	2	SA	33 1/2	33 1/2	33 1/2	33 1/2	- 2 1/2	400
65	47	68 1/2	48	69 1/2	Apr. 8	40	July 6	Col. & South. 1st pf.	8,500,000			June 30, '20	1	SA	33 1/2	33 1/2	33 1/2	33 1/2	0	400
48	40	51 1/2	41	52 1/2	Jan. 10	35	Aug. 10	Col. & South. 2d pf.	8,500,000			Dec. 15, '19	4	A	33 1/2	33 1/2	33 1/2	33 1/2	0	400
44 1/2	28 1/2	69	29 1/2	67	Jan. 9	50	May 19	Columbia Gas & Elec.	30,000,000			Aug. 16, '20	1 1/2	Q	60 1/2	60 1/2	58 1/2	58 1/2	+ 1	3,900
..	..	75 1/2	43 1/2	95 1/2	Jan. 9	18	Sept. 30	Columbia Graph. pf.	1,251,475			Oct. 1, '20	12 1/2	Q	20 1/2	20 1/2	18 1/2	18 1/2	- 1	12,300
..	..	23 1/2	91 1/2	92 1/2	Jan. 14	77 1/2	Oct. 8	Columbia Graph. pf.	10,581,500			Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	70	70	70	70	0	1,600
39	30	65 1/2	31 1/2	65 1/2	Jan. 14	40	Feb. 16	Consol. Tab. Rec.	10,581,500			Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	44 1/2	44 1/2	44 1/2	44 1/2	0	1,600
..	..	75 1/2	34 1/2	95 1/2	Aug. 20	55 1/2	Feb. 10	Consol. Cigar.	90,000			Oct. 15, '20	1 1/2	Q	75 1/2	75 1/2	72 1/2	72 1/2	+ 1 1/2	3,700
..	..	80 1/2	38 1/2	80 1/2	Aug. 20	10 1/2	Feb. 13	Consol. Cigar pf.	4,000,000			Sept. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	81	81	81	81	0	1,300
105 1/2	82 1/2	100 1/2	78 1/2	93 1/2	Mar. 22	73 1/2	July 28	Consolidated Gas	100,384,500			Sept. 15, '20	1 1/2	Q	89 1/2	89 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	- 2	7,700
18	95	111 1/2	10 1/2	Con. G., El. L. & P., Balt.	14,607,700			Oct. 1, '20	2	Q	0	..
113	90	94	94	94	Sept. 15	85	Sept. 15	Consol. Coal Md.	40,205,499			Oct. 30, '20	1 1/2	Q	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	0	..
118 1/2	7 1/2	37 1/2	37 1/2	37 1/2	Jan. 3	20 1/2	Feb. 5	Con. Int. Cal. M. (\$10)	4,300,000			June 30, '20	1 1/2	Q	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	0	..
..	..	30 1/2	30 1/2	30 1/2	Jan. 26	21 1/2	Feb. 5	Consol. Text. (sh.)	207,355			Oct. 15, '20	1 1/2	Q	75 1/2	75 1/2	75 1/2	75 1/2	0	1,600
95	65 1/2	102 1/2	65 1/2	97 1/2	Apr. 8	73	Oct. 11	Continental Can Co.	13,500,000			Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	0	100
107	90	110	107 1/2	102 1/2	Jan. 22	97 1/2	June 22	Continental Can Co. pf.	4,435,000			Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	0	100
..	..	16	10 1/2	14 1/2	Apr. 16	9 1/2	Oct. 28	Cont. Candy.	500,000			Oct. 20, '20	2 1/2	Q	10	10	10	10	0	4,600
60	44	84 1/2	38	84 1/2	Jan. 2	68	Aug. 2	Cont. Insur. Co. (\$25)	10,000,000			July 1, '20	\$2.50	SA	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	+ 1/2	1,000
70 1/2	29 1/2	98	46	105 1/2	Apr. 13	70 1/2	Feb. 13	Corn Prod. Ref. Co.	49,784,400			Oct. 20, '20	1 1/2	Q	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2	0	10,350
104	90 1/2	100 1/2	102	43 1/2	Apr. 29	30	May 24	Corn Prod. Ref. Co. pf.	207,355			Oct. 20, '20	1 1/2	Q	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2	0	10,350
..	..	100 1/2	102	43 1/2	Apr. 29	30	May 24	Corden & Co. (sh.)	759,464			Nov. 1, '20	62 1/2	Q	37	37 1/2	36 1/2	36 1/2	- 1/2	3,800
51 1/2	40	70	40	67	Apr. 17	45 1/2	Aug. 9	Crex Carpet Co.	2,698,500			June 15, '20	3	SA	129 1/2	130 1/2	129 1/2	129 1/2	0	27,200
7 1/2	52	26 1/2	52 1/2	27 1/2	Apr. 7	115 1/2	May 24	Crucible Steel Co.	37,500,000			Oct. 15, '20	2	Q	129 1/2	130 1/2	129 1/2	129 1/2	0	27,200
91 1/2	86	105	91	100	Jan. 7	90	Oct. 28	Crucible Steel Co. pf.	25,000,000			Sept. 30, '20	1 1/2	Q	91	91	90	90	- 1	800
..	..	105 1/2	91	100	Jan. 7	90	Oct. 28	Cuban Am. Sugar (\$10)	10,000,000			Sept. 30, '20	1 1/2	Q	41	41	37 1/2	39 1/2	+ 1	5,000
96	90	107 1/2	101 1/2	101 1/2	Jan. 20	81	Aug. 19	Cuban Am. Sugar pf.	7,583,800			Sept. 30, '20	1 1/2	Q	35 1/2	35 1/2	35 1/2	34 1/2	- 1/2	1,700
3 1/2	37 1/2	87 1/2	38 1/2	20 1/2	Jan. 3	31 1/2	Oct. 18	Cuba Cane Sugar (sh.)	300,000			Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	74 1/2	74 1/2	73 1/2	73 1/2	- 1/2	1,200
83	77 1/2	107 1/2	79 1/2	85 1/2	Jan. 21	71 1/2	Oct. 18	Cuba Cane Sugar pf.	50,000,000			Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	74 1/2	74 1/2	73 1/2	73 1/2	- 1/2	1,200
..	DAVISON CHEMICAL (sh.)	183,519		
..	De Beers Con. M. (sh.)	62,900			July 28, '20	\$2.360 1/2
..	Deere & Co. pf.	37,828,500			Sept. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	101	105	102 1/2	102 1/2	0	2,900
111 1/2	100	116	116	91 1/2	Oct. 2	82 1/2	May 20	Delaware & Hudson	42,503,000			Sept. 20, '20	2 1/2	Q	101	105	102 1/2	102 1/2	0	2,900
185	100	217	172 1/2	200 1/2	Sept. 15	165	Oct. 11	Del. Lack. & W. (sh.)	42,242,000			Oct. 20, '20	1 1/2	Q	42 1/2	44 1/2	44 1/2	44 1/2	0	1,400
13 1/2	5 1/2	15 1/2	6 1/2	10 1/2	Feb. 24	2 1/2	Oct. 1	Denver & Rio Grande	38,000,000		
100	98	120	110	108	Mar. 30	90 1/2	June 8	Denver & Rio Grande pf.	49,778,400			Jan. 15, '11	2 1/2	..	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	0	6,700
..	Detroit Edison	27,636,900			Oct. 15, '20	2	Q	0	..
140	80	105	80	101	Jan. 12	85 1/2	July 30	Detroit United Railway	15,000,000			Sept. 1, '20	2	Q	0	..
*113	*113	118	112	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Diamond Match	16,965,100			Sept. 15, '20	2 1/2	Q	11 1/2	11 1/2	11 1/2	11 1/2	0	1,900
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Dome Mines (\$10)	4,000,000			Oct. 20, '20	2 1/2	Q	11 1/2	11 1/2	11 1/2	11 1/2	0	1,900
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Duluth, South Shore & Atl. pf.	12,000,000		
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Duluth, South Sh. & Atl. pf.	10,000,000		
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Dur. Hos. Cl. B. (\$50)	3,252,850			Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	11 1/2	11 1/2	11 1/2	11 1/2	0	..
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Durham Hosiery pf.	3,000,000			Nov. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	11 1/2	11 1/2	11 1/2	11 1/2	0	..
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	EASMAN KOLIAK	19,586,200			Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	34 1/2	34 1/2	34 1/2	34 1/2	0	..
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Electric Storage Battery	19,891,800			Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	34 1/2	34 1/2	34 1/2	34 1/2	0	..
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Elk Horn Coal (sh.)	12,000,000			Sept. 11, '20	75c	..	22 1/2	22 1/2	22 1/2	22 1/2	0	400
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Elk Horn C. pf. (\$50)	6,600,000			Sept. 10, '20	75c	Q	22 1/2	22 1/2	22 1/2	22 1/2	0	400
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Emerson Brantingham	10,132,500		
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Emerson Brantingham pf.	12,170,500			Nov. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	0	..
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Endicott-Johnson (\$50)	16,390,000			Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	65 1/2	65 1/2	64 1/2	64 1/2	- 1/2	2,100
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Endicott-Johnson pf.	15,000,000			Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	65 1/2	65 1/2	64 1/2	64 1/2	- 1/2	2,100
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Erie	112,481,000		
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Erie 1st pf.	47,500,000			Apr. 9, '07	2	..	28 1/2	28 1/2	28 1/2	28 1/2	0	6,300
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Erie 2d pf.	10,000,000			Apr. 9, '07	2	..	20 1/2	20 1/2	18 1/2	19 1/2	- 1 1/2	1,100
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Erie & Pittsburgh (\$50)	2,000,000			Sept. 10, '20	1 1/2	Q	0	..
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	FAIRBANKS CO. (\$25)	1,500,000			Oct. 1, '20	2	Q	0	..
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Fairbanks Co. pf.	2,000,000			Oct. 1, '20	2	Q	0	..
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Famous Players-Lasky (sh.)	214,677			Oct. 1, '20	\$2	Q	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	0	2,700
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Famous Players-Lasky pf.	10,000,000			Oct. 1, '20	2	Q	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	0	2,700
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Federal Mining & Smelting	6,000,000			Jan. 15, '09	1 1/2	Q	10	10	10	10	0	100
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Federal Mining & Smelting pf.	12,000,000			Sept. 15, '20	1 1/2	Q	31 1/2	31 1/2	31 1/2	31 1/2	0	100
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Fisher Body Corp. (sh.)	500,000			Nov. 1, '20	\$2.30	Q	104	104	104	104	0	..
..	..	16 1/2	10 1/2	13	Jan. 3	9 1/2	May 10	Fisher Body Corp. pf.	4,063,564			Nov. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	104	104	104	104	0	..
..																				

[illegible]

New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued

1918.		1919.		Price Ranges		This Year to Date.		STOCKS.		Amount		Last Dividend		Per Cent.		Last Week's Transactions		Sales.	
High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
233 1/2	81	97 1/2	85	94 1/2	Apr. 10	83 1/2	Apr. 28	Shaw-Sheffield S. & I. pf.	6,700,000	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	85 1/2	85 1/2	83 1/2	83 1/2	—	5 1/2	100
162 1/2	120	257	132	310	Apr. 14	100	Aug. 10	South Porto Rico Sugar	5,625,000	Oct. 1, '20	15	Q	112	112	112	112	—	8	100
110	102	117	107	116	Jan. 14	100	Sept. 7	South Porto Rico Sugar pf.	5,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	2	Q	98 1/2	102 1/2	98 1/2	100	—	3	129,800
110	80 1/2	115	91 1/2	105 1/2	Jan. 14	83 1/2	Feb. 13	Southern Pacific	302,887,400	Oct. 1, '20	1/2	Q	104 1/2	104 1/2	104 1/2	104 1/2	—	1 1/2	29,800
138 1/2	114 1/2	133	103	133 1/2	Oct. 5	137 1/2	Feb. 18	Southern Pacific Trust receipts	34,293,500	Oct. 1, '20	1/2	Q	31 1/2	31 1/2	28 1/2	30 1/2	—	1 1/2	1,100
34 1/2	28 1/2	33	20 1/2	33 1/2	Oct. 5	50	Feb. 13	Southern Railway	58,738,100	Oct. 1, '20	2	SA	64 1/2	64 1/2	63 1/2	64 1/2	—	1/4	3,300
75 1/2	57	72 1/2	52 1/2	68 1/2	Oct. 5	50	Feb. 13	Southern Railway pf.	5,700,200	Oct. 1, '20	2	SA	64 1/2	64 1/2	63 1/2	64 1/2	—	1/4	3,300
120	84	100	124	160	Apr. 12	120	Feb. 11	Standard Milling	7,399,000	Aug. 31, '20	14	Q	—	1 1/2	1,800
80 1/2	79	94 1/2	85 1/2	97 1/2	Apr. 12	78	Feb. 11	Standard Milling pf.	6,488,000	Aug. 31, '20	14	Q	—	1 1/2	1,800
...	Apr. 25	Standard Oil, N. J.	98,538,500	Sept. 15, '20	5	Q	64 1/2	71 1/2	64 1/2	64 1/2	—	+50	...
...	Sept. 14	100 1/2	June 28	S. O. N. J. sub. pf.
...	113 1/2	100 1/2	June 17	Standard Oil, N. J. pf.	98,338,300	Sept. 15, '20	1 1/2	Q	105 1/2	105 1/2	105 1/2	105 1/2	—	6,000	...
...	91 1/2	70 1/2	Sept. 20	Steel & Tube pf.	17,500,000	Oct. 1, '20	3 1/2	Q	83	83	83	83	—	100	...
...	95 1/2	90	Oct. 13	Stern Bros. pf.	3,000,000	Sept. 1, '20	13 1/2	Q	—
...	91 1/2	20 1/2	Aug. 5	Stewart War. Sp. (sh.)	400,000	Aug. 15, '20	8 1/2	Q	32	32	30 1/2	30 1/2	—	1 1/2	1,800
...	118 1/2	50	Feb. 15	Stromberg Carb. (sh.)	7,432,000	Oct. 1, '20	8 1/2	Q	7 1/2	7 1/2	6 1/2	6 1/2	—	1 1/2	1,800
72 1/2	35 1/2	151	45 1/2	100 1/2	Apr. 8	53 1/2	Aug. 10	Studebaker	60,000,000	Sept. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	51 1/2	52 1/2	49 1/2	51 1/2	—	28 1/2	5,300
100	80 1/2	104 1/2	92	101 1/2	Jan. 31	85 1/2	Oct. 26	Studebaker Co. pf.	10,260,000	Sept. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	—	1 1/2	1,800
...	14	12 1/2	Oct. 30	Submarine Boat (sh.)	725,920										

FOOTNOTES

High and low prices are based on sales of 100-share lots, except in special instances where an asterisk (*) indicates that the price given is for less than that amount. †Including the amount of New York Central Railroad stock listed. ‡Payable in common Class B stock. x Ex dividend.

Class B stock: x Ex dividend.	
The rates of dividends referred to under note indicated by 1 include extra or special dividends as follows:	
American Shipbuilding	2 1/2% Extra
Am. Sugar Refining	3% Extra
Rush Terminal	2 1/2% Scrip
Certain-Ted Products	\$1 Extra
Columbia Graphophone	1-20% Stock
Corn Prod. Ref.	1 1/4% Extra
Durham Hosiery, Class B.	25c Extra
Eastman Kodak	2 1/2% Extra
Do paid 5% extra on Sept. 1, 1920.	

1. 1920.		
Unionano Sugar.....	50c	Extra
Indiana Creek Coal.....	2c	Extra
Int. Mer. Mar. pf.....	5 %	Back
Kennecott Copper.....	25c	Extra
(Capital distribution).		
Ohio Fuel Supply.....	50c	Extra
(Payable in Lib'ty L'n Bds.)		
Pacific Mail.....	1c	Extra
St. Joseph.....	25c	Extra
South Porto Rico Sugar.....	2 %	Extra
Standard Milling.....	2 %	Extra
Stem Bros. & Co. pf.....	14 %	Back
Am. Bosch Magneto paid 20% in stock July		
13, 1920.		
American Steel Foundries paid \$2 in com-		
stock May 29, 1920.		

Alb. & Susq. paid 1½% Extra on Jan. 10,
not included in amount given in preceding
table.

American Tobacco paid on common 75% in Class B stock on Aug. 1, 1920.
Brown Shoe common paid 33 1-3% in common stock on July 1, 1920.

Central of New Jersey paid a special dividend of 2% on June 30, 1920.
Chandler Motor paid 33 1/3% in stock June 10, 1920.
Consolidated Cigar paid 15% in common

Crucible Steel paid 50% in stock April 30, 1920, 12 2-3% in stock July 31, 1920, and 14 2-7% in stock on Aug. 31, 1920.

Endicott-Johnson paid 10% in stock on common June 10, 1920.
General Motors paid May 1, Aug. 2 and Nov. 1, 1920, 1-40 of a share on new common.
General Chemical paid 20% in stock May

General Chemical paid 20% in stock May 1, 1920.
International Harvester paid 12½% in common stock on common Sept. 15, 1920.
International Motor Truck paid 100% in

stock May 11, 1920.
Kelly Springfield Tire paid on common May
1, Aug. 2 and Nov. 1, 1920, 3% in common
stock.
Manhattan Electrical Supply Company paid

10% in common stock on Oct. 15, 1920.
May Department Stores paid on common
33 1-3% in common stock on July 10, 1920.
Mexican Petroleum paid on common 10% in
common stock July 10, 1920.

Middle States Oil paid 20% in stock March 1, 1920, and 50% in stock July 10, 1920.

National Aniline and Chemical paid 4% in common stock on Oct. 9, 1920.
Owens Bottle common paid 5% in common

Pan American Petroleum and Transp. paid on common and Class B stock \$5 in Class B stock on July 10, 1920.

Pierce Oil common paid 2 1/2% in common stock on July 1 and Oct. 1, 1920.
Pure Oil paid 50c in common stock Sept. 1, 1920.
St. Joseph Lead paid 1-10 in stock on Oct.

Savage Arms paid 5% Extra on Jan. 15 and April 30, in addition to the regular quarterly payments of 1½%.

Stearns, Roebeck & Co. paid 40% in common stock on common July 15, 1920.
Sinclair Cons. Oil paid 2% in stock July 15, 1920.
South Porto Rico Sugar paid 100 in common stock on common Aug. 6, 1920.

stock on common Aug. 6, 1920.
Studebaker Corporation paid 33 1-3% in
stock on May 5, 1920.
Texas Pacific Coal and Oil paid 2% in stock
Sept. 20, 1920.

United Retail Stores paid 5% in stock Aug. 16, 1920.
United States Rubber paid 12½% in stock Feb. 19, 1920.
United Cigar Stores paid 10% in stock April 1920.

United Cigar Stores paid 10% in stock Apr. 1, 1920.
 Union Bag and Paper paid 50% in stock May 20, 1920.
 Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke paid 10% in stock Nov. 1, 1920.

Woolworth (F. W.) Company paid 50% in common stock June 1, 1920.

Securities

LAST SALES OF INACTIVE STOCKS.


Stock.	Last Sale.	Date.
Alleg. & Western.....	*101	Nov., '18
American Cities pf.....	10½	May, '18
American Coal (\$25).....	52	June, '18
American Smelters pf. B.....	91½	Aug., '17
Car., Clinch. & Ohio.....	22½	Aug., '17
Car., Clinch. & Ohio pf.....	50	Oct., '17
Certain-Treed Prod. 2d pf.....	*78¼	July, '18
Cleve. & Pitta. sp. gtd. (\$50).....	*50	Apr., '17
Dayton Power & Light pf.....	97	Nov., '16
Detroit Mackinac.....	*70	July, '15
Hav. El. Ry., L. & P. pf.....	105	May, '17
Helmé (G. W.) Co.....	190	Jan., '17
Hocking Valley.....	112	Apr., '15
Ingersoll-Rand.....	*185	Sep., '18
Mobile & Birm.....	81½	Nov., '18
Northern Central (\$50).....	*72¼	Apr., '16
Northwestern Tel.....	51	Nov., '16
Old Dominion (\$25).....	70¼	Apr., '16
Va. Ry. & Power.....	47½	Sep., '16

*Odd lot.

Standard Oil Securities

	Oct. 30		Oct. 23			Oct. 30		Oct. 23			Oct. 30		Oct. 23	
	Bid	Asked	Bid	Asked		Bid	Asked	Bid	Asked		Bid	Asked	Bid	Asked
Anglo-Am. Oil, Ltd.	21½	21½	21½	21½	Illinois Pipe Line	163	167	162	166	Southwest Pa. Pipe Lines	62	66	63	67
Atlantic Lobos Oil	30	35	28	34	Imperial Oil, Ltd.	103	106	102	106	Standard Oil of California	340	344	320	324
Atlantic Lobos pf.	65	75	65	75	Indiana Pipe Line	90	92	90	92	Standard Oil of Indiana	780	790	762	765
Borne-Scrymser	410	425	410	425	International Petroleum, Ltd.	17½	18	17½	18	Standard Oil of Kansas	575	590	525	540
Buckeye Pipe Line	80	80	80	80	National Transit	30½	30½	30½	30½	Standard Oil of Kentucky	430	450	440	470
Cheesebrough Mfg. Con.	205	220	210	225	New York Transit	170	180	170	180	Standard Oil of Nebraska	440	455	430	440
Cheesebrough Mfg. Con. pf.	105	100	100	105	Northern Pipe Line	99	101	99	101	Standard Oil of New York	384	387	372	376
Continental Oil	108	113	107	113	Ohio Oil	310	315	303	308	Standard Oil of Ohio	425	445	415	440
Cumert Pipe Line	31	33	31	33	Penn.-Mex. Fuel	45	48	47	50	Standard Oil of Ohio pf.	104	107	105	107
Cumberland Pipe Line	150	155	140	150	Prairie Oil & Gas	570	580	550	560	Swan & Finch	60	70	60	70
Eureka Pipe Line	113	117	114	118	Prairie Pipe Line	230	233	221	224	Union Tank Car	113	117	114	118
Galena-Signal Oil	46	48	44	46	Solar Refining	400	420	390	410	Union Tank Car pf.	98	100	96	99
Galena-Signal Oil pf., new	88	92	90	94	Southern Pipe Line	117	121	119	123	Vacuum Oil	347	351	347	350
Galena-Signal Oil pf., old	92	96	92	97	South Penn Oil	272	276	267	272	Washington Oil	30	35	30	35

The Trend of Bond Prices—Average of 40 Listed Issues



Stock Exchange Bond Trading

Week Ended October 30

Total Sales \$68,243,550 Par Value

[illegible]

Stock Exchange Bond Trading—Continued

Range, 1920						Range, 1920						Range, 1920					
High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Net	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Net	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Net
94 1/4	80	10	St. L. I. M. & S. gen. 5s	80	80	30 1/4	21	39	Un. Ry. of S. F. 4s	30 1/4	29	68 1/4	77 1/2	77 1/2	Vict. 4 1/2s, 1922-23, reg. 42	95 1/2	96 16
76	66	37	St. L. I. M. & S. r. 4s	73 1/4	72 1/4	30	20 1/4	46	Un. Trust recta. 30s	30 1/4	29	96 1/4	95 1/4	12	Vict. 4 1/2s, 22-23, reg. 46	96 00	96 00
73	63 1/4	19	St. L. I. M. & S. 4s	70 1/4	71	84 1/4	74	57	Eq. Trust recta. 30s	30 1/4	29						
64	52	337	St. L. & S. F. pr. 4s	62 1/4	61 1/4	97 1/4	79	3	Un. Fuel Gas 6s	80	89						
91 1/4	81	31	St. L. & S. F. pr. 4s	80 1/4	80	98 1/4	97	171	U. S. Rubber 7 1/2s	98 1/4	98						
92 1/4	85	1	St. L. & S. F. pr. 4s	89 1/4	89	100 1/4	97	113	U. S. Rubber 7 1/2s	99	98						
70	50 1/4	288	St. L. & S. F. pr. 4s	68 1/4	67 1/4	90	70 1/4	92	U. S. Rubber 7 1/2s	98 1/4	97 1/4						
60	36 1/4	748 1/2	St. L. & S. F. pr. 4s	65 1/4	65 1/4	93 1/4	79	13	U. S. Rubber 7 1/2s	98 1/4	97 1/4						
67 1/4	40	34	St. L. & S. F. pr. 4s	60 1/4	60 1/4	80	80	2	Utah Fuel 1st 5s	80	80						
71 1/4	60	37	St. L. & S. F. pr. 4s	68 1/4	68 1/4	12 1/4	84 1/4	1	Utah Fuel 1st 5s	80	80						
71 1/4	60	37	St. L. & S. F. pr. 4s	68 1/4	68 1/4	85 1/4	70 1/4	14	Utah Pow. & L. 5s	80 1/4	79 1/4						
60	39 1/4	2	St. L. & S. F. pr. 4s	60	60	28	20	5	V. C. & P. 1st 4 1/2s	28	28						
88 1/4	81 1/4	7	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	84 1/4	85 1/4	95 1/4	90 1/4	6	Va. Car. Ch. 1st 5s	92 1/4	92 1/4						
100 1/4	96 1/4	45	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	103 1/4	103 1/4	76	63	1	Va. Ry. & Power 5s	68	68						
92	86 1/4	26	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	90 1/4	90 1/4	86 1/4	72 1/4	23	Virginian Ry. 5s	85	85						
103 1/4	96 1/4	1	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	102 1/4	102 1/4	91	79	30	WABASH 1st 5s	80 1/4	87 1/4						
64 1/4	55 1/4	21	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	62 1/4	62 1/4	60 1/4	69 1/4	14	Wash. Term. 4s	60 1/4	69 1/4						
77	60	2	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	75 1/4	75 1/4	76	64 1/4	10	West Shore 4s	73 1/4	73 1/4						
60 1/4	55 1/4	2	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	58 1/4	58 1/4	97 1/4	93 1/4	3	Western Electric 5s	94	94						
61	40 1/4	12	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	57 1/4	57 1/4	63 1/4	54 1/4	4	W. N. Y. & P. 1st 5s	63 1/4	63 1/4						
49 1/4	30	27	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	43 1/4	43 1/4	91	81	23	W. N. Y. & P. 1st 5s	80 1/4	80 1/4						
45	32	140	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	39 1/4	39 1/4	86 1/4	76 1/4	24	Western Pacific 5s	85 1/4	85 1/4						
73	61 1/4	70	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	72 1/4	72 1/4	30 1/4	47	42	Western Md. 4s	50 1/4	58 1/4						
106	93 1/4	650	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	103 1/4	103 1/4	81 1/4	70	21	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
94 1/4	73 1/4	493	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	79 1/4	79 1/4	92 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
79 1/4	68 1/4	254	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	77 1/4	77 1/4	92 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
73 1/4	62 1/4	14	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	72 1/4	72 1/4	92 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
90	77	106	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	90 1/4	90 1/4	92 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
65 1/4	50	168	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	63 1/4	61 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
90	71 1/4	2	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	86 1/4	86 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
70 1/4	62	8	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	69 1/4	69 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
60 1/4	50	31	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	62 1/4	62 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
85 1/4	78 1/4	25	S. P. M. & M. con. 4s	82 1/4	82 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
93 1/4	87 1/4	1	Stand. Milling 1st 5s	92 1/4	92 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
80	80	5	Stand. Milling 1st 5s	80	80	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
74 1/4	62 1/4	4	TERA. ST. L. ref. 4s	73 1/4	71 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
86 1/4	75 1/4	7	Tex. & Pac. 1st 5s	82 1/4	82 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
56	50	6	Tenn. Copper cv. 6s	54 1/4	53 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
93	83 1/4	2	Tenn. C. & L. gen. 5s	90 1/4	90 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
54	38	17	Third Av. ref. 4s	52 1/4	50 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
37	19 1/4	380	Third Av. adj. 3s	34 1/4	30 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
84	75	3	Third Av. 1st 5s	78 1/4	77 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
81 1/4	74	2	T. St. L. & W. pr. 4s	81 1/4	81 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
56	42 1/4	21	Tol. St. L. & W. 4s	54 1/4	55 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
92	88	3	Tri-City 5s	91 1/4	91 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
87	86	3	UN. RAGG. P. 5s	86 1/4	86 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
85 1/4	74 1/4	253	Union Pac. 1st 5s	81 1/4	80 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
84	69 1/4	38	Union Pac. 1st ref. 4s	76 1/4	75 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
88	78 1/4	178	Union Pac. 4s	84 1/4	83 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
102 1/4	95	60	Union Pacific 6s	100 1/4	99 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						
76 1/4	63 1/4	35	Un. Ry. Inv. Pitts 5s	70 1/4	69 1/4	90 1/4	83 1/4	12	W. U. Tel. R. E. 4 1/2s	79 1/4	77 1/4						

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BONDS

90	10	Lib. 3 1/2s, 1932-47, reg. 92	88	92.88	90
99	46 1/4	Lib. 3 1/2s, 1932-47, reg. 92	88	92.72	90
90	12	Lib. 1st cv. 4s, 1927-42, 80.00	80	89.30	89
90	22 1/4	Lib. 2d cv. 4s, 1927-42, 80.00	80	88.18	88
90	60 1/4	Lib. 1st cv. 4s, 1927-42, 80.00	80	89.50	89
90	32 1/4	Lib. 2d cv. 4s, 1927-42, 80.00	80	96.00	90
90	64 1/4	Lib. 2d cv. 4s, 1927-42, 80.00	80	88.04	88
90	40 1/4	Lib. 3d cv. 4s, 1928-30, 90.00	90	89.50	89
96	3	Lib. 3d cv. 4s, 1928-30, 90.00	90	90.10	90
90	130 1/4	Lib. 4th cv. 4s, 1933-38, 89.02	88	88.00	88
94	8	Lib. 4th cv. 4s, 1933-38, 89.02	88	88.00	88
		registered	88	87.90	88
90	28 1/4	Vict. 3 1/2s, 1922-23, reg. 44	94	95.04	94

Total sales \$21,230,000

STATE BONDS

NEW YORK CITY BONDS						
1	48, 1950	86 1/4	76 1/4	76 1/4	+ 1 1/4	
2	4 1/2s, 1964	93 1/4	93 1/4	93 1/4	+ 2 1/4	
3	4 1/2s, 1964	93 1/4	92 1/4	92 1/4	+ 1 1/4	
4	4 1/2s, 1963	96 1/4	96 1/4	96 1/4	+ 1 1/4	
5	4 1/2s, May, 1957	97 1/4	97 1/4	97 1/4	+ 1 1/4	
6	4 1/2s, 1965	98 1/4	98 1/4	98 1/4	+ 1 1/4	
7	4 1/2s, Nov., 1957	97 1/4	97 1/4	97 1/4	+ 2 1/4	
8	4 1/2s, 1963	97 1/4	97 1/4	97 1/4	+ 1 1/4	
9	4 1/2s, 1967	97 1/4	97 1/4	97 1/4	+ 1 1/4	
Total sales					\$150,000	
Grand total					\$68,243,550	

Transactions on the New York Curb

WEEK ENDED OCT. 30						Range, 1920						Range, 1920					
Trading by Days						High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Close	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Close
Monday	34,820	70,700	208,930	\$467,000	61,000	33 1/2	29	32,300	Caribbean Synd.	15 1/4	14 1/4	1 1/4	1 1/4	3,000	Ophir Silver M.	25 1/4	25 1/4
Tuesday	35,705	90,115	129,130	1,109,000	78,000	42 1/2	29 1/2	200	Citizens R. T. S.	34 1/4	34 1/4	1 1/4	1 1/4	21,000	Ray Verde Con.	1 1/4	1 1/4
Wednesday	148,140	143,680	249,445	930,000	205,000	25 1/4	4 1/4	8,000	Col. Emerald	6 1/4	5 1/4	1 1/4	1 1/4	7,200	Rex Con	6 1/4	6 1/4
Thursday	43,380	81,960	236,200	2,062,000	30,000	3	10 1/4	10,300	Cushing Pet.	5 1/4	5 1/4	1 1/4	1 1/4	25,500	Roper Group M.	1 1/4	1 1/4
Friday	42,825	73,500	237,430	849,000	95,000	10 1/4	6 1/4	600	Duquesne Oil	2 1/4	2 1/4	1 1/4	1 1/4	2,000	So. Am. G. & P.	5 1/4</	

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Contributions to this list are invited from dealers and brokers of recognized standing. When bids or offers are received for the same security from more than one house the highest bid and the lowest offer are given. No consideration of any kind is accepted for the insertion of these quotations. They are given strictly as news and are as of the Friday before publication, this date being selected as the last full day of the financial week on which more quotations are available than on the half day of Saturday when many brokers are absent from their offices and on which the volume of business is relatively small. Nevertheless, it is to be recognized that changes occurring on Saturday will be reflected at the opening of the market on Monday, so that the quotations given below are subject to alteration. Address, The Open Market, Wall Street Office, The Annalist, 2 Rector Street, N. Y.

Bonds

UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES			
	Bid for	At	By
U. S. 2s, reg., 1930.....	101 1/4	C. F. Childs & Co.	101 1/4
Do coupon, 1930.....	101 1/4	"	"
U. S. 4s, reg., 1925.....	100 3/4	"	"
Do coupon, 1925.....	100 3/4	"	"
U. S. conversion 3s, 1948.....	77	"	"
Pan. Canal 2s, reg., '36-'38.....	101	"	"
Do coupon, 1936-'38.....	101	"	"
Panama 3s, reg., 1961.....	77	"	"
Do coupon.....	77	"	"

Bonds

OTHER FOREIGN, Including Notes			
	Bid for	At	By
Argentine Govt. 5s, 1945.....	63 1/2	Bull & Eldredge.....	64 1/2
Alberta 5 1/2s, Jan., 1939.....	81 1/4	Lynch & McDermott.....	81 1/4
Do 5s, May, 1925.....	90	"	"
Do 6s, June, 1928.....	90	"	"
British Col. 5 1/2s, 1939.....	80	"	"
Do 4 1/2s, Dec., 1925.....	84 1/4	"	"
Belgian Govt. 6s, 1-yr., Jan., '21.....	99 1/2	Bull & Eldredge.....	99 1/2
Do 5s, 3-yr., Jan., 1925.....	91 1/4	Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.....	91 1/4
Do 7 1/2s, June, 1945.....	90 1/2	Bull & Eldredge.....	90 1/2
Calgary 5s, April, 1922.....	92	Lynch & McDermott.....	94 1/4
Do 7s, 1928.....	92 1/4	"	"
French 5s, 1945.....	101 1/4	Bull & Eldredge.....	102
Montreal 4 1/2s, Jan., 1926.....	83	Lynch & McDermott.....	84 1/4
Do 6s, Dec., 1922.....	94 1/4	"	"
Do 6s, May, 1923.....	94 1/4	"	"
New Brunswick 5s, Dec., 1926.....	85	"	"
Norway 6s, 1923.....	95	Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.....	96
Do 5s, 1940.....	101 1/4	"	"
Ontario 5s, June, 1926.....	87	Lynch & McDermott.....	89
Quebec 6s, March, 1925.....	93	"	"
Do 5s, June, 1925.....	88	"	"
Russian Government 5 1/2s, 1921.....	23	Bull & Eldredge.....	26
Do 6 1/2s, 1919.....	26	"	"
Saskatchewan 4s, July, 1923.....	87	Lynch & McDermott.....	89
Do 6s, Feb., 1924.....	83	"	"
Swedish Govt. 6s, 1930.....	83	Bull & Eldredge.....	85 1/4
Switzerland 5 1/2s, Aug., 1929.....	84 1/4	"	"
United Kingdom of Gt. Britain and Ireland 5 1/2s, 1921.....	88 1/4	Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.....	89 1/4
Do 5 1/2s, 1922.....	94 1/4	"	"
Do 5 1/2s, 1923.....	89	Bull & Eldredge.....	89 1/4
Do 5 1/2s, 1937.....	87 1/4	"	"

MUNICIPALS, Etc., Including Notes

Attleboro (Mass.) cpn. 6s, 1923.....	5.25	Estabrook & Co.	5.30
Do 6s, 1924.....	5.30	"	"
Alliance (Ohio) Waterworks 5s, 1921-23.....	5.25	A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.	5.30
Boston (Mass.) 4s, 1924.....	5.25	Estabrook & Co.	5.30
Bryan (Ohio) Waterworks 5 1/2s, 1926-33.....	5.00	A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.	5.00
Bridgeport (Conn.) 5s, 1934.....	5.00	R. M. Grant & Co.	5.00
Brockton (Mass.) cpn. 5s, 1925-25.....	4.50	Estabrook & Co.	4.50
Cleveland Heights (Ohio) School District 6s, 1946.....	5.25	A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.	5.25
Cleveland (Ohio) coupon 6s, Sept., 1925.....	5.30	Estabrook & Co.	5.30
Cincinnati (Ohio) coupon 6s, Aug., 1928.....	5.30	"	"
Comanche County (Texas) Road Dist. 5s, 1921-30.....	5.00	A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.	5.00
Cumberland Co. (N. C.) Rd. and Bridge 6s, 1922.....	5.50	R. M. Grant & Co.	5.50
Dade County (Fla.) 5s, 1925.....	5.00	A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.	5.00
Delaware County (Ohio) redemption 4 1/2s, 1921.....	5.00	Estabrook & Co.	5.00
Dallas (Tex.) coupon 4 1/2s, 1921.....	5.00	R. M. Grant & Co.	5.00
Duluth (Minn.) 5s, 1923.....	5.75	"	"
Des Moines (Ia.) 5s, July, 1931.....	5.35	"	"
Full River (Mass.) 5 1/2s, 1926.....	5.50	"	"
Gallipolis (Ohio) redemption 5s, 1921-44.....	5.50	A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.	5.50
Grayson County (Texas) Road Dist. No. 1 4 1/2s, 1924-1920.....	5.00	"	"
Greenlee Co. (Ariz.) 6s, 1930-20.....	5.75	"	"
Hickory (N. C.) Highway 5s, 1924.....	5.00	A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.	5.00
Holbrook (Mass.) reg. 4s, 1934-35.....	5.50	A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.	5.50
Hunt County (Texas) Road 5s, 1929-48-51.....	5.75	Estabrook & Co.	5.75
Kansas City (Mo.) 4 1/2s, 1930.....	5.25	"	"
Do 4s, 1930.....	5.25	"	"
Little River D. D. (Mo.) cpn. 5 1/2s, 1922.....	5.00	"	"
Little Rock (Ark.) 7s, 1921.....	5.00	"	"
Lynn (Mass.) Water 4s, July 1, '23.....	5.75	"	"
Narragansett (R. I.) cpn. 5s, 1921.....	5.75	"	"
Do 5s, 1924-25.....	5.50	"	"
Mansfield (Mass.) reg. 4s, 1924-26.....	5.00	"	"
Do reg. 4s, 1927-30.....	5.15	"	"
New Bedford (Mass.) reg. 4s, 1928-30.....	5.70	"	"
Newport (R. I.) cpn. 5 1/2s, 1926-30.....	5.37	"	"
Do coupon 5 1/2s, 1925.....	5.50	"	"
New Britain (Conn.) street 4s, 1925.....	5.25	"	"
New Haven (Conn.) school district 4s, 1928-29.....	5.50	"	"
No. Hempstead (N. Y.) Water reg. 4 1/2s, Nov. 1, 1921-30.....	5.25	"	"
New York City bonds:			
Interchangeable 4 1/2s, July, '27.....	95	Bull & Eldredge.....	96 1/4
Do 4 1/2s, June, 1928.....	95	"	"
Do 4 1/2s, March, 1929.....	95	"	"
Do 4 1/2s, Nov., 1927.....	95	"	"
Do 4 1/2s, May, 1927.....	95	"	"
Do 4 1/2s, April, 1926.....	91	"	"
Do 4 1/2s, March, 1924.....	91	"	"
Do 4 1/2s, March, 1922.....	91	"	"
Do 4 1/2s, Sept., 1920.....	91	"	"
Do 4 1/2s, March, '00, op. '30.....	91	"	"
Do 4s, May, 1929.....	85	"	"
Do 4s, Nov., 1929.....	85	"	"
Do 4s, May, 1927.....	85	"	"
Registered 4s, Nov., 1926.....	83	"	"
Do 4s, Nov., 1926.....	83	"	"
Interchangeable 3 1/2s, Nov., 1929.....	77	"	"
Reg. 3 1/2s, Nov., 1929-32, inc.....	5.30	"	"
Do 3 1/2s, Nov., 1940-50, inc.....	5.35	"	"
Do 4 Cou. (Serial) 4 1/2s, June, 1921-30, inc.....	5.50	"	"
Do 4 Cou. (Serial) 4 1/2s, July, 1921-32, inc.....	5.50	"	"
Do 4 Cou. (Serial) 4 1/2s, April, 1921-31, inc.....	5.50	"	"
Portland (Ore.) 5s, 1921-25.....	5.75	Estabrook & Co.	5.75
Port of Tacoma (Wash.) 5s, 1927-53.....	5.50	P. W. Chapman & Co.	5.50
Quincy (Mass.) sewer reg. 4s, June 1, 1921-43.....	5.125	R. M. Grant & Co.	5.125
Richmond (Va.) 6s, 1930.....	5.25	Estabrook & Co.	5.25
Racine (Wis.) coup. 4 1/2s, 1921.....	6.00	"	"
Salem (Mass.) reg. 4s, 1936-39.....	4.50	"	"
Seabright (N. J.) Improvement 6s, April 1, 1926.....	6.00	R. M. Grant & Co.	6.00
Salisbury (N. C.) Improvement 6s, July 1, 1924-34.....	6.00	"	"
Scioto County (Ohio) Flood Emergency 5s, 1934.....	5.50	A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.	5.50
St. Louis City 4s, 1928-29-31.....	90	St. L. & Co., St. L.	92
Do 4 1/2s, 1925.....	90 1/4	Steinberg & Co., St. L.	90 1/4
South Bend (Ind.) 6s, 1925.....	5.40	A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.	5.40
Youngstown (Ohio) coup. 5s, 1921.....	5.25	Estabrook & Co.	5.25
Wyoming (Ohio) Sewer Extension 5s, 1922-45.....	5.50	"	"
Waterbury (Conn.) 4s, 1927.....	5.50	A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.	5.50
Wilkes-Barre (Pa.) 4 1/2s, 1932.....	5.50	"	"
Xenia (Ohio) Water Works 5 1/2s, 1927.....	5.50	A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.	5.50

STATE

New York:			
Canal Imp. 4 1/2s, Jan., 1924.....	103	Canfield & Bro.....	104
Highway Imp. 4 1/2s, Sept., 1923.....	103	"	"
Canal Imp. 4 1/2s, Jan., '25.....	96	Bull & Eldredge.....	98
Highway Imp. 4 1/2s, March, '25.....	96	"	"
Barge Canal T. 4 1/2s, Jan., '25.....	96	"	"
Highway Imp. 4s, March, 1927.....	93	Canfield & Bro.....	103 1/4
Highway Imp. 4s, March, 1928.....	93	"	"
Highway Imp. 4s, March, 1929.....	93	"	"
Highway Imp. 4s, March, 1930.....	93	"	"
Highway Imp. 4s, Sept., 1928.....	92 1/4	Bull & Eldredge.....	93 1/4
Highway Imp. 4s, March, 1928.....	92 1/4	"	"
Canal Imp. 4s, Jan., 1927.....	92 1/4	"	"
Do Imp. 4s, Jan., 1927.....	92 1/4	"	"
Do 4s, July, 1921.....	92 1/4	"	"
Do 4s, Jan., 1921.....	92 1/4	"	"
Do 4s, July, 1920.....	92 1/4	"	"
Barge Canal Ter. 4s, Jan., '26.....	92	"	"
Do 4s, Jan., 1942.....	92	"	"

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Annalist Open Market

PUBLIC UTILITIES			
—Bid for—		—Offered—	
At	By	At	By
Adirondack P. & L. 5s, 1962.	77 Pynchon & Co.	80 Pynchon & Co.	
Alabama Power Co. 1946.	78	79 1/2 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Alabama Tr. & L. 4 1/2 s, 1962.	41 A. F. Ingold & Co.	43 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
Alton Southern Ry. 1939.	65 Redmond & Co.	65 Redmond & Co.	
Alton Granite & St. L. 5s, 1944.	32 Stix & Co., St. L.	40 Stix & Co., St. L.	
Amer. Tel. & Tel. 4s, 1939.	35 Joseph Gilman.	70 Joseph Gilman.	
Amer. P. & L. deb. 6s, 2016.	68 Pynchon & Co.	72 Pynchon & Co.	
Amer. P. & L. 5s, 1921.	91	93 Pynchon & Co.	
Amer. Light & Trac. Co. 1925.	34	56 1/2 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
Asheville Ry. & L. 1st 5s, 42.	77 Pynchon & Co.	82 Pynchon & Co.	
Aug.-Allen Ry. & Elec. 5s, 1935.	23	30 Redmond & Co.	
Bell Tel. Co. of Canada 5s, April 1, 1925.	72 Stone & Webster.	77 Stone & Webster.	
Do 7s, 1925.	89 Joseph Gilman.	81 1/2 Joseph Gilman.	
Belt W. G. & E. 5s, 1937.	82 Lynch & McDermott.	97 Lynch & McDermott.	
Brooklyn Edison 7s, 1930.	94 1/2 Lynch & Co.	95 1/2 Lynch & Co.	
Brazilian Tr. & P. 8s, 1922.	90 Lynch & McDermott.	92 Lynch & McDermott.	
Butte Elec. & P. 1st 5s, 1951.	83 1/2 Lynch & Co.	84 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Burlington Gas & L. 1st 5s, 1955.	65	57 Pynchon & Co.	
Burlington Ry. & L. 1st 5s, 1932.	59	85 A. E. Lewis & Co., L. A.	
Cal. Elec. Generating 1st 5s, 1948.	72	85 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
Cal. G. & E. unifying 5s, 1937.	84	79 1/2 Pynchon & Co.	
Cedar Rapids P. & Mfg. 5s, 1953.	70	80	
Carolina P. & L. 1st 5s, 1938.	75	71 Stone & Webster.	
Cape Breton Elec. & 1952.	84	86 1/2 Stix & Co., St. L.	
Cape Breton & Fair Grounds 4 1/2 s, 22	84	80 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Central Dist. Tel. 1st 5s, 1943.	84	83 Joseph Gilman.	
City Elec. 5s, 1937.	76 1/2	74 1/2 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Ches. & Potomac Tel. of Va. 5s, 43	79	83 Joseph Gilman.	
Colorado Pr. 1st 5s, 1953.	71 1/2	84 Joseph Gilman.	
Commercial Elec. 4s, 2391.	86	84 Pynchon & Co.	
Central States Elec. 5s, 1922.	86	84 1/2 Pynchon & Co.	
Cities Service deb. C.	96	98 H. L. Doherty.	
Central Power & Light 7s, 1921.	83	85 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
Cin. Gas & Elec. 5s, 1933.	87	89 A. B. Leach & Co.	
Cin. Gas & Transp. 5s, 1933.	80	85	
Columbia Gas & Elec. 1st 5s, 1927	80	80	
Do deb. 5s, 1927.	75	79 Stone & Webster.	
Conn. Power 1st 5s, 1953.	74	96 Pynchon & Co.	
Columbus St. Ry. 5s, 1932.	81	86 Stix & Co., St. L.	
Compton Heights 5s, 1923.	82	84 Pynchon & Co.	
Consumers' Power (Mich.) 5s, 36.	82	84 Pynchon & Co.	
Conn. Ry. & L. Co. 1st 4 1/2 s, 1961.	62	65 Redmond & Co.	
Do untamper.	62	65	
Cns. Tel. of Hazleton (Pa.) 5s, 53	82	85 Joseph Gilman.	
Do income 5s, 1933.	20	25 Redmond & Co.	
Cons. Wat. (Utica) 1st 5s, 30.	80	86 Redmond & Co.	
Do deb. 5s, 1930.	75	83 Pynchon & Co.	
Cons. Cities L. P. & T. 1st 5s, 42	75	83 B. H. & F. W. Pelzer.	
Cons. Traction (N. J.) 5s, 1933.	66	85 A. B. Leach & Co.	
Cumberland Co. Pr. & L. 5s, 42	75	85 Pynchon & Co.	
Duquesne Lt. 1st 5s, 1949.	89 1/2	100 Spencer Trask & Co.	
Detroit Edison 7s, 1928.	97	95 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
Denver Gas & Elec. 7s, 1922.	92	41 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Denver City Tramway 5s, 1933.	39	44 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	
East Bay Water 1st 5s, 1946.	83 1/2	78 Stone & Webster.	
East St. Louis & Sub. 5s, 23.	44	91 Redmond & Co.	
Eastern Tex. Elec. 5s, 1942.	74	82 Stone & Webster.	
Economy L. & P. Co. 1st 5s, 56.	84	85 McKimley & Morris.	
El Paso Elec. 5s, 1932.	77	82 Pynchon & Co.	
Empire Gas & Fuel 5s, 1929.	84	69 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
Empire Gas & Fuel 5s, March, 33	80	83	
Federal Light & Traction 5s, 1942.	67	78	
Do 5s, 1922.	75	78	
Do 7s, 1922.	77	70 Stone & Webster.	
Fl. Worth Pr. & L. 5s, 1931.	81	70 Pynchon & Co.	
Galveston Elec. 5s, 1940.	65	70 Stone & Webster.	
Do 5s, 1940.	65	70	
Great Western Power 5s, 1930.	99 1/2	160 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Great West. Tr. & L. 5s, 49.	84	86 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Great West. Pr. 1st 5s, 1946.	77 1/2	78 1/2 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Do 5s, 1925.	85 1/2	86 1/2 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Gr. Ry. & Elec. 1st 5s, 1932.	79	82 Spencer Trask & Co.	
General Gas & Elec. 5s, 1932.	81	82 B. Goldschmidt.	
Harwood Elec. 5s, 1930.	81	84 Redmond & Co.	
Home Tel. & Tel. (Spokane) 1st 5s, 1936.	75	76 1/2 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Houston Elec. 5s, 1925.	85	79 Stone & Webster.	
Indianapolis Gas 1st 5s, 1952.	75	78 Pynchon & Co.	
Idaho Power 1st 5s, 1947.	78	79 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Jersey City, Hob. & Pat. 4s, 1949.	46	51 B. H. & F. W. Pelzer.	
Kansas City H. T. 5s, 1923.	88	59 1/2 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	
Kansas City L. D. Tel. 5s, 1925.	73	78 Joseph Gilman.	
Knoxville Ry. & L. 5s, 1946.	80	83 Pynchon & Co.	
Knoxville Trac. 5s, 1938.	80	83 Pynchon & Co.	
Kinloch Long Distance 5s, 1929.	80	84 Stix & Co., St. L.	
Kinloch Telephone 5s, 1928.	38	90	
Laclede Gas Light 7s, 1929.	94 1/2	96	
Lake Shore Elec. Ry. 1st cons 5s, 1923.	63	63 Pynchon & Co.	
Do gen. 5s, 1923.	45	45	
Laurentide Power 5s, 1946.	78	80 Pynchon & Co.	
Loco. & Mach. Co. of Montreal 4s, 1924.	84	86 Lynch & McDermott.	
Los Angeles Ry. Corp. 1st & ref. 5s, 1940.	59 1/2	62 McDonnell & Co.	
Los Angeles Pacific 1st & ref 5s, 1943.	64 1/2	66 1/2 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Los Angeles Pacific 4s, 1950.	70	72 1/2 A. E. Lewis & Co., L. A.	
Los Angeles Ry. 1st 5s, 1938.	82 1/2	83 1/2 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
Madison River Pr. 1st 5s, 1953.	86 1/2	86 A. H. Bickmore & Co.	
Mich. State Tel. Co. 1st 5s, 1924.	60	60 Pynchon & Co.	
Middle West Utilities 6s, 1925.	60	60	
Memphis St. Ry. 5s, 1945.	71	73 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
Milwaukee El Ry. & L. 5s, 1951.	91	93	
Do 4 1/2 s, 1951.	75	76 Stone & Webster.	
Miss. River Power 1st 5s, 1951.	84	80 Stix & Co., St. L.	
Missouri Elec. 2d 6s, 1921.	84	85 1/2 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Missouri Edison 5s, 1927.	60	71 Lynch & McDermott.	
Montreal Tramway 5s, 1945.	78	78	
Montreal L. H. & P. 4 1/2 s, Jan. 1932.	78	84 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Do (Lachine) 5s, April, 1933.	79 1/2	82 1/2	
Mt. Whitney Pow. & Elec. 1st 6s, 1939.	79 1/2	80 Pynchon & Co.	
Nev.-Cal. Electric 6s, 1946.	77	80 Pynchon & Co.	
Nev.-Cal. Pr. 1st 6s, 1927.	81	84	
Nashville Ry. & L. 1st 5s, 1953.	40	53	
New England Pr. 1st 5s, 1953.	35 1/2	59 Redmond & Co.	
New Orleans Ry. & L. 4 1/2 s, 1935.	82 1/2	82 1/2 Joseph Gilman.	
N. Y. & Westchester Ltg. 4s, 2004.	88	91 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
New England Tel. & Tel. 5s, 1932.	75	80 Stone & Webster.	
Niagara Lockport & Ont. 6s, 58.	61	65 Pynchon & Co.	
Niagara Falls Power 5s, 1922.	75	81	
Northern Texas Elec. 5s, 1940.	75	77	
Nor. & Ports. Trac. 5s, 36.	75	77	
Nor. States Pr. 1st & ref. 5s, 41.	40	40	
Northern Elec. 5s, 39.	67	73 Joseph Gilman.	
Northern Ont. L. & P. 1st 5s, 1931	65	66 1/2 Pynchon & Co.	
Northwestern Tel. Co. 4 1/2 s, 1934.	63	63 Joseph Gilman.	
Nova Scotia Tr. & P. 1st 5s, 46.	96 1/2	97 1/2 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Ohio State Tel. 5s, 1944.	80	81 McDonnell & Co.	
Ontario Pr. 1st 5s, 1943.	83	84 1/2	
Pacific G. & El. 7s, 1925.	85 1/2	87 1/2	
Pacific Light & Power 5s, 1951.	85 1/2	86	
Do 5s, 1942.	85 1/2	86 S. Goldschmidt.	
Do 5s, 1930.	85 1/2	86 Stone & Webster.	
Paterson Railway 1st 5s, 1931.	84	84 Joseph Gilman.	
Peninsula Tel. 1st 6s, 1931, Ser. B.	84	84	
Peninsula Tel. 1st 6s, 1943, Ser. A.	84	84	
Portland Ry. & Light 5s, 1930.	64	64 Redmond & Co.	
Porto Rico Tel. 6s, 1944.	65	65	
Providence Securities 4s.	65 1/2	65 1/2	
Rio de Janeiro Tr. & P. 5s, 1935.	65 1/2	65 1/2 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
San Joaquin L. & Pow. 6s, 1950.	80	80 A. E. Lewis & Co., L. A.	
Do 5s, 1945.	77 1/2	78 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
St. Paul Gas Light 5s, 1944.	78	78 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
St. Louis Transit 5s, 1924.	24	24 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	
St. Louis & Suburban 5s, 1921.	43	43 Stix & Co., St. L.	
Do gen. 5s, 1925.	78	82 Pynchon & Co.	
San Antonio Water Sup. Co. 5s, 33	82	83 Stone & Webster.	
Seattle Elec. 5s, 1920.	79	83 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
Shawinigan W. & P. 5s, 1950.	83	83 1/2 Lynch & McDermott.	
Shawinigan W. & P. 5s, 1934.	80	82 1/2 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
So. Cal. Gas & 1950.	82	80 1/2 Cahn, McCabe & Co., L. A.	
So. Cal. Edison g. m. 5s, 1930.	82 1/2	84 Joseph Gilman.	
Do 1st & ref. 6s, 1944.	88 1/2	76 Redmond & Co.	
South Bend Home Tel. 1st 6s, 32.	70	70 Pynchon & Co.	
Southern N. Eng. Tel. Co. 5s, 48.	70	77 Cahn, McCabe & Co., L. A.	
Superior Water, L. & P. 4s, 31.	70	83 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Syracuse Gas 1st 5s, 1946.	77 1/2	83 Stone & Webster.	
So. Counties Gas 1st 5 1/2 s, 1936.	87 1/2		
Spring Valley Water gen. 4s, 1923.	79		
Tampa (Fla.) Elec. 1st 5s, 1939.	79		

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PUBLIC UTILITIES—Continued

Bid for	By	Offered	By
Wlec. Bond & Share pf.	78 H. F. McConnell & Co.	82 H. F. McConnell & Co.	
Federal Light & Traction	45	48 MacQuoid & Coady.	
Do pf.	45	48	
Gold & Stock Telegraph	30 Joseph Gilman	30 Stone & Webster.	
Galveston-Houston Electric	20 Stone & Webster.	20	
Do pf.	20	20	
Illinois Traction	64 J. Nickerson, Jr.	64	
Do pf.	64	64	
Iowa Ry. & Lt. pf.	77 J. Nickerson, Jr.	82 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Middle West Utilities pf.	26 A. H. Hickmore & Co.	28 A. H. Hickmore & Co.	
Mississippi River Power	11½ Stone & Webster.	13½ Stone & Webster.	
Do pf.	11½	13½	
Michigan State Tel. pf.	54 Joseph Gilman	61 Joseph Gilman.	
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.	85	90 H. F. McConnell & Co.	
Northern States Power	41 MacQuoid & Coady.	44 H. F. McConnell & Co.	
Do pf.	41	44	
North American Tel.	78 Joseph Gilman	81	
Northwestern Tel.	38 H. F. McConnell & Co.	40	
North Texas Elec.	67 Stone & Webster.	70 Stone & Webster.	
North Texas Elec. pf.	75	77	
Ohio State Telephone	15½ A. & J. Frank, Cin.	16 A. & J. Frank, Cin.	
Ohio Traction Co.	12½ E. F. Hutton & Co.	13½ E. F. Hutton & Co.	
Pacific Gas & Elec. 1st pf.	12½ J. Nickerson, Jr.	13½ J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Pacific Lighting Corp.	148	150	
Do pf.	148	150	
Pacific & Atlantic Tel.	10 Joseph Gilman	15 Joseph Gilman.	
Peninsula Tel.	45	45	
Porto Rico	80	87 Joseph Gilman.	
Do pf.	80	87	
Puget Sound Power & Light	16½ Stone & Webster.	18½ Stone & Webster.	
Do pf.	16½	18½	
Republic Ry. & Light	85 MacQuoid & Coady.	89 H. F. McConnell & Co.	
Do pf.	85	89	
San Joaquin L. & P.	6 A. E. Lewis & Co., L. A.	7 A. E. Lewis & Co., L. A.	
Do pf.	6	7	
Southern & Atlantic Tel.	12 Joseph Gilman	19 Joseph Gilman.	
Southern California Edison	85½ J. Nickerson, Jr.	87 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Do pf.	85½	87	
Spring Valley Water Co.	92	93½	
Standard Gas & Electric	16 H. F. McConnell & Co.	17 H. F. McConnell & Co.	
Do pf.	16	17	
Tampa Electric	37 MacQuoid & Coady.	38	
Tenn. Ry. Light & Power	110 Stone & Webster.	114 Stone & Webster.	
Do pf.	110	114	
Texas Power & Light pf.	75 J. Nickerson, Jr.	76 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Tri-City Ry. & Lt. pf.	80	82 E. F. Hutton & Co.	
Utah Power & Light pf.	80 E. F. Hutton & Co.	82 E. F. Hutton & Co.	
United Light & Railways	24 H. F. McConnell & Co.	25 H. F. McConnell & Co.	
Do 1st pf.	24	25	
Western Power	21½ MacQuoid & Coady.	22½	
Do pf.	21½	22½	
Western States Gas & Elec.	16 J. Nickerson, Jr.	63 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Do pf.	16	63	

INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

Amal. Sugar pf.	38 Webb & Co.	100 J. Nickerson, Jr.
Aluminum Mfg. pf.	83 Pynchon & Co.	87 Pynchon & Co.
Amer. Brass	185 J. U. Kirk & Co.	188 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Amer. Candy	35 T. H. Keyes & Co.	6 T. H. Keyes & Co.
Amer. Chic	36 Williamson & Squire.	36 Williamson & Squire.
Do pf.	36	36
Amer. Cyanamid	28 J. U. Kirk & Co.	32 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Do pf.	28	32
Amer. Oilfields pf.	82 A. E. Lewis & Co., L. A.	84 A. E. Lewis & Co., L. A.
Amer. Oilfields	35 J. Nickerson, Jr.	36
Amer. Road Machine	2 R. S. Dodge & Co.	3 R. S. Dodge & Co.
Amer. Radiator 7½ pf.	100 Pynchon & Co.	100 Pynchon & Co.
Amer. Rolling Mills	60½ A. & J. Frank, Cin.	60½ A. & J. Frank, Cin.
Do pf.	60½	60½
Amer. Stove	125 Pynchon & Co.	125 Pynchon & Co.
Amer. Tel. & Cable	47 Joseph Gilman	51 Joseph Gilman.
Amer. Tobacco 8½ scrip.	106 McDonnell & Co.	108 McDonnell & Co.
Amer. Type Founders	38 Webb & Co.	42 Webb & Co.
Do pf.	38	42
Amer. Wholesale pf.	89 Pynchon & Co.	89 Pynchon & Co.
Atlas Powder	137 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	140 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Do pf.	137	140
Atlas Portland Cement pf.	75½ Pynchon & Co.	76½ Pynchon & Co.
Austin, Nichols & Co. 7½ pf.	72	80
Bliss (E. W.)	410	410 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Do pf.	410	410
Borden Co.	91 Williamson & Squire.	92½ A. R. Clark & Co.
Do pf.	91	92½
Babcock & Wilcox	104 T. H. Keyes & Co.	108 T. H. Keyes & Co.
Barnwick-Halke-Collender pf.	19 Pynchon & Co.	19 Pynchon & Co.
Bucyrus	19 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	21½ M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Do pf.	19	21½
Brooklyn City R. R.	3½ J. U. Kirk & Co.	4 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Can. Explosives pf.	70 A. F. Ingold & Co.	72 A. F. Ingold & Co.
Caracas Sugar	150 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	155 Williamson & Squire.
Celluloid	87 Webb & Co.	90 Webb & Co.
Central Aguirre Sugar	87 J. U. Kirk & Co.	87 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Carbon Steel	88	88
Do 1st pf.	88	88
Do 2d pf.	88	88
Central Sugar	19 McClure, Jones & Reed.	20 J. Nickerson, Jr.
Do pf.	19	20
Central Coal & Coke	93 Steinberg & Co., St. Louis.	97 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Do pf.	93	97
Chicago Ry. Equipment	78 J. Nickerson, Jr.	80 J. Nickerson, Jr.
Childe	112 Steinberg & Co., St. Louis.	116 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Do pf.	112	116
Clinchfield Coal	88 Williamson & Squire.	92 Williamson & Squire.
Colts Arms	32 T. H. Keyes & Co.	33 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Commonwealth Edison rights	46 J. U. Kirk & Co.	48
Commercial Union Tel.	1½ McDonnell & Co.	1½ McDonnell & Co.
Columbia Sugar	17 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	18 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Corcoran Victor	6 A. & J. Frank, Cin.	10 A. & J. Frank, Cin.
Consolidated Coal	79 Steinberg & Co., St. Louis.	81 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Cont. Motors pf.	92 Pynchon & Co.	96 Pynchon & Co.
Curtiss Aero pf.	90 J. U. Kirk & Co.	95 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Crocker-Wheeler	90	90
Do pf.	90	90
Dalton Adding Machine	97 A. & J. Frank, Cin.	100 A. & J. Frank, Cin.
D. L. & W. Coal	172 W. C. Orton & Co.	190 Williamson & Squire.
Du Pont Chem. pf.	9	9
Du Pont Powder	205 T. H. Keyes & Co.	215 T. H. Keyes & Co.
Do pf.	205	215
East Bear Ridge Colliery Co.	24½ Brooks & Co., Scranton.	25½ Brooks & Co., Scranton.
E. Coast Fish	3 Kohler, Bremer & Co.	4 Kohler, Bremer & Co.
Do Voting tr. effs.	3	4
East Coast Fish Products pf.	3	4
Eastman Kodak	524 A. F. Ingold & Co.	526 A. F. Ingold & Co.
Eastern Steel	69	69
Do pf.	69	69
Eisenmann Magneto pf.	30 J. U. Kirk & Co.	33 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Empire Steel & Iron	72 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	75 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Do pf.	72	75
Falls Motors	33	33
Falls Motors pf.	100 J. U. Kirk & Co.	103 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Federal Sugar	103 Webb & Co.	107 Webb & Co.
Do pf.	103	107
Federal Adding Machine	1 Kohler, Bremer & Co.	1 Kohler, Bremer & Co.
Do pf.	1	1
Firestone Tire & Rubber	100 T. H. Keyes & Co.	110 T. H. Keyes & Co.
Do 6½ pf.	90	96
Firestone Tire 7½ pf.	30 Pynchon & Co.	35 Pynchon & Co.
Fisk Rubber pf.	49	49
Fulton Iron	60½ Steinberg & Co., St. L.	64½ Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Do pf.	60½	64½
Gen. Amer. Tank Car 1st pf.	80 J. Nickerson, Jr.	86 J. Nickerson, Jr.
General Oil	37 Webb & Co.	40 Webb & Co.
General Baking	135 E. F. Hutton & Co.	137 E. F. Hutton & Co.
General Pet. (Cal.)	145 J. U. Kirk & Co.	146 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Gillette Safety Razor	90 Joseph Gilman	200 A. & J. Frank, Cin.
Gold & Stock Telegraph	188 A. & J. Frank, Cin.	200 A. & J. Frank, Cin.
Globe Wernicke	69 T. H. Keyes & Co.	72 T. H. Keyes & Co.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber	69 J. U. Kirk & Co.	73 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Do pf.	69	73
Godchaux Sugar	45	46
Do pf.	45	46
Green Watch	100 Westheimer & Co., Cin.	102
Great Western Sugar	340 J. U. Kirk & Co.	350 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Do pf.	340	350
Griffin Wheel pf.	86 Pynchon & Co.	92 Pynchon & Co.
Hamilton-Brown Shoe	153½ Steinberg & Co., St. L.	154½ Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Hercules Powder	290 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	294 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Do pf.	290	294
Herschell-Spill	40	40
Do pf.	40	40
Hocking Valley Products, new	7½ Glidden, Davidge & Co.	9 Glidden, Davidge & Co.
Holly Sugar	43 Webb & Co.	43 Webb & Co.
Do pf.	43	43
Hydraulic Steel pf.	77 Pynchon & Co.	82 Pynchon & Co.
Hupp Motors pf.	97	101
Illinois Cent. R. R. leased line	37 A. M. Kidder & Co.	37 A. M. Kidder & Co.
Inter. Shoe	145 Brooks & Co., Scranton.	149 Brooks & Co., Scranton.
Do pf.	145	149

INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS—Continued

Bid for	By	Offered	By
Kirby Lumber	47 W. C. Orton & Co.	49 W. C. Orton & Co.	
Do pf.	47	49	
Kelly-Springfield rights	103½ McDonnell & Co.	103½ McDonnell & Co.	
Lackawanna R. R. Co. (N. J.)	63 A. M. Kidder & Co.	65 Williamson & Squire.	
Libbey Oven Sheet G.	183 A. & J. Frank, Cin.	183 Pynchon & Co.	
Do pf.	183	183	
Lone Star Gas	30½ T. H. Keyes & Co.	31 T. H. Keyes & Co.	
Lough Valley Coal Sales	83 W. C. Orton & Co.	84 W. C. Orton & Co.	
Marquette Iron	4 A. F. Ingold & Co.	4 A. F. Ingold & Co.	
Madras Marble	8 F. T. Stanton & Co.	8 F. T. Stanton & Co.	
Marcon	7	12	
Marconi English	1½	1½	
Marconi pf.	7	7	
Marconi Spanish	1½	1½	
Marcon Canadian	80 Kohler, Bremer & Co.	90 Kohler, Bremer & Co.	
Metropolitan Stores	43 J. U. Kirk & Co.	45	
Do pf.	43	45	
Michigan Sugar	10 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	10 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	
Minnesota Central R. R.	25½ Brooks & Co., Scranton.	25½ Brooks & Co., Scranton.	
Motor Products	40 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	50 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	
Morris & Essex R. R.	63 A. M. Kidder & Co.	67 A. M. Kidder & Co.	
National Candy	109 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	109½ Steinberg & Co., St. L.	
Do 1st pf.	109	109½	
Do 2d pf.	109	109½	
National Sugar Ref.	137 J. U. Kirk & Co.	142 J. U. Kirk & Co.	
New Jersey Zinc	160 Williamson & Squire.	165 Williamson & Squire.	
Do rights	89 McDonnell & Co.	9 McDonnell & Co.	
New Niquero Sugar	23½	23½	
N. Y. & Honduras Rosario	10½ J. M. Leopold & Co.	12 J. M. Leopold & Co.	
New York, Lack. & West. R. R.	82 A. M. Kidder & Co.	88 A. M. Kidder & Co.	
Niles-Bemont-Pond	86 J. U. Kirk & Co.	88 J. U. Kirk & Co.	
O'Gara Coal Co.	20 Brooks & Co., Scranton.	20 Brooks & Co., Scranton.	
Do pf.	20	20	
Packard Motor	82 T. H. Keyes & Co.	83 Pynchon & Co.	
Paragon Ref.	27½ A. & J. Frank, Cin.	27½ A. & J. Frank, Cin.	
Penn. Coal & Coke	39½ Br.	41½ Br.	
Procter & Gamble	112½ A. & J. Frank, Cin.	112½ A. & J. Frank, Cin.	
Porto Rican Am. Tob. scrip.	98 McDonnell & Co.	100 McDonnell & Co.	
Pitts., Beasmer & Lake Erie	22 A. M. Kidder & Co.	25 A. M. Kidder & Co.	
Premier Motor	77½ Westheimer & Co., Cin.	77½ Westheimer & Co., Cin.	
Pure Oil 6½ pf.	40½	40½	
Republic Motor Truck pf.	79 Pynchon & Co.	81 Pynchon & Co.	
Rice-Stix Dry Goods	350 Stix & Co., St. L.	350 Stix & Co., St. L.	
Do 1st pf.	103	103	
Do 2d pf.	103	103	
Royal Baking Powder	110 Williamson & Squire.	113 Williamson & Squire.	
Do pf.	110	113	
St. Louis, Rocky Mtn. & Pac.	37½ Steinberg & Co., St. L.	38½ Steinberg & Co., St. L.	
Safety Car Heating & Lighting	64 Williamson & Squire.	68 Williamson & Squire.	
Santa Cecilia Sugar pf.	35 J. Nickerson, Jr.	43	
Savannah Sugar	68 J. U. Kirk & Co.	72 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	
Seaville Mfg.	340 T. H. Keyes & Co.	370 T. H. Keyes & Co.	
Seranton Lacey	125 Brooks & Co., Scranton.	125 Brooks & Co., Scranton.	
Do deb.	78	84	
Shoe & Tube pf.	82 Pynchon & Co.	85 Pynchon & Co.	
Singer Manufacturing	155 Williamson & Squire.	160 Williamson & Squire.	
Southern Acid & Sulphur	108½ Steinberg & Co., St. L.	108½ Steinberg & Co., St. L.	
Stanwood Rubber	7 Kohler, Bremer & Co.	15½ Kohler, Bremer & Co.	
Templar Motors	7½ M. Lachenbruch & Co.	30 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	
Thomas Iron	34 McDonnell & Co.	36 McDonnell & Co.	
Tobacco Products 8½ scrip.	94	96	
Textile Products Mfg. Co. 8½ pf.	100 Stix & Co., St. Louis.	103 Stix & Co., St. L.	
Thompson (J. R.) pf.	108 Pynchon & Co.	115 Pynchon & Co.	
Union Ferry	40 Williamson & Squire.	45 Williamson & Squire.	
Union Carbide & Carbon	1½ McDonnell & Co.	1½ McDonnell & Co.	
U. S. Mortgage Units	205 Kohler, Bremer & Co.	220 Kohler, Bremer & Co.	
U. S. Metal Cap Seal	1½	2½	
United New Jersey R. R. Canal	205 A. M. Kidder & Co.	210 A. M. Kidder & Co.	
U. S. Lumber	200 Brooks & Co., Scranton.	210 Brooks & Co., Scranton.	
U. S. Playing Card	290 A. & J. Frank, Cin.	280 A. & J. Frank, Cin.	
U. S. Printing & Lithographing	36	38	
Do 1st pf.	89	92½	
Do 2d pf.	150	150	
Do pf.	150	150	
Union Oil (Cal.)	180 E. F. Hutton & Co.	188 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
U. S. Worsted 1st pf.	64 Pynchon & Co.	68 Pynchon & Co.	
Utah-Idaho Sugar	7½ E. F. Hutton & Co.	78 E. F. Hutton & Co.	
Van Baiting	65 Pynchon & Co.	70 Pynchon & Co.	
Ward Baking	60 Webb & Co.	64 J. Nickerson, Jr.	
Do pf.	60	64	
Wagner Elec.	97½ M. Lachenbruch & Co.	98 M. Lachenbruch & Co.	
Western Cartridge	225 Steinberg & Co., St. Louis.	235 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	
West India Sugar pf.	88 Webb & Co.	93 Webb & Co.	
Wayne Coal	3½ J. M. Leopold & Co.	4½ J. M. Leopold & Co.	
White Oil & Gas	4½ Kohler, Bremer & Co.	5½ Kohler, Bremer & Co.	
White Rock Water	58	60	
Wilco 8½ pf.	58 R. S. Dodge & Co.	60 R. S. Dodge & Co.	
Winchester	82 Pynchon & Co.	87 Pynchon & Co.	
Do 1st pf.	82	87	
Do 2d pf.	82	87	
Wire Wheel of America pf.	50 Pynchon & Co.	56 Pynchon & Co.	
Woodward Iron	49 W. C. Orton & Co.	51 W. C. Orton & Co.	
Wyoming Shovel	59 Brooks & Co., Scranton.	59 Brooks & Co., Scranton.	
Do deb.	86	89 Brooks & Co., Scranton.	

Latin America and the Telephone

A survey of telephone and telegraph systems in Cuba, Mexico and the countries of South and Central America shows that there is only one telephone for each 300 of population in all those countries, the lowest ratio being in Haiti, where there are only eighty-two telephone instruments to serve 2,600,000 persons. In the United States, according to the survey made by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, there are thirty-four telephones for each 300 persons, and the telephone mileage is 29,800,000, as compared to 905,587 in the southern countries.

The telegraph statistics show a more favorable comparison with those of this country than do the telephone figures," says the survey. The reason is that the telegraph is used more by a specialized class, mainly for business. The telephone in the Latin-American countries has not come anywhere near being the universal and democratic means of communication that it is in the United States.

The total of 325,403 telephones in all the South and Central American countries, including Cuba and Haiti, should be compared with the 12,000,000 in the United States, which have about the same total population. Argentina leads with 105,205 telephones, or nearly a third of the total. The other countries having more than 10,000 telephones are: Brazil, 67,366; Mexico, 44,211; Cuba, 38,152; Chile, 23,670; and Uruguay, 19,496. Haiti, with a total of 2,600,000 people, has eighty-two telephones.

Uruguay leads the Latin-American countries in telephone density with 1.34 telephones to each hundred persons. The only other countries having as much as one telephone to a hundred of population are Argentina, Cuba and Panama. In the three countries having the highest telephone development, the systems are almost wholly under private ownership.

The total telephone wire mileage is 905,587, compared with 29,800,000 in this country. Considering the fact that the total area of the South and Central American countries is 8,476,000 square miles, compared with the 3,027,000 square miles of the United States, there is only about one-tenth of a mile of wire for every square mile in the Latin countries, while there is nearly ten miles for every square mile here. This means that the telephone network is nearly a hundred times as highly developed here. The extent to which the countries

are served by their systems is indicated by the figures showing the telephone development in the largest city in each country. Havana, Cuba, is the most highly developed, with 5.5 telephones per hundred population. Taking in all of Cuba, however, there is only one telephone per hundred persons. Mexico City has 3.9 per hundred—Mexico as a whole has only .25 telephones per hundred population. These figures show how in the Southern countries the bulk of the systems are in the large cities, while the other areas are hardly served at all. This condition is contrasted with that in the United States. At the same date New York City had 11

Acceptances

Continued from Page 559

dation in the local financial district, and the usual business listlessness on the eve of a Presidential election combined to hold down activity in the market for bankers' acceptances last week. Dealers reported that there was a smaller inquiry, and naturally fewer orders were executed. The result was a piling up of bills in dealers' portfolios such as had not previously been seen in some little time. This was so noticeable that many of the dealers stopped bidding for new paper in the closing days of the week, and for the first time in quite a while bills were offered in the New York market without finding takers.

The slowing down of demand was noticed in all of the usual sources of absorption. Savings banks, which had been buying in fair quantity, were virtually out of the market last week, and the big commercial banks were even more spasmodic in

their purchasing than they had been earlier in the Fall. This commercial bank buying, of course, goes by no rule and follows no precedent, but until last week there had been enough demand from day to day to take care of a good number of bills in the aggregate. When one bank stopped buying usually another came forward and gave its support to the market, and in this way the institutions, as a whole, kept up a constant demand, which, while not especially large, was abundant to take care of the major portion of the offerings.

Out-of-town banks of the smaller cities and the so-called "country banks," which have been the real backbone of the market so far as demand was concerned, were notably absent last week, and this probably was the worst blow of all to the market, for with this demand gone the most persistent and consistent absorptive source was taken away.

A development of the week which should not be overlooked was the accumulation of New York bills in the hands of the dealers. Not in quite some time

had the dealers been able to get such paper into their portfolios, for the demand for bills was almost wholly centred on these names. Now, with the general slackening in the business, the New York names, along with all others, began to pile up, and by the end of the week there was a good volume of the best names in the market in the dealers' hands.

This should supply a groundwork for the market this week, or whenever it may be that the demand will again pick up. With the market demanding New York names and the dealers able to furnish them in good quantity there seems to be no reason why business should not be resumed on an active basis as soon as call money rates ease a little and buying starts up again.

An increase of \$14,983,000 in the amount of bills purchased by the Reserve Bank, as shown in Saturday's statement by that institution, reflects the extreme dullness which obtained throughout the period.

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets

Boston

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
175 Abmeek	55	54 1/2	54 1/2	1/2
145 Alaska G. M. ..	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
40 Allouez	24	23 1/2	23 1/2	1/2
260 Anaconda	51 1/2	49 1/2	50 1/2	1 1/2
360 Arcadian Con. ..	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	0
200 Ariz. Con.	9 1/2	9 1/2	9 1/2	0
12,062 Big Heart	9 1/2	8 1/2	8 1/2	1 1/2
300 Bingham	9 1/2	9 1/2	9 1/2	0
200 Batopilas	68	68	68	0
160 Butte & Balak ..	42	42	42	0
620 Cal. & Ariz.	33 1/2	34	34	1/2
255 Cal. & Hecla	246	252	252	1/2
1,840 Can. Hill	10 1/2	17 1/2	18 1/2	1 1/2
25 Centennial	9 1/2	9 1/2	9 1/2	0
39 Chino	34	33 1/2	33 1/2	1/2
740 Cop. Range	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	0
210 Daly West	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	0
790 Davis Butte	7 1/2	7 1/2	7 1/2	0
515 East Butte	9 1/2	9 1/2	9 1/2	0
820 Franklin	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
60 Hancock	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
800 Helvetic	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
325 Island Creek	53	52	52	1/2
20 Isle Royale	24	24	24	0
265 Kerr Lake	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	0
100 Keweenaw	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
875 Lake Cop.	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
300 La Salle	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
615 Mass. Con.	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
710 Mayflow-O.C.	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	0
10 Michigan	3 1/2	3 1/2	3 1/2	0
136 Mohawk	56	54 1/2	55	1 1/2
668 New Cornelia	18 1/2	17 1/2	17 1/2	1 1/2
110 New River	46	45 1/2	46	1/2
150 New River pf.	94 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	1 1/2
265 Nipissing	8 1/2	8 1/2	8 1/2	0
1,195 North Butte	14 1/2	13 1/2	14 1/2	1 1/2
35 Old Dom.	22 1/2	22 1/2	22 1/2	0
210 Osceola	32	30	30	1 1/2
162 Quincy	41	41	41	0
195 St. Mary's	35 1/2	35	35	1 1/2
3,700 Seneca Cop.	19	17 1/2	19	1 1/2
225 Shannon	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
3,400 South Utah	106	106	106	0
25 Superior Cop.	4	4	4	0
240 Sup. & Boat	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
265 Trinity	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
1,100 Tuolumne	55	54	54	1 1/2
5 U. Cop. Land	52 1/2	54	54	1 1/2
187 U. S. Smelt	52 1/2	54	54	1 1/2
722 U. S. Sm. pf.	44 1/2	43 1/2	43 1/2	1 1/2
250 Utah Copper	58	58	58	0
3,870 Utah Apex	2 1/2	3	3	1 1/2
645 Utah Con.	5 1/2	4	4	1 1/2
4,500 Utah Metals	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
1,230 Victoria	2 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2
300 Winona	35	30	30	1 1/2
97 Wolverine	11 1/2	10	11	1 1/2
300 Wyandotte	25	25	25	0

RAILROADS

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
638 Bost. & Alb.	132	132	132	1/2
503 Bost. Elec.	67 1/2	66 1/2	66 1/2	1 1/2
1 Bost. El. pf.	87	87	87	0
265 Bost. & Me.	63 1/2	63 1/2	63 1/2	0
20 Bost. & Me. pf.	49	48	48	1 1/2
64 Bost. & Prov.	135	135	135	0
12 Chi. Junc. pf.	76 1/2	73	75	1 1/2
45 Maine Cent.	66	63	63	1 1/2
10 Me. Cent.	69	69	69	0
7 North N. H.	82	81	81	1 1/2
438 N.Y. N.H. & H.	33 1/2	32	32 1/2	1 1/2
146 Nor. & Wor.	83	82	82	1 1/2
114 Old Colony	83	81	81	1 1/2
141 Prov. & Wor.	120	120	120	0
35 Rutland pf.	24 1/2	24 1/2	24 1/2	0
647 West End	41 1/2	41	41	1 1/2
191 West End pf.	51	50	50	1 1/2

MISCELLANEOUS

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
94 Am. Ag. Chem.	82	76 1/2	76 1/2	4 1/2
180 Am. C. C.	80 1/2	80 1/2	80 1/2	0
180 Am. Oil & E.	2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2
265 Am. Pneu.	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	0
20 Am. P. S. pf.	10 1/2	10 1/2	10 1/2	0
244 Am. Sugar	104 1/2	104	104	1 1/2
175 Am. Sug. pf.	100	100	100	0
2,611 Am. A. & T.	109 1/2	109	109	1 1/2
10 Am. Wool.	69 1/2	69 1/2	69 1/2	0
154 Am. Wool pf.	95	94	94	1 1/2
148 Amoskeag	77 1/2	76	76	1 1/2
6 Amoskeag pf.	78	78	78	0
150 Art Metal	15	14	14	1 1/2
710 Atlas Tack	23	22 1/2	22 1/2	1 1/2
634 Beacon Choc.	5	5 1/2	5 1/2	1 1/2
2,000 Bost. M. Pet.	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
10 Booth Wash.	6 1/2	6 1/2	6 1/2	0
571 Century Steel	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
704 Eastern Mfg.	29	28	28 1/2	1 1/2
35 Eastern S. S.	20 1/2	20 1/2	20 1/2	0
307 Edison Elec.	161	157	158	1 1/2
100 Elder Corp.	22 1/2	22 1/2	22 1/2	0
30 Gen. Electric	139 1/2	138 1/2	138 1/2	1 1/2
35 Gorton P. F.	13 1/2	13 1/2	13 1/2	0
421 Gray & Davis	14 1/2	14 1/2	14 1/2	0
255 Green T. & D.	38 1/2	38 1/2	38 1/2	0
100 Hendee Mfg.	22	22	22	0
62 Int. P. Com.	26	25	25	1 1/2
62 Int. Pot. Mills	50	50	50	0
28 Int. C. M. pf.	87 1/2	87 1/2	87 1/2	0
423 Int. Products	10	18 1/2	18 1/2	1 1/2
100 Int. M. Truck	40	40	40	0
45 Island Oil	5	5 1/2	5 1/2	1 1/2
475 J. T. Connor	13 1/2	13 1/2	13 1/2	0
460 Libby M. & L.	124 1/2	124 1/2	124 1/2	0
175 Loew's Theat.	11 1/2	11 1/2	11 1/2	0
760 Mass. Gas	85	84	85	1 1/2
145 Mass. Gas pf.	63 1/2	63	63	1 1/2
35 McIlwain pf.	93	92	93	1 1/2
1,715 Mex. Inve.	39	38 1/2	38 1/2	1 1/2
8 Mex. Lino.	130 1/2	128	130 1/2	1 1/2
20 Miss. R. Pow.	11 1/2	11 1/2	11 1/2	0
10 Miss. R. Pow. pf.	52	52	52	0
3,973 Nat. Leather	10	9 1/2	9 1/2	1 1/2
390 Nat. Oil	6 1/2	6 1/2	6 1/2	0
473 N. E. Tel.	100	99 1/2	99 1/2	1 1/2
1,357 Orpheum Cir.	26 1/2	26 1/2	26 1/2	0
332 Pacific Mills	153	150	150	1 1/2
55 Recase But'le	134	134	134	0
179 Root & Van.	24 1/2	24 1/2	24 1/2	0

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
190 Simms Mag.	10 1/2	9 1/2	9 1/2	1 1/2
100 So. Phosphate	20 1/2	20 1/2	20 1/2	0
430 Swift & Co.	100 1/2	105	105 1/2	1 1/2
1,453 Swift Int'l.	20 1/2	20 1/2	20 1/2	0
19 T. G. Plant pf.	89 1/2	86	86	1 1/2
29 Torrington	63	63	63	0
118 United Drug	100 1/2	106	106	1 1/2
61 Un. D. 1st pf.	46	46	46	0
691 United Fruit	21 1/2	21 1/2	21 1/2	0
2,043 Un. Shoe M.	39	38 1/2	39	1 1/2
152 U. Shoe M. pf.	24 1/2	23 1/2	23 1/2	1 1/2
135 Un. Tw. Drill	24 1/2	24 1/2	24 1/2	0
3,190 Ventura Oil	17 1/2	17 1/2	17 1/2	0
90 Waldorf	19	18 1/2	19	1 1/2
10 Walworth Watch	20 1/2	20 1/2	20 1/2	0
15 Walworth Mfg.	77	77	77	0
235 W. worth Mfg.	17	17	17	0
50 Warren Bros.	27	27	27	0
15 W. Bros. lat pf.	30	30	30	0

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
\$1,000 Am. T. & T.	96 1/2	96 1/2	96 1/2	0
2,000 Am. T. & T.	77 1/2	77 1/2	77 1/2	0
1,000 A. G. & W.	75 1/2	75 1/2	75 1/2	0
12,000 Carson T.	100	100	100	0
5,000 Chi. Junc.	78	78	78	0
2,000 K. C. M. & B.	69	69	69	0
40,000 Miss. R. P.	75 1/2	75 1/2	75 1/2	0
4,000 N. E. Tel.	85	85	85	0
4,000 New River	82 1/2	82 1/2	82 1/2	0
1,000 Pond Cr.	86	86	86	0
1,000 Swift & Co.	84 1/2	84 1/2	84 1/2	0
25,000 Seneca Cop.	80	80	80	0
2,000 Seneca Cop.	81	81	81	0
5,000 West. Tel.	80 1/2	80 1/2	80 1/2	0

BONDS

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
\$5,000 Un. Tract.	50	50	50	0

Philadelphia

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
20 Alliance Ins.	20	20	20	0
261 Am. Gas	40	40	40	0
261 Am. Stores	55 1/2	52	52 1/2	1 1/2
1,575 Phila. (J. G.)	62 1/2	58 1/2	58 1/2	4
34 Buff. & S. pf.	50	48 1/2	48 1/2	1 1/2
60 Cambria Iron	18 1/2	18 1/2	18 1/2	0
3,280 E. Star Bat.	122 1/2	115	119 1/2	4 1/2
100 Gen. Asphalt.	58	58	58	0
310 Gen. Amph. pf.	98	97 1/2	97 1/2	1 1/2
110 H. & B. T. pf.	10	9 1/2	9 1/2	1 1/2
225 Ins. of N. A.	30	29 1/2	30	1 1/2
835 Lake Superior	11 1/2	10 1/2	10 1/2	1 1/2
600 Lehigh Nav.	69 1/2	69	69	1 1/2
59 Nor. Central.	67	67	67	0
71 Pa. Salt	68	67 1/2	67 1/2	1 1/2
7 Phila. Co.	33 1/2	33	33	1 1/2
7 Phila. Co. 5% pf.	26 1/2	26 1/2	26 1/2	0
1,019 Phila. Elec.	23 1/2	23	23 1/2	1 1/2
365 Phila. El. pf.	27 1/2	27	27 1/2	1 1/2
350 Phila. Ins.	53 1/2	51 1/2	51 1/2	2 1/2
1,151 Phila. R.	17 1/2	17 1/2	17 1/2	0
29 Phila. Trac.	54 1/2	54	54	1 1/2
825 Tono. Belmont	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
570 Tono. Mining	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	0
1,583 Un. Tract.	31	29 1/2	29 1/2	1 1/2
10 Un. Cos. N. J.	17 1/2	17 1/2	17 1/2	0
7,232 Un. Gas Imp.	37 1/2	37	37	1 1/2
160 U. G. Imp. pf.	50	50	50	0
100 Welshach Co.	46	46	46	0
20 York J. & S. S.	38	38	38	0
21 York Ry. pf.	30	30	30	0

BONDS

Sales	High	Low	Last	Net
\$10,000 El. & P. T.	54 1/2	54 1/2	54 1/2	0
4,000 L. V. ann.	107 1/2	107 1/2	107 1/2	0

Canada's Favorable Trade Balance Shifting Alarmingly

Financiers and Business Men Perturbed at Return This Year to an Adverse Balance After War's Prosperity—On the Right Side of the Ledger Only Nine Times in 52 Years—Increase in Dominion's Foreign Debt an Added Source of Uneasiness, but Savings Are Increasing and Crops Are Good

By W. L. EDMONDS

FINANCIERS and business men in Canada are by no means viewing with equanimity the proportions to which the adverse balance in the country's external trade is swelling. Back in pre-war times an adverse balance in exports as compared with imports was by no means an exception. From 1867 to 1916, a period of forty-nine years, there were only five years in which a favorable balance was experienced, and the aggregate of these balances amounted only to \$44,754,562. During the five years ended 1915 the adverse balance, on the other hand, amounted in the aggregate to \$955,683,654. But while every student of economics realized that the large annual adverse balance would at some time or other have to be corrected, most people consoled themselves with the theory that, as long as money could be freely borrowed in London, and the tide of immigration be maintained at its then average ratio, there was no immediate danger to the country's financial standing.

Although the outbreak of the war in 1914 suddenly both shut off London as a source of supply for funds and brought immigration from Europe almost to a standstill, dire consequences were prevented by the enormous stimulus that the demand for munitions, manufactured goods and agricultural products gave to the export trade, which by 1918 had reached a total of \$1,586,169,792, whereas in 1913 it was but \$377,068,355.

In 1916, the first time in seventeen years, exports surpassed imports, the balance amounting to the substantial sum of \$233,793,479. In 1918 it reached \$577,484,042. This proved to be the high-water mark, for the favorable balance receded to \$300,014,471 during the fiscal year 1919, and to

\$174,959,929 in that ended March 31, 1920. The favorable balance for the five-year period amounted in the aggregate to \$1,612,271,383.

And now the ratio of exports to imports is again reverting to the order that obtained in pre-war days. Up to the end of August, a period of five months in the current fiscal year, the adverse balance in the Dominion's external trade amounted to \$143,500,116, the aggregate value of the imports being \$597,890,603, as compared with \$454,390,487 for exports. For the corresponding five months of 1919 there was, on the other hand, a favorable balance of \$108,194,391. The cause of this pronounced reversal of the balance is to be found in the fact that, while exports decreased by only \$20,058,202, the imports made a gain of \$231,636,305. The increase in the latter is due to the larger quantities of merchandise brought in from the United States and Great Britain, while the decrease in the exports is the result of a decline in the trade with Great Britain, there having been an increase in the shipments to nearly all other countries.

That which makes the present adverse trade balance particularly perturbing is the large increase which has taken place in the foreign indebtedness of the Dominion the last five or six years as a result of its participation in the great war.

Prior to the outbreak of the war the total foreign indebtedness of the country was estimated at about \$3,000,000,000, and the annual interest charges at between \$130,000,000 and \$135,000,000. Since then the public debt alone—that is, the debt incurred by the Federal Government—has risen from \$544,391,369 to \$3,005,812,846 as per official statement of Aug. 31, while the interest charges

now amount, according to a statement made in Parliament by the Minister of Finance in May last, to \$140,000,000 a year, whereas in 1914 they were only \$12,893,505. In the net debt the increase is from \$335,996,850 to \$2,254,483,434.

Just what the total foreign debt of the Dominion is at present—that is, the debt of Federal and provincial Governments, railways, industrial concerns and municipalities—there are no available statistics to determine. That it has materially increased since 1914 is evident from the fact that recent estimates place the annual interest charges at approximately \$200,000,000, of which the greater part is payable in Great Britain. That payable in the United States is estimated at from \$65,000,000 to \$70,000,000.

In the five years ended December, 1919, new securities floated by Federal and provincial Governments, railways, industrial corporations and municipalities amounted in the aggregate to \$2,988,508,643. But as of this total no less than \$2,244,459,302, or slightly more than 75 per cent., was raised within the Dominion, it follows that the great bulk of the interest is payable to the Canadian people and not to creditors abroad. Flotations made in the United States in the five-year period amounted to \$777,127,182, or about 25 per cent. of the total.

While the development of the adverse balance in the external trade of the Dominion is naturally not being viewed with equanimity, it is not, on the other hand, an occasion for alarm. A long and serious period of depression might be such, but no one is anticipating a long and serious period of depression. True a modification in business is at present being experienced. But that it is an ad-

Latest Earnings of the Railroads

Compiled from Monthly Reports of Revenues and Expenses to Interstate Commerce Commission

Month of August, 1920.				Eight Months of Calendar Year, 1920.			
Gross Revenue.	Increase.	Operating Income.	Increase.	NAME OF ROAD.	Mileage.	Gross Revenue.	Increase.
\$1,118,079	\$281,514	\$281,514	\$281,514	Alabama Great Southern.....	313	\$7,364,260	\$674,154
19,802,620	4,219,542	4,219,542	4,219,542	Atchafalaya, Topeka & Santa Fe.....	8,820	137,445,643	28,522,068
5,772,347	1,721,636	1,721,636	1,721,636	Atlantic Coast Line.....	4,880	48,408,882	6,886,571
20,222,080	2,400,613	2,400,613	2,400,613	Baltimore & Ohio.....	5,153	139,081,224	25,179,339
1,652,351	133,014	133,014	133,014	Boston & Maine.....	225	5,183,636	845,706
8,206,354	1,459,852	1,459,852	1,459,852	Boston & Maine.....	225	5,183,636	845,706
1,917,482	540,104	540,104	540,104	Boston & Maine.....	225	5,183,636	845,706
2,193,148	345,911	345,911	345,911	Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh.....	580	12,562,751	3,452,232
5,038,246	823,604	823,604	823,604	Central of Georgia.....	1,924	16,721,920	2,839,900
758,536	230,390	230,390	230,390	Central of New Jersey.....	686	30,912,382	2,148,273
7,615,757	1,032,238	1,032,238	1,032,238	Central New England.....	301	4,295,600	115,724
2,618,421	643,615	643,615	643,615	Chesapeake & Ohio Lines.....	2,520	53,761,378	6,634,476
2,778,704	1,535,951	1,535,951	1,535,951	Chicago & Alton.....	1,050	18,588,141	2,311,469
1,243,878	333,927	333,927	333,927	Chicago & Eastern Illinois.....	1,150	18,588,141	2,311,469
15,332,177	3,595,839	3,595,839	3,595,839	Chicago & North Western.....	8,405	102,273,012	14,664,752
13,835,365	421,108	421,108	421,108	Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	10,629	104,920,356	9,795,197
497,999	84,516	84,516	84,516	Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf.....	461	4,215,819	1,251,239
2,809,728	578,294	578,294	578,294	Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha.....	1,749	20,123,808	2,900,073
2,007,672	810,536	810,536	810,536	Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific.....	338	13,231,729	2,562,502
7,927,822	870,003	870,003	870,003	Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis.....	2,408	35,774,008	10,160,738
1,306,731	175,056	175,056	175,056	Colorado & Southern.....	1,009	9,557,557	880,792
4,314,320	959,437	959,437	959,437	Delaware & Hudson.....	881	26,485,248	3,968,511
7,610,274	1,353,437	1,353,437	1,353,437	Delaware, Lackawanna & Western.....	956	47,812,081	1,050,878
3,703,738	597,985	597,985	597,985	Denver & Rio Grande.....	2,545	32,975,497	3,930,486
1,626,113	596,574	596,574	596,574	Duluth & Iron Range.....	208	6,963,791	1,275,678
2,255,770	1,097,161	1,097,161	1,097,161	Duluth, Missabe & Northern.....	409	12,200,692	1,300,834
1,128,710	127,647	127,647	127,647	El Paso & Southwestern Company.....	1,027	11,350,441	2,402,597
2,129,101	809,064	809,064	809,064	Elgin, Joliet & Eastern.....	835	11,350,441	2,402,597
9,504,121	787,748	787,748	787,748	Elgin, Joliet & Eastern.....	835	11,350,441	2,402,597
841,158	191,757	191,757	191,757	Florida East Coast.....	1,080	64,951,849	6,535,018
2,510,355	1,254,401	1,254,401	1,254,401	Grand Trunk Western.....	764	8,921,872	2,178,188
10,519,795	1,860,775	1,860,775	1,860,775	Great Northern.....	8,175	75,541,016	9,383,065
2,258,044	1,131,435	1,131,435	1,131,435	Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe.....	1,907	16,301,893	3,578,303
1,629,920	290,255	290,255	290,255	Hocking Valley.....	350	9,602,500	2,402,597
32,488,634	2,812,894	2,812,894	2,812,894	Illinois Central.....	4,799	89,914,796	20,879,114
833,308	235,853	235,853	235,853	Indian Harbor Belt.....	129	5,253,545	1,070,712
1,627,655	475,473	475,473	475,473	International & Great Northern.....	1,154	11,465,331	2,383,195
1,612,034	290,232	290,232	290,232	Kansas City Southern.....	779	11,902,048	2,337,051
1,076,066	150,173	150,173	150,173	Lake Erie & Western.....	741	7,175,262	1,026,108
7,088,753	1,051,876	1,051,876	1,051,876	Lehigh Valley.....	1,435	44,665,823	3,572,068
1,932,547	600,728	600,728	600,728	Los Angeles & Salt Lake.....	1,168	10,141,572	2,110,449
11,279,962	1,857,363	1,857,363	1,857,363	Louisville & Nashville.....	1,040	80,007,497	11,350,828
1,862,062	312,067	312,067	312,067	Maine Central.....	1,216	12,792,871	1,543,353
8,301,363	828,586	828,586	828,586	Michigan Central.....	1,892	54,558,815	5,348,237
1,303,998	134,120	134,120	134,120	Minneapolis & St. Louis.....	1,644	10,313,812	1,993,240
10,300,158	1,691,334	1,691,334	1,691,334	Missouri Pacific.....	7,290	73,148,449	14,748,377
1,562,754	215,045	215,045	215,045	Mobile & Ohio.....	1,165	11,756,705	2,031,525
1,941,100	162,925	162,925	162,925	Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis.....	1,247	15,795,340	3,278,237
33,884,287	4,350,103	4,350,103	4,350,103	New York Central.....	6,060	225,830,997	26,307,172
2,692,725	687,463	687,463	687,463	New York, Chicago & St. Louis.....	574	17,453,642	1,813,352
11,856,689	2,492,563	2,492,563	2,492,563	New York, New Haven & Hartford.....	1,981	78,273,498	11,701,676
1,580,323	121,203	121,203	121,203	New York, Ontario & Western.....	589	8,214,450	775,061
6,795,319	135,351	135,351	135,351	Norfolk & Western.....	219	50,723,454	2,048,739
659,338	62,167	62,167	62,167	Norfolk Southern.....	944	5,143,073	1,047,053
9,068,022	544,469	544,469	544,469	Northern Pacific.....	6,655	68,048,442	5,244,929
880,844	156,494	156,494	156,494	Northwestern Pacific.....	536	5,056,236	895,600
4,031,599	425,262	425,262	425,262	Oregon Short Line.....	2,358	28,269,463	4,454,200
2,698,038	205,054	205,054	205,054	Oregon-Wash. R. R. & Nav. Co.....	2,223	21,533,529	3,543,760
955,548	290,870	290,870	290,870	Panhandle & Santa Fe.....	857	5,749,234	1,999,428
3,930,443	535,628	535,628	535,628	Pere Marquette.....	2,298	25,132,796	3,038,465
7,849,098	910,708	910,708	910,708	Philadelphia & Reading.....	1,126	55,773,637	8,848,126
8,476,607	860,981	860,981	860,981	Pittsburgh & Lake Erie.....	924	18,790,682	1,177,749
1,843,433	622,364	622,364	622,364	St. Louis Southwestern.....	1,928	13,344,934	4,964,945
806,246	170,314	170,314	170,314	St. Louis Southwestern.....	1,928	13,344,934	4,964,945
3,619,595	537,913	537,913	537,913	Seaboard.....	807	5,811,182	1,659,323
13,609,929	1,873,785	1,873,785	1,873,785	Southern.....	3,563	31,916,922	4,779,204
880,107	211,668	211,668	211,668	Spokane, Portland & Seattle.....	6,971	98,944,410	16,835,711
3,412,380	191,156	191,156	191,156	Texas & Pacific.....	549	5,723,578	963,120
1,355,281	396,444	396,444	396,444	Toledo & Ohio Central.....	1,946	25,883,069	3,332,300
1,105,850	253,388	253,388	253,388	Toledo, St. Louis & Western.....	503	7,605,031	1,746,755
12,448,429	1,671,735	1,671,735	1,671,735	Union Pacific.....	454	7,177,516	2,208,803
857,626	205,768	205,768	205,768	Union Railroad of Pennsylvania.....	3,614	78,939,786	9,646,377
1,682,737	475,541	475,541	475,541	Virginian.....	523	6,232,915	1,047,402
1,721,947	343,452	343,452	343,452	Western Maryland.....	797	11,608,844	2,261,963
1,087,013	209,970	209,970	209,970	Western Pacific.....	1,011	9,803,088	1,870,879
1,718,968	527,945	527,945	527,945	Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	811	10,440,017	2,159,099
2,890,304	364,740	364,740	364,740	Yazoo & Mississippi Valley.....	1,381	19,630,599	4,091,998

*Deficit or decrease.

justment to normal conditions rather than a precursor of hard times is the general opinion. In the steel and paper and pulp industries the volume of business is actually on the ascending scale, while in practically all descriptions of merchandise stocks are light.

AGRICULTURE IN GOOD SHAPE

The situation in respect to the agricultural industry was never better. Crops this year throughout the Dominion are excellent, and, with live stock, dairy and other products, will yield the farmers of the country a total revenue of at least \$2,000,000,000. A conservative estimate would indicate at least \$3,000,000,000 for the factory products, the value set by the census of two years ago, since when there has been a substantial development in several of the most important industries of the Dominion, to say nothing of the higher prices obtaining. Last year the products of the mines had a value of \$173,000,000, of the fisheries \$60,250,000, and of the lumber mills \$113,251,000. Allowing approximately the same for the current year, it will be seen that the aggregate productive value of these five industries will in all probability exceed the substantial sum of \$5,250,000,000.

A reassuring feature in connection with the financial situation in the Dominion is to be found in the savings deposits of the Canadian people as shown by the official Government returns the total at the end of August amounting to \$2,258,573,606, an increase over the corresponding month of 1915 of \$239,275,961, or 11.35 per cent.

The importance of Canadian trade with the Uni-

ted States is made apparent by the fact that total imports from the United States in August were \$85,864,199 and the exports \$47,629,238. Thus out of a total trade of \$238,085,409 no less than \$133,493,527, or 56 per cent., being with the United States, which supplied practically 70 per cent. of the imports.

A very large proportion of exports to the United States has been in the form of paper, wood pulp and pulp wood, which are absolutely necessary to American publishers, and it is more than probable that one-third of the total value of exports to the United States this year will be in the form of pulp and paper. The rapid increase in this class of exports generally, chiefly to the United States, is one of the most important developments of the trade of this country in recent years. In August pulp and paper exports to all countries were valued at \$18,259,000, of which the United States got \$14,056,000 in addition to pulp wood valued at \$1,695,000. The value of pulp and paper alone to the United States during August was about \$3,500,000 in excess of the average for the preceding four months. These figures show how rapidly this branch of the export trade is increasing in value.

GROWTH OF NEWSPRINT TRADE

This is made doubly manifest by the figures for the last six years. In 1914 the exports of newsprint was 292,578 tons, in 1916 407,701, in 1918 605,093, in 1919 662,427, and for the year ended March 31, 1920, 713,626. In August 70,510 tons were exported, which is at the rate of about 850,000 tons for the year. Large as this is the limits of

expansion have not, by any means, been reached. The extensions now under way assure a production of approximately 1,000,000 tons of newsprint in 1923. The United States now gets 80 per cent. of the pulp, paper and pulp wood exported, and there is good reason for the opinion that she will continue to do so. It is becoming more and more evident that on this market Canadian mills will concentrate. Authorities pretty well agree that, in spite of all that is said about the probability of this country supplying Great Britain's needs for newsprint, that market and the Continent in general will be taken care of by the Scandinavian countries, Finland and Russia. Geographical conditions will determine that. In addition, the rate of exchange prevents the placing of very large amounts of British capital in the Canadian pulp and paper industry; but no such barrier confronts the British in investing in the Scandinavian countries.

This sudden and unexpected American demand for pulp and paper has been a great boon to Canada. Coming at a time when manufacturing industries, which had been stimulated, and, indeed, created by the war, were languishing through the sudden stoppage of orders for munitions, the insistent demand from the south for paper and paper-making materials has helped to fill up what seemed likely to be a serious temporary void in Canada's industrial life. It has also brought into the country when most needed a very large amount of capital, without which the rapid expansion of the industry could not have taken place. So as between the two countries the benefit has been reciprocal.

Credit Deflation a Problem of Values More Than Uses

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tends and profits, but likewise because of savings which had accumulated during the war. The savings of the people were larger than they had ever been, as a result of having denied themselves certain comforts and luxuries in order to buy Liberty bonds. As many of these Liberty bonds had been purchased only by making certain sacrifices, the end of the war seemed to remove the necessity of holding on to these bonds at the expense of further sacrifices. Consequently large numbers of small holders sold their bonds to obtain funds to purchase the clothing and luxuries they had been denying themselves during the war period. This pennied-up purchasing power by its sudden release gave a tremendous stimulus to business activity.

While the banks had succeeded in aiding the Government to an almost unbelievable extent in financing the war, their potential loaning power at the time the armistice was signed was still very large. The reserve ratio of the Federal Reserve banks was at such a point that potential expansion of several billions of dollars was clearly possible. Under such conditions as these optimism was but natural. It is thus not surprising that the banker should have felt secure in granting lines of credit to industries that were obviously in a strong financial condition. If the banker lost his sense of relative values the business man and the public did likewise.

With the price level constantly increasing, a 20

or 30 per cent. margin on a loan seemed ample, even though the goods involved had advanced abnormally high in relation to the abnormally high general price level. While many business men and bankers felt that the price level was unstable, and that sooner or later a considerable recession in prices was inevitable, it was beyond the power of any one to know just when the peak of prices would be reached. As long as public buying continued and the demand for goods remained unsatisfied the banker and the business man felt it their duty to make every effort to have the goods effectively demanded by the public produced.

If the banker misjudged the buying power of the public and thus made loans on the basis of values that proved unstable, the manufacturer and the merchant did likewise to the extent that they now find themselves overstocked with goods that will not move at the prices originally expected. The business community must realize that its interest and those of the banking community are mutual—that they are affected favorably or adversely by the same factors. There is no conceivable condition possible under which an unfavorable condition for the one can be favorable for the other.

No one, unless he is ignorant of the real facts of the situation, would charge the banking community—as some have recently done—with attempting to put into force measures that are inimical to the business interests. Every measure

that the banks have taken has been in the interest of sound business development, for it is under only such conditions that the banks can possibly hope to prosper. Situations similar to the present have occurred in the past and will inevitably occur in the future as improved banking and credit organizations tend to develop to a point where these errors and misunderstandings can be scientifically prevented.

Notwithstanding the futility of hoping to find any magic remedy for our present ills or of expecting that it will take other than a considerable period for conditions to become again normal—if indeed there is in industry any such state—the future industrial outlook for the United States is reassuring. Our yet unrealized natural resources in the soil, the forests and the mines, coupled with our wonderfully developed organizing ability, acquired skill, and native thrift and industry, guarantee for us an enviable position in the trade and commerce of the world.

Our proved productive capacity, our capital accumulation and our large, varied and—on the whole—effective labor force afford, with the above enumerated natural resources, all the requisite forces to take a leading place in the trade of the world, always assuming the capacity to organize and maintain a stable and progressive political and social order.

The McFadden Gold Bill Condemned and Defended

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be found in a moderate increase of reserves, due to importations of gold from Paris and London. The lawful reserves of the Reserve banks on Sept. 3 aggregated \$2,117,957,000, and on Sept. 24 they aggregated \$2,151,594,000, an increase of some \$34,000,000. In the statement of the Mechanics and Metals National Bank of October the following statement is made: "The gold coming from France is helping to increase the base upon which that credit rests." In the ten days ended Sept. 30 approximately \$11,000,000 of gold was imported from France, which indicates what a small amount imported into the country has so great an influence on the money market. Can it be that the normal production of gold in the United States, which in 1915 was \$100,000,000, would not exert a like influence on the money market, or is there some magic difference between that gold which is imported from Europe and that which may be produced in the United States? These small importations of gold ease our money market at the expense of a depreciation in French and British exchange, which reduces their purchasing power in our market.

It is fundamental to the re-establishment of the gold standard as the basis of world intercourse that gold mining should go on at something like

its normal rate. This requires that prospecting, exploration and development shall be carried on continually, and that the industry shall invite investment upon terms fairly competitive with other industries. Gold mining under modern conditions is not an industry into which or from which capital can readily be shifted. It takes a long time to find and develop a good gold mine. It is not a casual industry, which can be suspended and resumed without serious interference with the volume of production. A considerable portion of the output always is obtained on a small margin of profit, and if such operations are suspended and the mines fill with water they are likely to be abandoned permanently. The gold-mining industry, which has so greatly shut down in the last four years, will be completely shut down unless constructive aid is provided without delay, in which event it will take years to develop a normal output of gold at a very much greater expense. To allow the gold mines of the United States to cave in and fill with water entails a waste of developed gold resources, which in a most critical hour of financial need will cause want.

George E. Roberts, who served for fourteen years as Director of the Mint, in a statement of Dec. 20, 1919, made the following comment: "I

fear that a low production of gold and an unfavorable outlook for the industry at a time when credit was being curtailed and prices lowered would have the effect of reviving all the monetary heresies of the past. We want to stand by the gold standard; it is the sheet anchor of enduring prosperity; but the gold standard will require a healthy gold-mining industry to sustain it."

Far from being a danger to the gold standard the enactment of this bill will protect the monetary gold reserve, and will greatly assist in retaining the gold standard during the present period of credit restriction, accompanied by declining prices. The continued depletion of the gold stock by excess exportation and industrial use will force a rapidity in deflation which will seriously impair the public confidence in the nation's finance and currency unless a normal gold output is maintained.

That this situation may be remedied without delay the Congressional consideration of this bill should be expedited. The British gold producer has been aided by the exchange premium. This bill offers a domestic solution for our own gold problem. I trust that this convention of bankers will lend the impetus of their indorsement to this bill, which will protect the position of the United States as a creditor nation.

Dividends Declared and Awaiting Payment

STEAM RAILROADS.				Pe-Pay-Books				Pe-Pay-Books				Pe-Pay-Books			
Company.	Rate.	riod. able.	Books Close.	Company.	Rate.	riod. able.	Books Close.	Company.	Rate.	riod. able.	Books Close.	Company.	Rate.	riod. able.	Books Close.
A. T. & S. F. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	*Oct. 29	Cities Service 1 1/2	Stk	Dec. 1	Nov. 15	Kaufman D. St. 1	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 20	Stover Mfg. &			
Cent. of N. J. 2	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 29	Do pf. & pt. B. 1/2	M	Dec. 1	Nov. 15	Kayser (Julius)				Eng. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 20
Chn. S. & C. pf. \$1.50	Nov.	1	Oct. 22	Cit. S. Bk. Sh. 4 1/2	M	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	1st & 2d pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 20	Superior Steel 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15
Del. & Hudson 2 1/2	Q	Dec. 20	*Nov. 27	Clinchfield Coal 1/2	Q	Nov. 15	Nov. 10	Kelly Spg. Tire 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Do 1st & 2d pf. 2	Q	Nov. 15	Nov. 1
Ga. So. & F. 1st				Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 27	Kelly Spg. Tire 7/8	Stk	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Taylor - Wh. I.			
& 2d pf. 2 1/2	Nov.	8	Oct. 30	Cluett-Peabody 2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 21	Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 15	Nov. 1	& S. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 25
Gl. North. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Sep. 24	Col. Fuel & L. 1/2	Q	Nov. 20	Oct. 30	Kelsey Wire pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 21	Tex. P. & L. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 22
Gl. North. Ore. 2	Q	Dec. 15	Nov. 27	Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 20	Oct. 30	Kress (S.H.) Co. 1	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 20	Tob. Products 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 15	Oct. 29
Ill. Central 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 5	Col. Gas & E. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 15	Oct. 30	Lanc. Mills pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 20	Transatl. Coal 1	M	Nov. 15	Oct. 31
N. Y. Central 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 1	Columbia Grap. 2 1/2	Q	Jan. 1	*Dec. 10	Laurel L. Mills 2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 19	Un. Cig. Stores 10	Stk	Nov. 15	Oct. 29
N. O. T. & M. 1 1/2	Dec.	1	Nov. 20	Columb. Grap. 1-20	Stk	Jan. 1	*Dec. 10	Lee R. & Tire 5/8	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 15	Un. Drug 1st pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15
Norfolk & West. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 18	Nov. 30	Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Jan. 1	*Dec. 10	Lehigh C. & N. 1	Q	Nov. 30	Oct. 30	Un. Drug 2d pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	*Nov. 15
Norfolk & W. pf. 1	Q	Nov. 19	Oct. 30	Col. Graph. F. pf. 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 20	Lig. & M. Tob.				Un. Iron Wks. 6 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 1
Nor. Pacific 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 2	Con. Gas. N. Y. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 15	Nov. 27	A & B. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 15	Un. Oil (Wich-			
Pennsylvania 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 30	*Nov. 1	Conn'w'th Ed. 2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Lima Loco. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 15	Ita. Kan.) pf. 2	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 25
Pere M. pr. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 16	Conn. Mills 1st				Lincoln Mfg. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 19	Union Tank Car			
P. & W. Va. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 30	Oct. 25	pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Lindsay Light 2	Q	Dec. 31	Nov. 30	com. & pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 5
Reading 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 11	Oct. 19	Cons. Cigar 1 1/2	Stk	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 31	Nov. 30	Un. Verde Ext. 5/8	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 5
Reading 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 9	Nov. 23	Cont. Guaranty 2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 27	Loew's, Inc. 5/8	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 16	Un. El. Sec. pf. 3/4	S	Nov. 1	*Oct. 19
				Cont. Motors 2 1/2	Q	Nov. 16	Nov. 7	Loose-Wiles B.				Un. R. Stores 5	Stk	Dec. 15	Dec. 1
				Cont. P. & Bag. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 15	Nov. 8	2d pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 16	U. S. Oil 1 1/2	Stk	Nov. 1	Oct. 20
				Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 15	Nov. 8	Lowell Elec. L. 2 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 15	Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 20
				Cosden & Co. 6 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	*Sep. 30	Ludlow M. As. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 1	U. S. Steel 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 30	Dec. 2
				Cud. Pk. 6 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 21	Ludlow M. As. 1 1/2	Sp	Dec. 1	Nov. 1	Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 20	Nov. 1
				Do 7 1/2 pf. 3 1/2	S	Nov. 1	Oct. 21	Luther Mfg. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 19	Utah Apex Min. 2 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 19
				Dallas P. & L. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 22	Mahoning Inv. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Nov. 24	Vacuum Oil 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 30	Nov. 1
				Deere & Co. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	*Nov. 15	Mahoning Inv. 1 1/2	Ex	Dec. 1	Nov. 24	Van R. 1st pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 17
				Diam. Match 2	Q	Dec. 15	*Nov. 30	Manomet Mills 2 1/2	Q	Nov. 2	Oct. 26	Do 2d pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 17
				Dodge St. Pul-				Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 31	Dec. 22	Ventura Con. 0.			
				ley pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 21	McElwain (W.H.)				Fields 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15
				Dom. Bridge 2	Q	Nov. 15	Oct. 30	& Co. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Va. L. C. & C. 10	Stk	Nov. 1	*Sep. 30
				Dom. Coal pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 12	Do 1st pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Va. Car. Chem. 1	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 15
				Dom. Steel pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Do 2d pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Wamp. Mills 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15
				Dow Chemical 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 15	*Nov. 5	Martin-Parry 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	*Nov. 17	Warwick L. & S. 3	Q	Nov. 15	Oct. 31
				Dow Chemical 1 1/2	Ex	Nov. 15	*Nov. 5	Mass. Cot. Mills 4	Q	Nov. 10	Oct. 14	Way. Pulp & P. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 15
				Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 15	*Nov. 5	Mass. Gas 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Weber & Heilb. 5/8	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 20
				Dow Drug 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 21	Merchants Mfg. 3	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 23	Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 15
				Du P. (E.I.) de				Merrimack Mfg. 2	Q	Dec. 1	Oct. 26	Westmore Mfg. 3	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 28
				Nem. Power 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 20	Merritt Oil 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 15	Oct. 50	Westfield River			
				Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 20	Miami Copper 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 15	*Nov. 1	Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 28
				Du Pont Chem.				Mich. D. Forge 2 1/2	M	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	W. India Sug. F. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 15
				com. & pf. 1 1/2	Nov.	5	Oct. 25	Mich. Stamping 1 1/2	M	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 15
				Durham Hos'y				Midvale Steel 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 15	White (J.G.) &			
				Mills pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 20	Midwest Refin. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Co. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 15
				& 2d pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 15	Dec. 1	Midwest Refin. 1 1/2	Ex	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	White (J.G.) M.			
				East. Kodak 2 1/2	Q	Jan. 1	Nov. 30	Mohawk Min. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 9	Wh. St. No. 1 1	Nov.	1	Oct. 15
				East. Kodak 1 1/2	Ex	Nov. 15	Oct. 30	Moline Plow 1st				Wickw. Spencer			
				East. Kodak 2 1/2	Ex	Jan. 1	Nov. 30	Do 2d pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 17	Steel com. A. 1	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 22
				Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Jan. 1	Nov. 30	Do 2d pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 17	Do 1st pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 22
				Edison Elec. Ill.				Montreal L. H.				Will & Baumer			
				(Boston) 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	& P. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 15	Oct. 31	Co. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15
				Edison Elec. Ill.				Morris (Philip)				W. J. Co. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 1	Nov. 10
				(Brooklyn) 2	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 16	& Co. 1 1/2	Nov.	1	Oct. 15	Yale & T. Mfg. 2 1/2	Q	Nov. 20	Nov. 10
				Eisenmann Mag-				Motor Wheel 2	Nov.	20	Nov. 10	*Holders of record; books do not close.			
				neto pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 20	Mullins Body 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 16	*Payable in Liberty bonds.			
				Eisenlohr (O.) &				Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 16	*Payable in common; 1/2 preferred.			
				Bros. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 15	Nov. 1	Narragan. Mfg. 5	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 21	*Account accumulated dividends.			
				Elec. Sec. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 22	Nash Motors pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 20				
				El. Bd. & S. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 16	Nasha. Mills 2	Q	Nov. 2	*Oct. 26				
				Elgin N. Watch 2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 23	Nasha. Mills 2	Sp	Nov. 2	*Oct. 26				
				Elk Basin Pet. 2 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Nat. Biscuit 1 1/2	Q	Jan. 15	*Dec. 31				
				Emerson Sh. pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 26	Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 30	*Nov. 16				
				Esmond Mills 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 26	Nat. Carbon pf. 2	Q	Nov. 1	*Oct. 21				
				Do pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 26	Nat. Lead pf. 1 1/2	Q	Dec. 15	Nov. 19				
				Emer. Brant pf. 1 1/2	Q	Nov. 1	Oct. 15	Nat. Stl. Roll							

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
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